ZHOU 

Qin, Alex

Alex holds a JSD from the City University of Hong Kong and an LLM from the Northwestern University. He had served as a senior research associate at the City University of Hong Kong and participated in several General Research Fund projects. Alex is skilled at analysing research questions with qualitative and quantitative methods. His JSD thesis empirically examined the diverse contracting practices between commercial banks and retail investors in mainland China. He has presented papers at conferences such as Law & Society Annual Meeting and Asian Law Institute Conference.

Alex is currently Assistant Professor at the Faculty of Law, Macau University of Science and Technology.

Presentations

• ‘Re-evaluating the Information Disclosure Mechanism in the Sale of Bank-issued Wealth Management Products in China’, CBFL Working Paper Presentation, 21 July 2020

Publications

Book Chapter

• Qin Zhou, ‘China: confronting a growing wealth management sector ‘ in Sandra Booysen (ed), Financial Advice and Investor Protection: Comparative Law and Practice (Edward Elgar Publishing 2021) 190

Journal Article

• Qin Zhou, “Crisis-driven Regulation: Evidence from Engineering China’s Banking Wealth Management Market” (2022)  22(1) Journal of Corporate Law Studies  535-569 https://doi.org/10.1080/14735970.2021.1995972
• Qin Zhou, “Re-evaluating the Information Disclosure Mechanism in the Sale of Bank-issued Wealth  Management Products in China” (2021) 51(2) Hong Kong Law Journal, 691-736 (SSCI)
• Qin Zhou and Jing Feng, “What We Do and Do Not Know About Standard Form Contracts? An Empirical Study of Wealth Management Product Contracts in China,” (2021) 16 Asian Journal of  Comparative Law, 124-154.

Conference Papers

• “Suing the Leviathan: An Empirical Analysis of the Litigation Involving Bank-Issued Wealth Management Products in China”, presented at the Asian Law Institute Conference (Singapore) hosted by National University of Singapore Faculty of Law, 11-12 June 2019
• “What We Do and Do Not Know about Standard Form Contracts? An Empirical Analysis of Wealth Management Product Agreements in China”, presented at the Law and Society Annual Meeting (Toronto, Canada) hosted by Law and Society Association,  7-10 June, 2018
• “Innovative Authoritarianism: Central-Provincial Relations and Legislating Open Government Information Regulations in China”, Workshop on Financing and Managing China’s Intergovernmental Relations (Hong Kong) hosted by the Education University of Hong Kong, 14-15 March, 2017

• Banking and Finance Law
• Contract Law
• Law and Society

Research Projects

Re-evaluating the Information Disclosure Mechanism in the Sale of Bank-issued Wealth Management Products in China

Information disclosure is perceived as a cure for information asymmetry. Mandatory information disclosure is expected to reduce information asymmetry and protect consumers from misrepresentation or misunderstanding. Empirical studies, however, show that a majority of consumers do not read the standard form contracts prepared by financial institutions. The ‘no-reading problem’ has been proven to be the main reason for the failure of mandatory information disclosure. This article provides empirical evidence for understanding retail investor behaviour when they agree to standard form contracts for bank-issued wealth management products. Drawing on a survey of 479 respondents, this article finds that the percentage (more than one-fifth) of respondents who read their contracts carefully is higher than the rate reported by previous studies. One possible reason is that risk-averse Chinese retail investors now have easier access to the relevant contracts. The survey results reinforce the arguments that an important reason for the ‘no-reading problem’ is because standard form contracts are generally not designed in a reader-friendly manner. However, the results also indicate that even where retail investors read their contracts, they hold optimistically mistaken beliefs about important terms. Based on the survey findings, this article concludes that the current information disclosure regime needs improvement and suggests some ways to better reduce information asymmetry.

The Evolving Regulations on Bank-issued Wealth Management Products

The state-market relationship has generated heated debate for decades. The success or failure of market performance invariably triggers a discussion on the necessity of government intervention. The reasons for government intervention in markets may also change during economic cycles. This article examines the interactive relationship between the Chinese state and the financial markets. Using the bank-issued wealth management product market in China as a case study, this article examines and comments on the dynamic state-market relationship in China. The state can intervene in markets through market participation, legislation, and/or supervision. The state may rely on one particular measure to intervene in markets or use all three measures depending on the changing market conditions. The development of the bank-issued wealth management product market and its evolving regulation indicate that the Chinese state has shifted its measures of intervention from direct market participation to government oversight of the financial market.