|281. ||JULY 2009 Issue|
|Courting Religion: The Judge between Caesar and God in Asian Courts|
Thio Li-ann  Sing JLS 52 (Jul)
Religion is almost universally guaranteed as a fundamental liberty and human right, although the scope of religious freedom and understandings of religious identity within secular democracies are informed by the specific model of constitutional secularism practiced. States often evidence an ambivalent attitude towards religion, treating it as Law's Other, that is, a competing normative system which has regulative force on social behaviour and influences conceptions of citizenship and affective loyalties. This article examines the interpretive method of two secular Asian courts, which are meant to be bastions of impartiality, in negotiating questions of religious identity and religious freedom. It analyses the judicial weighting and balancing of relevant competing factors and considers the varied understanding of what secularity requires and whether the concerns of religious minorities are adequately safeguarded within secular polities where religion remains an important social force.[Full Text]
|282. ||JULY 2009 Issue|
|The Paradox of Securities Markets Efficiency: Where to Next?|
Razeen Sappideen  Sing JLS 80 (Jul)
This article examines the claim of securities markets efficiency based on the efficient markets hypothesis (EMH), which Fama proclaimed to be a well substantiated truth in 1978. Behavioural theory shows that individuals do not act to maximise their utility as asserted by neoclassical economists, while entrepreneurial theory explains share price movements to be the product of error prone guesswork by market participants. Alongside this, the emergence of the shareholder value concept in the late 1980s advocated by both corporate managers and outsider market makers has undermined the very foundations of share price efficiency. This undermining seems to have been caused by forces exogenous to the firm. Nonetheless, securities markets are highly competitive. This article explains the need for a new theory to explain the inherent paradox.
|283. ||JULY 2009 Issue|
|The Efficacy of Securities Investors' Rights in Singapore|
Alexander F.H. Loke  Sing JLS 109 (Jul)
Despite a steady trickle of enforcement actions taken against market misconduct by the Singapore regulators, no securities class actions have arisen out of these enforcement actions, which have ranged from misleading statements and market manipulation to the failure to comply with on-going disclosure obligations. This article examines whether the paucity of securities class actions might be attributable to the nature of the rights that securities investors possess. In doing so, the analysis reveals answers to an important theoretical question - the extent to which current rights protect the securitiesinvestor's interest in the fair and accurate pricing of securities.
|284. ||JULY 2009 Issue|
|The Financial Assistance Prohibition: Changing Legislative and Judicial Landscape|
Maisie Ooi  Sing JLS 135 (Jul)
This article looks mainly at the recent changes to the law relating to financial assistance in Singapore, but in doing so will also consider the treatment of the same rule in other jurisdictions. It does so with a hope that it will be helpful to the ongoing consideration of its further reform in Singapore and elsewhere.
|285. ||JULY 2009 Issue|
|The Story of "Personal Equities" in Singapore: Thus Far and Beyond|
Kelvin F.K. Low  Sing JLS 161 (Jul)
The story of "Personal Equities" in Singapore is a fascinating one. The first successful claim of a "personal equities" outside the statutory regime in Singapore surfaced some forty years after the introduction of the Torrens system in 1956. Subsequently, the "personal equities exception" was affirmed by one Court of Appeal and rejected by another. Since then, the Singapore courts have proceeded on the basis that there is a finite list of "personal equities" listed in section 46(2) of the Land Titles Act. This article proposes to explore these developments and demonstrate that the "personal equities exception" is in truth not an exception to indefeasibility. As a matter of statutory interpretation, such claims are simply not caught in the first place by the principle of indefeasibility as conferred by section 46(1) of the Land Titles Act. As such, potential "personal equities" claims ought not to be limited by section 46(2) exclusively.
|286. ||JULY 2009 Issue|
|Rogers v. Whitaker Lands on Malaysian Shores- Is There Now a Patient's Right to Know in Malaysia?|
Mathews Thomas  Sing JLS 182 (Jul)
In Foo Fio Na v. Dr. Soo Fook Mun  1 M.L.J. 593 ('Foo Fio Na'), the Federal Court of Malaysia rejected the Bolam test in duty of disclosure of risks cases and endorsed the patient-centered approach in Rogers v. Whitaker (1992) 175 C.L.R. 479 ('Rogers'). This article examines the common law developments in England and Australia as well as recent developments in Malaysia in relation to this duty and argues that the decision in Foo Fio Na falls short of its apparent promise of a patient-centred approach. The author proposes that a more appropriate framework to safeguard patient autonomy in Malaysia is required - one that allows for the convergence of the legal and ethical principles relating to a patient's right to know about material risks and one that recognises this right as an extension of the right to life guaranteed by the Malaysian Federal Constitution.
|287. ||JULY 2009 Issue|
|Legislation and Case Notes: Prenuptial Agreement on Division of Matrimonial Assets Subject to Court Scrutiny|
Leong Wai Kum  Sing JLS 211 (Jul)
The Court of Appeal affirmed the legality of a prenuptial agreement on division of matrimonial assets and held that it is always subject to scrutiny under section 112 of the Women's Charter. This note deals only with these principles.
|288. ||JULY 2009 Issue|
|Legislation and Case Notes: Unilateral Mistake in the English Courts: Reasserting the Traditional Approach|
John Cartwright  Sing JLS 226 (Jul)
In the case of Statoil A.S.A. v. Louis Dreyfus Energy Services L.P., Aikens J. has reasserted the traditional principles of English lawgoverning unilateral mistake. On one level, it is an unexceptional decision. It applies the well-settled law relating to unilateral mistake, based on long-established authority and as a reflection of the approach taken recently by the Court of Appeal to the significance of mistake in contract. On the other hand, the issues raised by the case prompt a re-examination of the approach of English law to unilateral mistake.[Full Text]
|289. ||JULY 2009 Issue|
|Legislation and Case Notes: Confessional Statements by Accomplices and CPC Hearsay: An Unhealthy Mix?|
Chin Tet Yung  Sing JLS 235 (Jul)
The Court of Appeal in Lee Chez Kee (C.A.) handed down a judgment with respect to the law on common intention and hearsay in criminal cases which has already attracted two case notes. This note adds to them by focusing on a particularly thorny issue before the Court, which is the relationship between the two statutory regimes providing for the admissibility of hearsay statements: the Criminal Procedure Code and the Evidence Act, especially section 30. The case is unusual in that the Court rendered dissonant judgments with different outcomes. Choo Han Teck J. concurred with V.K. Rajah J.A.'s analysis that the confessional statements were not admissible, and thought that there was a need for a retrial, given the prejudicial nature of the evidence wrongly admitted. Rajah J.A.'s view was that there was no need for a re-trial as the other evidence was sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused.
|290. ||JULY 2009 Issue|
|Legislation and Case Notes: A Policeman, a Gun, and a Fatal Mistake - Self-Defence in the Tort of Battery|
Margaret Fordham  Sing JLS 243 (Jul)
Justice demands that a person who is being attacked, or who perceives that he is about to be attacked, should have the right to defend himself. For this reason, both civil and criminal law provide that if a person injures or kills another person while defending himself against an actual or anticipated attack he may, in certain circumstances, escape liability for his act. Unfortunately, though - particularly in civil law - the precise parameters of self-defence have always been somewhat woolly. Although all courts deciding cases in which self-defence has been at issue have agreed on the key requirement that the force used by the defendant must be proportionate to the actual or perceived threat, there has been little examination of the scope of the defence. Recently, however, the House of Lords had the opportunity to review and clarify the nature of self-defence in the high-profile case of Ashley, a tort action which arose from the killing of an unarmed suspect by a police officer who mistakenly believed that the suspect posed an imminent threat. The decision in Ashley - that in civil law, self-defence requires the defendant's belief that he is under serious threat to be both honest and reasonable - is of significance throughout the common law world for the many interesting observations it contains on the differences between civil and criminal law. It is, moreover, of particular interest in Singapore, in light of changes to the Penal Code and proposed changes to the Criminal Procedure Code to limit the criminal liability of police officers who kill or injure suspects during anti-terrorist operations.