This paper intends to contribute to the debate concerning the foundation and place of non-compensatory damages as a class of remedy applicable to contract law. It pursues this objective based on the theory that non-compensatory damages serve in modern contract law to incentivise and promote the creation of knowledge-based public goods through contracts. Connected with this argument is the view that the settled acceptance of non-compensatory damages in contracts can help in the deployment of contracts to supplement intellectual property ("IP") law regimes in the creation of knowledge-based public goods. The postulations of this article are, chiefly, as follows: a) contract law remedies must respond to contemporary transactional hazards thrown up by the intangible economy; and, b) contracts can be assets per se when they border on critical social interests.

In BOM v BOK , the Singapore Court of Appeal settled a three-pronged test for unconscionable transactions: (1) plaintiff "infirmity", (2) defendant "exploitation" of plaintiff infirmity, and (3) evidential burden on defendant to show the challenged transaction to be "fair, just and reasonable". This formulation is intended to represent a "middle-ground" doctrine of unconscionability, in the sense that it is broader than the original "narrow doctrine" of unconscionability from such cases as Fry v Lane and Cresswell v Potter in England, but "much narrower" than the "broad doctrine" of unconscionability in such cases as Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio in Australia. The Court rejected for Singapore the so-called "broad doctrine" on the ground that it is too unruly to function as a legal doctrine. To the extent that the Court saw the Amadio formulation as representing the spurned "broad doctrine", this article is an attempt to defend that formulation against a charge of hopeless uncertainty. In significant respects, it is argued, the Court's "middle-ground" doctrine is itself potentially broader than the Amadio-style approach to unconscionability.

Despite more than ten years since Competition Law was first introduced in Singapore, a clear consensus on its underlying objectives remains elusive. In this article, we put forth a normative case for why Singapore's competition authorities should prioritise the promotion of economic welfare, as opposed to a more pluralistic approach that pursues competing objectives of equal standing. We argue that the normative bases for many of the rules in EU Competition Law are inconsistent with Singapore's Competition regime, and that such rules are not suitable for direct importation into Singapore. In particular, we illustrate how an overt reliance on EU case law as persuasive authority has resulted in a "formalistic" approach to Competition Law, where presumptions of law allow competition authorities to infer liability upon proof of certain conduct. Henceforth, we suggest that competition authorities in Singapore should exercise considerable caution in their application of EU law in individual cases.

The High Court almost always sits in its judicial capacity with a single Judge. The exceptions are limited. This article is concerned with the expanded constitution of the High Court in the exercise of its criminal and family court jurisdictions, and with the opinion expressed in some recent cases that the enlarged three-judge panel of the High Court might in these contexts be viewed as a de facto Court of Appeal. Upon a contemplation of the consequences said to result from such occasional expansions of the court, it is suggested in this article that the practice, while defensibly founded on practical necessity, should also lead to consideration of another method that could achieve the same outcome.

This paper examines the development and practical operation of a UK-based law clinic, founded on Therapeutic Jurisprudence ("TJ") principles. It discusses how the authors have sought to infuse TJ's core values, style and techniques, underpinned by humanitarian philosophies, into Clinical Legal Education (and as a starting point for its legal pedagogy). To date, most papers in this area have examined criminal law clinics in the US, but this paper is made unique by its focus upon the linkage between TJ and refugees against the UK contextual backdrop. TJ is becoming an increasingly important skills-base for graduates, particularly for those students who will become the next generation of lawyers/advisors, and must therefore, we argue, be incorporated into global legal education.

Proximity is a necessary condition to found a duty of care in negligence, In this article, I make three arguments. First, I argue that the cases show that proximity as currently defined (physical, causal and circumstantial closeness between the plaintiff and defendant) is an unsatisfactory duty-determining device. Proximity so defined does not explain most of the Singapore duty cases and is unsatisfactory in dealing with psychiatric harm cases. Next, I explore why this is so. It turns out that the current definition is unsatisfactory because it is non-binary, non-basic and fails to accommodate both the personal characteristics of the parties and residual legal principles. Lastly, I propose a new proximity rule and guidelines in implementing this rule. The new proximity rule is: proximity is present if and only if it is reasonable to expect the defendant to take account of the plaintiff's interest in not suffering the damage that he suffered.

This article relies on structural arguments derived from the criminal breach of trust provisions of the Penal Code , comparisons with the Larceny Acts and common law offences such as misconduct in public office and conspiracy to defraud, as well as the principle of equitable construction, to reach conclusions on the meaning of two important modalities of entrustment. These are entrustment "in such capacity [as servant]" and "in his capacity of a public servant" which are the bases for greater punishment under section 408 and section 409 respectively. The conclusions on the public servant modality are at variance with judicial interpretations of the Indian courts.

This article interrogates the nature and workings of relational constitutionalism in the multi-religious secular polity of Singapore, focusing on the project of maintaining 'religious harmony'. While managing inter-group conflict within rifted polities is a global problem, Singapore may have evolved some unique or unusual approaches in this project. Relational constitutionalism as a method of managing religious harmony brings with it a broader vocabulary of purpose beyond rights in speaking of duties, trust, solidarity, a conciliatory rehabilitative ethos, in service of sustainable relationships. This involves the executive prescribing values through non-binding soft constitutional norms, against the constitutional framework. With a view to pluralising the idea of constitutionalism, the article examines the norms, actors and processes deployed to resolve various 'disharmony crises'. It argues that a public ritual aimed at pacification and promoting solidarity has evolved, and reflects on how constitutions as 'living institutions' manage divided societies.

This article analyses intermediate rights lying between contract and property described by Merrill and Smith and the disclosure and protective strategies they suggest the law has adopted to deal with them. It finds their views confirmed by recent developments in the Singapore law of trusts and secured transactions. For the former, the nascent recognition that a beneficial interest is "a right against a right" has given it the flexibility to deal with both family and commercial trusts by weakening the property-based beneficiary principle and recognizing the separate entity of the trust fund. In the latter, Singapore courts are characterizing more unusual forms of security as a registrable floating charge that is not seen as a proprietary interest. The move towards more function as opposed to form here may reflect a continental drift away from English law towards American law as Singapore adapts to Chapter 11 type provisions introduced in May 2017 into its corporate restructuring legislation.

This case note discusses the Singapore High Court case of UKM , in which an order was granted to a gay man to adopt his biological son conceived through a gestational surrogacy arrangement in the United States. In particular, the High Court's assessment of the welfare of the child and of public policy, in light of two factors—the prohibition of male homosexual acts in section 377A of the Penal Code and the de facto curtailment of domestic surrogacy by Singapore's restrictive rules relating to the use of assisted reproduction technology services—will be examined.