Description

In large conglomerates in Korea controlled by family members (a.k.a. chaebols), a critical issue is how corporate and managerial control can be passed to the next generation within the family. High inheritance taxes in Korea make the problem more acute. Various measures have been used to increase the shareholding ratio of the sons and daughters in such companies – issuing undervalued stock, self-dealing, “funneling” of business, forming a holding company etc. Often these measures have harmed non-controlling shareholders and have been challenged judicially, but the Korean court has generally stuck to black letter rules which were easily circumvented. Such passivism of the Korean court led to many statutory amendment proposals in the legislature. However, the primary impetus for such proposals for politicians has been to curry favor with the electorate. A few case studies involving management succession will illustrate why corporate law issues became so political in Korea and show the limits of such politicization.

About The Speaker

Kyung-Hoon Chun is an Associate Professor at Seoul National University (SNU) School of Law, where he teaches corporate law, commercial transactions, M&A, and other related subjects. Before joining the SNU faculty in 2010, he practiced law at Kim & Chang in Seoul, Korea, as an associate and a partner (2000–2010). He studied at Seoul National University (LLB, 1995; Master in Law, 1998; PhD in Law, 2012), Judicial Research and Training Institute of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Korea (1997) and the Duke University School of Law (LLM, 2005). Since 2010 he has published more than 30 academic articles and book chapters and co-authored several textbooks and commentaries in Korean and English on contemporary issues of corporate governance, M&A, capital markets, and corporate finance.