The Court of Appeal in Syed Suhail v AG (2020) recently clarified in 2020 that the 'intentional and arbitrary discrimination test' was an example of how article 12(1), the equality guarantee, could be breached in relation to executive action, but was not itself the threshold test for breach, as it was considered not to accord sufficient protection where fundamental liberties are concerned. A two-limb approach was articulated, to assess the permissibility of differential treatment which first asked whether A and B were similarly situated and if so, whether legitimate reasons exist to justify this. It was underscored that the constitutional test in this respect not be conflated with ordinary administrative law grounds of challenge, such as relevancy or rationality review. This article focuses on two key questions: firstly, whether a distinctively constitutionally based ground for challenging executive action which contravenes article 12(1) has been developed and if not, whether traditional judicial review principles, understood as importing variable degrees of scrutiny depending on the nature of the power and gravity of interest implicated, may provide the degree of 'searching scrutiny' required for fundamental rights cases. Secondly, it explores the idea of 'legitimate legal expectations' generated by article 12(1), introduced by the court, as distinct from substantive legitimate expectations. It draws on developments in English public law, such as the principle of consistency and 'most anxious scrutiny' where rights are concerned, and reflects on how these ideas might add to the normative storehouse of public law governance in Singapore.