Description

In its inception, the EU Banking Union was conceived to centralise the supervision of credit institutions along the mandates of the ECB. However, the intricate articulation of competences between different actors e.g., Commission, Council, ESAs and NCAs has resulted in opaque interactions and unbalanced intervention measures. The recent banking failures in the Eurozone (i.e., Italy, Spain, Greece) have revealed the activism of the ECB and SRB while, at the same time, have shown the relegated position of the EBA. The close relationship between ECB and domestic supervisors in managing banking crises has determined the transfer of enforcement powers to NCAs, which have effectively replaced the functions of the EBA in relation to funding procedures and assessment methods for the viability of financial institutions. This paper argues that the EU bank resolution regime should be reconfigured to rebalance the roles of the ECB and EBA in facilitating the convergence between national authorities and SRB in line with the institutional mandates of the ESAs. On this view, the EBA should resume its authoritative position and technical contribution to resolution matters as defined in the Single Rulebook.

About the Speakers

Dr Andreas Kokkinis joined the University of Birmingham in September 2020 as a Senior Lecturer. Prior to that he was Associate Professor at Warwick Law School which he joined in 2013, and also taught at UCL, the University of Kent and Buckingham University. He holds a PhD from University College London (2014), an LLM from the London School of Economics (2009) and an LLB from the National University of Athens (2008). He qualified as an advocate in Greece in 2011. He has published widely in the areas of corporate governance, bank corporate governance and financial regulation, and engages regularly with policy makers and the media. He is a member of the Editorial Board of the Law and Economics Yearly Review. His monograph, Corporate Law and Financial Instability (Routledge, 2017) critiques the corporate law framework for UK banks from a prudential regulatory perspective. More recently, he has published articles critiquing the bonus cap on bank managers’ variable remuneration, proposing a flexible model for employee participation in corporate governance, and identifying the strategies through which senior management and shareholder incentives undermine regulatory objectives on NPL disclosure.

Dr Andrea Miglionico is a Lecturer in Banking and Finance Law at Reading University. He obtained his PhD in law at Queen Mary, University of London and his LLM Master of Laws in Banking Law and Financial Regulation at the London School of Economics and Political Science. Dr Miglionico primarily carries out research in the areas of Banking and Finance Law, Regulation of Financial Markets, Law and Economics. Much of his research work also focuses on non-performing loans, banking resolution and RegTech on banking compliance. Having published several journal articles and being involved in the analysis of several cases of banks in distress, Dr Miglionico’s research assesses the restructuring mechanism for failing banks, mergers and acquisitions of banks and bank customer relationships.