![\"CLTBL260826](\"https:\/\/law.nus.edu.sg\/clt\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/7\/2026\/06\/CLTBL260826-1.png\" "\\"CLTBL260826")
\n\t<\/figure>\n![\"jeremy](\"https:\/\/law.nus.edu.sg\/clt\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/7\/2026\/08\/jeremy-horder.png\" "\\"jeremy")
\n\t<\/figure>\n\n\t\t\tThe Singapore Symposium in Legal Theory AY2026 “The Strict and Vicarious Liability of Companies” by Professor Jeremy Horder, London School of Economics\t<\/h3>\n\tThe history of criminal law scholarship is largely the history of the struggle to develop a more principled (and humane) approach to the criminalization of individuals; but in course of that struggle, the meaning and significance
\nof key criminal concepts, as well as the understanding of what is historically and morally significant about the criminal law, has come to be understood as almost wholly in individualized terms. In that regard, a larger project I have in mind will involve an argument that membership of the EU between 1972 and 2020 had a profound and far-reaching effect on criminalization in the UK that had gone largely unnoticed, because it affected mainly (small) companies, even though it had very real implications for the individuals running those companies.\n\n\t\t\n\t\t\tMore >\u00a0\t\t<\/a>\n\t<\/h6>\n\n\t\t\tThe Singapore Symposium in Legal Theory AY2026 Roundtable “Platforms for Political Disinformation: Principled Criminal Liability for Posting and Hosting” by Professor Jeremy Horder, London School of Economics and Asst Prof Benny Tan, National University of Singapore\t<\/h3>\n\t
It is a well-understood feature of an ethically and politically sound criminal law that any criminalisation is capable of justification not (or not merely) in terms of wrongfulness but in terms of the harm principle. That is as true when the focus of criminalisation is speech as when the focus is action. Equally well-understood is the proposition that, even when criminalisation of conduct is capable of justification in terms of the harm principle, it may nonetheless be wrong to criminalise. That may be true if, for example, there are strong countervailing public policy considerations, or there are adequate alternative (non-criminal) ways of dealing with the conduct in question.<\/p>\n
\n\t\t\n\t\t\tMore >\u00a0\t\t<\/a>\n\t<\/h6>\n\n\t\t\t\t![\"jeremy](\"https:\/\/law.nus.edu.sg\/clt\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/7\/2026\/08\/jeremy-horder-roundtable.png\" "\\"jeremy")
\n\t<\/figure>\n\n\t\t\t\t![\"\"](\"https:\/\/law.nus.edu.sg\/clt\/wp-content\/plugins\/bb-plugin\/img\/pixel.png\")
\n\t<\/figure>\n\n\t\t\t\t![\"thomas](\"https:\/\/law.nus.edu.sg\/clt\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/7\/2026\/08\/thomas-adams.png\" "\\"thomas")
\n\t<\/figure>\n\n\t\t\tThe Singapore Symposium in Legal Theory AY2026 “Two Claims About the Nature of Constitutional Law” by Dr Thomas Adams, University of Oxford\t<\/h3>\n\t
Legal theorists have long been interested in the question of constitutional interpretation, but there is very little philosophical work on the nature of constitutional law. For example, what is its subject matter? What identifies a norm as a norm of constitutional law? Drawing on the work of the late John Gardner, I defend two claims. First, that constitutional law has as its object bodies whose authority is, in a sense I go on to describe and defend, fundamental. Second, that the function of constitutional law is to regulate the exercise of power by such bodies.<\/p>\n
\n\t\t\n\t\t\tMore >\u00a0\t\t<\/a>\n\t<\/h6>\n\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tVIEW ALL NEWS\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/a>\n\n\t\t\tEvents\t<\/h2>\n\t07<\/h6><\/span>Sep<\/h6><\/span><\/div>The Singapore Symposium in Legal Theory AY2026 \"The Strict and Vicarious Liability of Companies\" by Professor Jeremy Horder, London School of Economics<\/h5><\/div>CLT Meeting Room, Elm Level 2
\r\nNUS Law (UTown)<\/div><\/div><\/div><\/a><\/div><\/div><\/div>08<\/h6><\/span>Sep<\/h6><\/span><\/div>The Singapore Symposium in Legal Theory Roundtable \"Platforms and Political Disinformation: Principled Criminal Liability for Posting and Hosting\" by Professor Jeremy Horder, London School of Economics<\/h5><\/div>
\n\t\t\tThe Singapore Symposium in Legal Theory AY2026 Roundtable “Platforms for Political Disinformation: Principled Criminal Liability for Posting and Hosting” by Professor Jeremy Horder, London School of Economics and Asst Prof Benny Tan, National University of Singapore\t<\/h3>\n\t
It is a well-understood feature of an ethically and politically sound criminal law that any criminalisation is capable of justification not (or not merely) in terms of wrongfulness but in terms of the harm principle. That is as true when the focus of criminalisation is speech as when the focus is action. Equally well-understood is the proposition that, even when criminalisation of conduct is capable of justification in terms of the harm principle, it may nonetheless be wrong to criminalise. That may be true if, for example, there are strong countervailing public policy considerations, or there are adequate alternative (non-criminal) ways of dealing with the conduct in question.<\/p>\n
\n\t\t\n\t\t\tMore >\u00a0\t\t<\/a>\n\t<\/h6>\n\n\t\t\t\t\n\t<\/figure>\n\n\t\t\t\t\n\t<\/figure>\n\n\t\t\t\t\n\t<\/figure>\n\n\t\t\tThe Singapore Symposium in Legal Theory AY2026 “Two Claims About the Nature of Constitutional Law” by Dr Thomas Adams, University of Oxford\t<\/h3>\n\t
Legal theorists have long been interested in the question of constitutional interpretation, but there is very little philosophical work on the nature of constitutional law. For example, what is its subject matter? What identifies a norm as a norm of constitutional law? Drawing on the work of the late John Gardner, I defend two claims. First, that constitutional law has as its object bodies whose authority is, in a sense I go on to describe and defend, fundamental. Second, that the function of constitutional law is to regulate the exercise of power by such bodies.<\/p>\n
\n\t\t\n\t\t\tMore >\u00a0\t\t<\/a>\n\t<\/h6>\n\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tVIEW ALL NEWS\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/a>\n\n\t\t\tEvents\t<\/h2>\n\t07<\/h6><\/span>Sep<\/h6><\/span><\/div>The Singapore Symposium in Legal Theory AY2026 \"The Strict and Vicarious Liability of Companies\" by Professor Jeremy Horder, London School of Economics<\/h5><\/div>CLT Meeting Room, Elm Level 2
\r\nNUS Law (UTown)<\/div><\/div><\/div><\/a><\/div><\/div><\/div>08<\/h6><\/span>Sep<\/h6><\/span><\/div>The Singapore Symposium in Legal Theory Roundtable \"Platforms and Political Disinformation: Principled Criminal Liability for Posting and Hosting\" by Professor Jeremy Horder, London School of Economics<\/h5><\/div>
\n\t<\/figure>\n\n\t<\/figure>\n\n\t<\/figure>\n\n\t\t\tThe Singapore Symposium in Legal Theory AY2026 “Two Claims About the Nature of Constitutional Law” by Dr Thomas Adams, University of Oxford\t<\/h3>\n\t
Legal theorists have long been interested in the question of constitutional interpretation, but there is very little philosophical work on the nature of constitutional law. For example, what is its subject matter? What identifies a norm as a norm of constitutional law? Drawing on the work of the late John Gardner, I defend two claims. First, that constitutional law has as its object bodies whose authority is, in a sense I go on to describe and defend, fundamental. Second, that the function of constitutional law is to regulate the exercise of power by such bodies.<\/p>\n
\n\t\t\n\t\t\tMore >\u00a0\t\t<\/a>\n\t<\/h6>\n\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tVIEW ALL NEWS\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/a>\n\n\t\t\tEvents\t<\/h2>\n\t07<\/h6><\/span>Sep<\/h6><\/span><\/div>The Singapore Symposium in Legal Theory AY2026 \"The Strict and Vicarious Liability of Companies\" by Professor Jeremy Horder, London School of Economics<\/h5><\/div>CLT Meeting Room, Elm Level 2
\r\nNUS Law (UTown)<\/div><\/div><\/div><\/a><\/div><\/div><\/div>08<\/h6><\/span>Sep<\/h6><\/span><\/div>The Singapore Symposium in Legal Theory Roundtable \"Platforms and Political Disinformation: Principled Criminal Liability for Posting and Hosting\" by Professor Jeremy Horder, London School of Economics<\/h5><\/div>
07<\/h6><\/span>Sep<\/h6><\/span><\/div>The Singapore Symposium in Legal Theory AY2026 \"The Strict and Vicarious Liability of Companies\" by Professor Jeremy Horder, London School of Economics<\/h5><\/div>CLT Meeting Room, Elm Level 2
\r\nNUS Law (UTown)<\/div><\/div><\/div><\/a><\/div><\/div><\/div>08<\/h6><\/span>Sep<\/h6><\/span><\/div>The Singapore Symposium in Legal Theory Roundtable \"Platforms and Political Disinformation: Principled Criminal Liability for Posting and Hosting\" by Professor Jeremy Horder, London School of Economics<\/h5><\/div>
The Singapore Symposium in Legal Theory AY2026 \"The Strict and Vicarious Liability of Companies\" by Professor Jeremy Horder, London School of Economics<\/h5><\/div>CLT Meeting Room, Elm Level 2
\r\nNUS Law (UTown)<\/div><\/div><\/div><\/a><\/div><\/div><\/div>08<\/h6><\/span>Sep<\/h6><\/span><\/div>The Singapore Symposium in Legal Theory Roundtable \"Platforms and Political Disinformation: Principled Criminal Liability for Posting and Hosting\" by Professor Jeremy Horder, London School of Economics<\/h5><\/div>
\r\nNUS Law (UTown)<\/div>