It is recognised here that normative systems do not confer the position of not being targeted by an agent without power, which then implies that nobody can properly claim, from the internal perspective, to be the holder of an immunity. In its Hohfeldian meaning, the word “immunity” is just a mere linguistic resource used to describe some consequences coming from the absence of power. Since there is no normative way to confer an immunity, namely because a “norm of incompetence” is not a norm, speaking about an immunity as a legal position is to confuse norms with norm propositions. And once an immunity is seen as a mere deontic nothingness, there is no possible use of the word beyond the description of such a normative absence.

This article explores the relationship between descriptive and normative work in general legal theory by focusing on the possibility of describing contingent evaluations, as contrasted with a theoretical commitment to such an evaluation. This gives rise to a crucial distinction between analytical- descriptive and aspirational-normative theoretical work. Part I traces different levels of theoretical analysis, and the recognition of different theoretical roles in tackling normative subject matter. Part II introduces a triple-level analytical scheme developed to expand the Hohfeldian analysis of legal rights. This additional analytical resource is then utilised in working through different levels of the analysis of legal rights, and to reveal some points of overlap with the different levels of analysis of law’s normativity found in Part I. This broader understanding is then related to the different theoretical roles identified in Part I, so as to produce a classification of theoretical approaches to rights, with the aim of revealing where intelligible discourse between them is possible.