Assuming that the vocabulary of the so-called “legal positions” is, under certain circumstances, interchangeable with the normative vocabulary, this work reformulates the question of whether legal positions exist as the question of whether they are ontologically reducible to (dismissible and replaceable by) legal norms. Since there is no doubt that the so-called “legal positions” are part and parcel of the reality that is assumed as existent in specialized legal discourses, the question raised by this work is situated at the level of meta-legal theory. In Parts II and III two different answers to this question are reconstructed: the affirmative answer that seems to be dominant in legal theory, and the negative answer elaborated by Ross. In Part IV both answers previously reconstructed are translated into the language of reduction, where the question of whether legal positions exist is reformulated again, this time as the question of whether legal theory must consider them to exist or not. Building on the distinction between different types of reduction, the ultimate goal is to distil, refine or shape the dominant discourse of legal theory according to which legal positions must be accepted as existent.

It is recognised here that normative systems do not confer the position of not being targeted by an agent without power, which then implies that nobody can properly claim, from the internal perspective, to be the holder of an immunity. In its Hohfeldian meaning, the word “immunity” is just a mere linguistic resource used to describe some consequences coming from the absence of power. Since there is no normative way to confer an immunity, namely because a “norm of incompetence” is not a norm, speaking about an immunity as a legal position is to confuse norms with norm propositions. And once an immunity is seen as a mere deontic nothingness, there is no possible use of the word beyond the description of such a normative absence.

This article explores the relationship between descriptive and normative work in general legal theory by focusing on the possibility of describing contingent evaluations, as contrasted with a theoretical commitment to such an evaluation. This gives rise to a crucial distinction between analytical- descriptive and aspirational-normative theoretical work. Part I traces different levels of theoretical analysis, and the recognition of different theoretical roles in tackling normative subject matter. Part II introduces a triple-level analytical scheme developed to expand the Hohfeldian analysis of legal rights. This additional analytical resource is then utilised in working through different levels of the analysis of legal rights, and to reveal some points of overlap with the different levels of analysis of law’s normativity found in Part I. This broader understanding is then related to the different theoretical roles identified in Part I, so as to produce a classification of theoretical approaches to rights, with the aim of revealing where intelligible discourse between them is possible.

In a much-anticipated decision, the UK Supreme Court has settled a question on the scope of a bank’s duty of care when processing payments authorised by a customer or their agent. The duty has been narrowly construed in this context. This comment criticizes the decision for not responding to the societal problem of scam payments, and compares it with Singapore case law on the subject which, as it stands, construes the bank’s duty more broadly.

On 8 February 2025, the Singapore Parliament enacted the Workplace Fairness Act 2025, which is the first legal framework against workplace discrimination in Singapore. This comment builds on existing scholarship by focusing on the social implications that might result from three legal characteristics of the WFA: (a) the lack of provisions against conduct that would amount to indirect discrimination in other jurisdictions; (b) that sexual orientation and gender identity are not listed as protected characteristics; and (c) the explicit legalisation of discrimination against relatives and associates. Overall, I argue that while the WFA is a valuable addition to the employment law regime in Singapore, the law needs to be more sensitive to the socio-political consequences that could result from its legal operation.

As it is in medicine, so it is in law: the rules for when one can give legally valid consent to medical treatment differ for minors and adults. This paper analyses Singapore’s first judgment concerning medical decision-making by and on behalf of mature minors: a Family Court decision on Gillick competence in the context of COVID-19 vaccination. This paper also discusses its implications for medical practice and critiques the age of majority in Singapore.

A High Court recently ordered the Malaysian government to make public the investigation report on a plane crash accident in 1976 that killed 11 people. In granting the mandamus order, the court recognised that although not expressly provided for in the Federal Constitution, freedom of information (“FOI”) necessarily flows from the free speech clause in the constitution. While the court’s decision in acknowledging the existence of FOI in Malaysia is welcomed, this note argues that the implication of this decision seems minimal in advancing FOI in Malaysia. It is, therefore, suggested that an FOI legislative framework together with a consistent recognition, especially by the higher courts, of FOI in Malaysia would provide more systematic access to official information.

It is an oft-repeated truism that damages are compensatory. Errant doctrines which recognise the possibility of monetary recovery in excess of loss, such as punitive damages, are marginalised as anomalies. Others, such as negotiating damages, are uncomfortably shoehorned into the Procrustean bed of compensation. Cost-of-cure damages have likewise become a casualty of the law’s apparent fixation on compensation. Despite suggestions to the contrary, these damages are often treated as simply one measure of loss. That approach has thrown up difficult questions about the dual roles of the claimant’s intention to effect cure and the reasonableness of curing. In Terrenus Energy SL2 Pre Ltd v Attika Interior + MEP Pte Ltd [2025] SGHC(A) 4, the Appellate Division of the High Court was called on to revisit these questions, which had previously been confronted in JSD Corporation Pte Ltd v Tri-Line Express Pte Ltd [2022] SGHC 227.

This Note describes the key doctrinal developments in the Fearn decision and criticises two of these developments: the use-design distinction, and the privileging of the “common and ordinary” uses of land over “abnormal” uses of land. This Note argues that the use-design distinction is artificial and therefore the United Kingdom Supreme Court’s effective insulation of architectural design choices from “reasonableness” review may give rise to unbalanced and unfair results as it did in Fearn itself. This Note also considers the implications of privileging “common and ordinary” uses and, in particular, how a dispute between two “abnormal” uses might play out under this new regime; it considers that Fearn should have been viewed as a clash between two competing “abnormal” uses, and that a broad-based “give and take” principle should have applied to balance two competing, but fundamentally different, “abnormal” uses.

Under s 359(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code 2010, the court can order an offender to compensate the victim with a sum which the victim would have been able to recover in a civil claim in tort against the offender. The courts have used this useful power extensively, though problems remain. One such problem is seen in Ong Eng Siew, where the court declined to make a compensation order. Given the purpose of the compensation system, the court was not correct to hold – in effect – that the purpose of s 359(1) is to benefit only impecunious victims, and that the Prosecution bears the burden of proving that the victim is impecunious. Further, the compensation order should have covered not only medical expenses paid by the victim in cash, but also those paid using Central Provident Fund savings and MediShield Life insurance payouts. This comment also calls for further study of the compensation regime in practice and possible procedural reforms to make it easier for victims to have prosecutors present evidence relevant to the issue of compensation.