If a contracting party cannot pay in US dollars, can they pay the equivalent in Euros? Set against the backdrop of force majeure, the conclusion reached by the UK Supreme Court in RTI Ltd v MUR Shipping BV was, perhaps surprisingly, no. The court held that reasonable endeavours provisos in force majeure clauses can never require a party to accept non-contractual performance (ie, performance on different terms from the contract). This comment has two aims. First, it explains why the holding should be reconsidered, and in so doing sets out a preferable approach to interpreting reasonable endeavours provisos in force majeure clauses. Second, it makes suggestions on the approach to interpreting force majeure clauses more generally. In this regard, references and observations will also be made on the position in Singapore.

In Credit Suisse Trust Limited v Ivanishvili, Bidzina and others, the Singapore Court of Appeal rejected the proposition that a fiduciary’s duty of good faith is exclusively proscriptive, holding that this duty is not only a fiduciary duty but also has several prescriptive dimensions. This Comment examines the theoretical and practical implications of the decision both as regards the duty of good faith and the broader taxonomy of fiduciary duties and remedies in Singapore law.

In Hui Chun Ping v Hui Kau Mo (2024) 27 HKCFAR 634, the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal considered whether an agent who acquired a secret profit in breach of fiduciary duty could raise a limitation defence. Lord Hoffmann NPJ decided that the claim against the agent did not fall within s 20(1)(b) of the Limitation Ordinance and was subject to a limitation period. This Note makes two comments on his reasoning. First, it argues that Lord Hoffmann’s recourse to the historical roots of the limitation statute should be commended, even if his articulation of it was not without its shortcomings. Second, it critiques Lord Hoffmann’s unsatisfactorily equivocal answer to whether the limitation period arose by analogy or directly under s 20(2) of the Limitation Ordinance. It suggests that it would have been desirable for him to clarify that the limitation period in Hui arose by analogy only.

In divorce proceedings, a party to a marriage may seek to satisfy the court that the marriage has irretrievably broken down by proving, inter alia, that the other party has committed adultery. But what is the standard of proof for adultery? In WQX v WQW, the General Division of the High Court (Family Division) found that the wife had proved beyond reasonable doubt that the husband had committed adultery, but it queried whether the criminal standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt for adultery, which applied in the past, is still warranted today. It is submitted that there are indeed strong arguments in favour of lowering the standard of proof for adultery from the criminal standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt to the civil standard of proof on a balance of probabilities.

This Note discusses the application for judicial review initiated by the Sabah Law Society in respect of special grant reviews and payments between the Federation of Malaysia and the State of Sabah under Articles 112C and 112D of the Malaysian Federal Constitution. It is argued that the Malaysian High Court in granting leave to commence judicial review proceedings, and the Court of Appeal in upholding the High Court’s decision, ought to have considered whether the rights of the State of Sabah could be enforced by the Sabah Law Society in judicial review proceedings before the High Court. The Note concludes that any dispute on the special grant ought to be resolved in proceedings between the Federation and the State concerned and falls within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Malaysian Federal Court.

In DDN v DDO, the Appellate Division of the High Court explored how the notion of therapeutic justice applies in the context of a variation of access orders. This note reviews DDN v DDO and argues that the approach adopted by the Appellate Division of the High Court has much to commend it for recognising the need for flexibility when varying orders relating to children while at the same time reminding parents of the importance of parental responsibility and encouraging them to put in their best efforts to make adjustments to access orders by agreement in the spirit of therapeutic justice.

In Haris Ibrahim, the Federal Court of Malaysia discussed the legal limits to executive authorities’ powers to investigate judges on suspicion of crime. The case is a rare contribution to the jurisprudence on judges’ criminal liability at common law, as well as a case study in the challenges of reconciling judicial independence with other principles of the constitutional framework and other actors’ roles therein. The Court held that the implied constitutional principle of judicial independence requires that executive authorities follow a “set of protocols” (which the Court formulated) when investigating sitting judges. This was not wrong in principle, but the Court’s understanding of the separation of powers did not give sufficient weight to other constitutional principles which require that the executive, too, be able to do its job without being unduly hindered – particularly when that job itself serves to safeguard constitutional values such as judicial accountability.

For Singapore’s bench, bar and academy, Law and Technology in Singapore (Second Edition) arrives at precisely the moment when legal method, institutional design and day-to-day practice are being stress-tested by generative AI, platform regulation, digital assets and data-driven decision making. The editors frame the project against a backdrop of “technological advancements … at a breathtaking pace,” with the rise of generative AI and the metaverse among developments that mean “the law cannot stand still”. In his foreword, Chief Justice Sundaresh Menon calls the book’s scope “remarkable,” reflecting technology’s “far-reaching impact … on virtually every aspect of our legal system,” and emphasises a forward-looking posture that keeps pace while maintaining fidelity to “fundamental principles”. For practitioners, policy-makers and scholars seeking a structured, Singapore-specific map through this terrain, the volume is both an indispensable reference and a platform for critical analysis.

In the past two decades, the field of “fashion law” has emerged at the intersection of intellectual property (“IP”) and a multi-billion-dollar global industry driven by creativity and constantly changing trends. Yet the relationship between fashion and IP has remained, in many respects, under-theorised and evolving. Fashion and Intellectual Property, edited by David Tan, Jeanne Fromer and Dev Gangjee, is an impressive and timely collection that brings together leading IP scholars from around the world to explore this complex theme. The book offers a fascinating range of theoretical, doctrinal and policy insights into how various IP laws interact with the fashion industry, exploring the role that fashion plays in society, how fashion exposes the tensions in patent, design, trademark and copyright doctrines, and to what extent IP laws accommodate phenomena like upcycling and cultural appropriation. The result is a rich, scholarly examination of fashion through an IP lens, one that should interest not only IP experts but anyone curious about how law engages with creativity and culture.

Common Law and Civil Law Perspectives on Tort Law is a comparative work that provides both contextual insights into and practical analysis of tort law in selected common law and civil law jurisdictions, including France, Italy, Germany, England, and the United States. The book is divided into eight chapters, with Chapter 1 setting out the place of tort law in the respective legal systems. This is in some ways the most interesting chapter as it locates tort law within the social, cultural, and political contexts of the jurisdictions. As the authors note, tort law reflects to some degree the values a society places on risk allocation, mutual obligations, and protection of the vulnerable. It is dynamic and shaped both by legislation and judicial decisions. While the book purports to deal with tort law, in fact it is largely concerned with the tort of negligence.