Many theorists aim to argue for certain moral or human rights on the basis that they protect something of great value or a weighty interest. What I argue here is that this type of argument cannot justify the kind of right that its proponents often envisage, ie, a human right with a certain peremptory force. More specifically, I argue that, on this view, rights are not deontic relations between two parties that hold regardless of the circumstances; they are best seen as goals to be aimed at, which may or may not give rise to specified duties on others. Moreover, rights, on this view, cannot have the degree of peremptoriness required to distinguish them from mere reasons for action; cashing them out as exclusionary reasons may offer a distinctive account but it should be noted first, that this is at odds with the picture of rights as goals and second, with their grounding in (prudential) value. Given these implications of the argument, it becomes unclear why one might want to invoke rights in the first place rather than simply argue for the protection of interests.