The notion of public interest in sentencing conjures up images of utilitarian consequentialism and the emergence in Singapore of a role for public interests analysis in sentencing may create a superficial impression of judicial hardening and the beginnings of a new and repressive law and order ideology. This article demonstrates that the impression is not only superficial but also false. Its central argument is that public interests analysis is or has the potential to contribute clarity and add value to desert-based sentencing and that taken together with judicial benchmarking, which it complements, reflects a model of desert, which is neither deontological nor empirical. Nevertheless, the resultant model is not necessarily inferior to either.

Limited access to bank branches excludes over one billion people from accessing financial services in developing countries. Digital financial services offered by banks and mobile money providers through agents can solve this problem without the need for complex and costly physical banking infrastructures. Delivering digital financial services through agents requires a legal framework to regulate liability. This article analyses whether vicarious liability of the principal is a more efficient regulatory approach than personal liability of the agent. Agent liability in Kenya, Fiji, and Malawi is analysed to demonstrate that vicarious liability of the principal, coupled to an explicit agreement as to agent rewards and penalties, is the more efficient regulatory approach.

Articles 14 and 15 of the Singapore Constitution enshrine the rights to free speech, religious freedom, and other related rights in Singapore. These provisions also set out the circumstances under which these rights may be restricted. Notably, however, these provisions are directed at legislative restrictions. The question is how they are applicable to executive action. This paper suggests that there are two possible means by which one can assess the constitutionality of executive action under Articles 14 and 15 in Singapore - the jurisdictional and substantive approaches - and demonstrates that evidence of both approaches can be found in Singapore law. Drawing upon constitutional theory, the paper argues that the theoretical foundation for legal doctrine in this regard ought to be a combination of both the jurisdictional and substantive approaches, and also discusses the doctrinal test by which challenges to executive action under Articles 14 and 15 should be assessed.

The Study of Singaporean cases on diminished responsibility reveals that our judges have generally dealt with the elements of the defence in a haphazard manner. Furthermore, they have placed too much reliance on medical expert opinion. The submission is made that a close adherence to the model formulated by the English case of R v Byrne for determining diminished responsibility cases will considerably improve the judicial handling of such cases in our jurisdiction

Artificial intelligence (“AI”) has garnered much attention in recent years, with capabilities spanning the operation of self-driving cars to the emulation of the great artistic masters of old. The field has now been ostensibly enlarged in light of the professed abilities of AI machines to autonomously generate patentable inventions. This article examines the present state of AI technology and the suitability of existing patent law frameworks in accommodating it. Looking ahead, the authors also offer two recommendations in a bid to anticipate and resolve the challenges that future developments in AI technology might pose to patent law. In particular, the case is made for fully autonomous machine inventors to be recognised as “inventors” by statute and for patent ownership of AI-generated inventions to be granted to the owners of these machine inventors by default.