The World Bank's Ease of Doing Business index has significantly affected regulations and policies regarding corporate matters around the world, and yet there has been scant academic attempt examining the use and implication of the index, especially in the area of investor protection, which is an essential element in doing business. In this paper, we examine in depth the research methodologies employed by the Doing Business project in measuring the strength of investor protection, especially in light of the recent renaming of this indicator from Protecting Investors to Protecting Minority Investors in Doing Business 2015. Using Singapore as a case study, we argue that, notwithstanding the positive changes brought in by Doing Business 2015, the variables and components chosen in_x000D_ this indicator essentially fail to capture the salient features of minority investor protection. We argue that minority investor protection is an area that is inherently too context-specific to be evaluated based on a unified business assumption or by pure quantitative methods. Lastly, we also provide specific suggestions to improve the Protecting Minority Investors indicator.

Business to business (“B2B”) artificial intelligence (“AI”) transactions raise challenging private law liability issues because of the distinctive nature of AI systems and particularly the new relational dynamics between AI solutions providers and procurers. This article advances a three-stage framework comprising data management, system development and implementation, and external threat management. The purpose is to unpack AI design and development processes involving the relational dynamics of providers and procurers in order to understand the parties’ respective responsibilities. Applying this framework to English commercial law, this article analyses the potential liability of AI solutions providers and procurers under the Supply of Goods and Services Act and the Sale of Goods Act. The assumption that only AI solutions providers will be subject to liability, or that no party will be liable due to the “autonomous” nature of AI systems, is rejected.

This discussion explores how the inability of the law of evidence to decide how to deal decisively with character evidence in general and similar fact evidence in particular has spawned the ambiguous formula of weighing probative value and prejudice. It also suggests that this weakness gives extraneous "political" factors the opportunity to insinuate themselves into actual decision-making. Because of this, decisions from other jurisdictions cannot be taken at face value, as may have been done in the most recent case in Singapore, Lee Kuan Peng.

The main task of this article is to inquire into the reasons for the general decline and final abolition of the jury system in Singapore. It also seeks to discover why the decline and fall of a major legal institution aroused so little public debate, let alone outcry. To this end, the focus must necessarily be historical, but, in the context of a nation still in the process of discovering its legal heritage, it is hoped that the account which follows will contribute in some small way towards the development of our legal history.

The Privy Council stated in de Lasala v de Lasala set of propositions concerning the effect of English decisions and opinion of the Judicial Committee on the courts of Hong Kong. Last year these views were supplemented, and perhaps contradicted, by remarks in Tai Hing Cotton Mill Ltd. v Liu Chong Hing Bank Ltd. The implications of these statements are considered and the attitudes and practices of the Hong Kong courts since de Lasala are explained and criticised. The conclusions reached is that undue deference is paid to House of Lords and Privy Council authority in a manner which is destined to appear incompatible with emerging political realities in Hong Kong. This analysis has obvious relevance for lawyers and legal theory in Singapore and Malaysia.

This article examines the law relating to the forfeiture of deposits, and the relevance of the law on contractual penalties. Deposits are very much like agreed sums payable upon a breach of contract, except for the fact of advance payment. However, there are very strong judicial statements to the effect that deposits are not subject to the same rules that apply to agreed sums payable upon a breach of contract. Consequently, while agreements to pay penalties are not enforceable, a reasonable penalty may be retained if paid in advance as a deposit. This article examines the legal position from both technical and policy perspectives.

Prosecutorial discretion is an essential element of our criminal justice. This discretion vests in the Attorney-General as the Public Prosecutor and is constitutionally protected. Recently, there have been several challenges to the exercise of this discretion on the basis of alleged violation of the constitutionally protected right to equal treatment. This article examines the basis of the prosecutorial discretion and considers the value of developing prosecution guidelines to assist prosecutors in making decisions consistently and fairly.