This article discusses the recent developments concerning the pre-trial disclosure of expert evidence. The positions in both the High Court and subordinate courts are discussed.

The insurance sector, in riding the wave of the FinTech phenomenon, has been rapidly expanding, with a slew of firms having emerged to provide so-called “InsurTech" services. These services incorporate concepts such as blockchain, artificial intelligence, digitalisation and the sharing economy to various aspects of the insurance industry. This profusion of technology brings with it the promise of various benefits including increasing efficiency and lowering costs for not only insurers and intermediaries, but also businesses or consumers as end-users of insurance. However, the development of InsurTech comes with corresponding risks and regulatory concerns not currently accounted for by the traditional regulatory model. This paper will examine potential risks associated with the application of InsurTech and scope out how current regulations might hinder (rather than facilitate) the development of InsurTech. This paper then concludes with a discussion of various possible responses or regulatory approaches to InsurTech applications.

ASEAN at present lacks a proper legal regime at the community level. However, this is to some extent compensated by similar approaches adopted by its members on certain matters. This include their outlook on free enterprise and competition, co-operation, common direction of their trade, their disposition to public control, and their attitude towards foreign investment. The prospects of an ASEAN community law depend upon whether the member countries are prepared to make the necessary adjustments to their national laws.

This article discusses recent developments in the law of co-ownership in Singapore, especially in relation to the doctrine of severance. In particular, the amendments to the law of co-ownership introduced by the Land Titles (Amendment) Act 2001 are considered. While the legislation appears at first sight to effect only technical amendments to the law, it has in fact made a significant change to the law of severance.

I propose to question Dr. Ramraj's recent argument in this Journal that September 11th has "exposed the increase in ethnic tensions in Singapore and Malaysia", and that there have been "divisive social consequences" for these two countries. I question his prescription that "for Singapore...policies and legislation based on race should be abolished" and that the "same may be said of Malaysia". Finally, I question his argument that legal and policy assistance in respect of any group can only be made in a politically neutral way, and that traditional group traits should be held hostage to individual moral choice. Dr. Ramraj prizes individual moral self-authorship in a way which dismisses the need to achieve substantive justice for the various communities in Singapore and Malaysia, and which ignores the terms and histories of the constitutions of these two nations. His arguments, even if not colour-blind, proceed from a version of constitutional colour-blindness, and ignore the needs of identity and multi-culturalism in these two nations.

The Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act is a unique feature in the legal landscape of Singapore. The statute—an important part of the Singapore government’s large and extensive arsenal of legal instruments to regulate inter-ethnic-religious relations in the country—gives the executive untrammelled discretion to curb political expression and political activity in the interests of maintaining religious harmony. Placed against the backdrop of its political developments, this article explores the political motives for the introduction of the statute, examines the exact nature of its structure and scope, and compares it against other legal instruments that perform similar political control. A particular focus is upon how the statute underscores the thinking behind Singapore-style state paternalism, and reflects its political leadership’s deep distrust of the electorate, and instinct to restructure voting behaviour and party politics. This article also reflects on the adverse effect of such enforced stricture on otherwise legitimate political activities by religion-linked organisations in Singapore.

The Singapore Court of Appeal's recent decision in Staywell clearly signalled a rejection of the European “global appreciation approach" when evaluating trademark infringement. By adopting a pro-mark ethos, the Court had chosen to ignore certain factors that might affect the consumers' purchasing decision by excluding extraneous factors that could potentially negate the finding of likelihood of confusion based solely on marks-similarity and goods-similarity. This article argues that Singapore courts could consider American jurisprudence when examining “likelihood of confusion" under trademark infringement claims, such as an evaluation of the Polaroid factors, to discern factors which have an impact and effect on the consumers' purchasing decision in order to better illuminate whether the average consumer is likely to be confused. It proposes a four-stage test which integrates the US likelihood of confusion factors into the autochthonous approach advanced in Staywell. Not only is this formulation consistent with the wording of the Trade Marks Act, it would strike a better balance between protecting the proprietary right of the registered mark owner and promoting_x000D_ entrepreneurship and business certainty in a manner that is consonant with consumer purchasing behaviour.