In recent decades, a number of fantastically successful, mainly American, multinational entities_x000D_ ("MNEs")—led and epitomised by the 'Four Horsemen', Apple, Amazon, Facebook, and Google,_x000D_ but also extending beyond the tech sector—have earned huge profits, while paying very low global taxes, through their use of intellectual property ("IP"). Since IP, in contrast to tangible property, generally lacks a clear location, it empowers corporate tax avoidance at the expense of both the production countries where the MNEs' high-value owner-employees live, and the market countries where their customers live._x000D_
This two-part article assesses the challenges posed for countries' international tax systems by the rise of mobile IP, including but not limited to the case where it is embodied in a digital platform. Part One assessed the challenges posed for the traditional income tax concept of source, and for the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development ("OECD")'s proposed focus on the site of 'value creation'. In this issue, Part Two focuses on proposals to shift taxing rights towards market jurisdictions that may enjoy location-specific rents with regard to the MNEs' access to their consumers, including via the use of digital service taxes ("DSTs").

The tax system in Hong Kong is often presented as a model for efficiency in terms of tax compliance and administration. The design features of the tax system contributed to the jurisdiction’s status as a preferred hub for international investment, but the equity impact of the system in terms of Hong Kong residents has scarcely been examined. The article analyses how tax exclusions, concessions and preferential rates have benefited the wealthy more than the poor and have prevented the income tax system from playing a role in mitigating the striking disparity in income distribution in the jurisdiction comparable to the role it plays in Hong Kong’s developed counterparts. The lessons from Hong Kong offer a striking example of the extent to which tax law design can impact on equity and social stability. In a world of growing income inequality, any effort to make a tax system more equitable is worth serious consideration.

This article looks at who is caveatee for the purposes of section 127 of the Land Titles Act. The focus is on the position of a person who has yet to acquire a registered title or interest in land. Where a caveat is sought to be removed, the question of who bears the onus of proof is also examined. The need for a provision to prevent abuse of the caveat procedure so as to ensure the effectiveness of the remedies provided in section 127 is also discussed.

For some time, and more urgently since the global financial crisis, there has been an interest in suitability as a method for protecting consumers. In broad terms, suitability means that consumers should receive the thing which best suits or fits their requirements or purposes. In the context of making loans to consumers, this means that consumer credit products should be suitable to the circumstances and requirements of the borrower. Suppliers in the market for goods have long been required to provide goods that are fit for the purpose of the buyer. Nevertheless, the idea that credit providers must supply loans that are not unsuitable is seen as startlingly new. This article examines the long and international history of the statutory obligation of fitness for purpose. It argues that this history shows that the objectives of the implied term are not dissimilar to the objectives for responsible lending and now, the imposition of a suitability requirement. In this way, the article explores a convergence between what is required of product providers in the market for goods and services and those in the market for financial services, with a particular examination of the Australian model in the National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth).

This article traces the development of the legal aid scheme and the work of the Legal Aid Bureau, which was set up pursuant to the passing of the Legal Aid and Advice Act in 1958, about 3 years before the advent of the Women's Charter. Since its inception, the Legal Aid Bureau has helped thousands of less privileged applicants from Singapore society enforce or defend their rights under the Women's Charter. Matters under the Women's Charter have formed the bulk of the Bureau's caseload over the past 5 decades. The number of cases handled by the Bureau each year has been rising steadily in the past few years. Going forward, the Bureau expects to continue its work of helping the less privileged get access to justice - particularly in the field of matrimonial matters - for an ever_x000D_ increasing number of applicants.

This article discusses the new provisions in the Evidence Act that provide for the admissibility of computer output as evidence. In Part II of the article, the author describes and explains the operation of these provisions. And in Part III, the provisions are analysed in detail. It is contended in this article that the provisions represent an elaborate scheme for authenticating computer output as a precondition to its admissibility in evidence, that the distinction between computer output as real evidence and as hearsay continues to be useful in applying the provisions, and that the evidential device of authentication supersedes the distinction between primary and secondary evidence.

In 1998, a court of three judges in Law Society of Singapore v Edmund Nathan held that the rule against double jeopardy does not prevent the Law Society from initiating a second set of professional disciplinary proceedings based on the same factual matrix as the first if the first had only terminated at the inquiry committee stage. In addition, it held that the initiation of a second set of proceedings based on the same factual matrix was not an abuse of process _x000D_ This article seeks to argue that the rule against double jeopardy should operate to prevent subsequent disciplinary proceedings even if the first set of proceedings had terminated at only the inquiry committee stage. It goes on to argue that the rule against double jeopardy should be triggered by subsequent proceedings based on the same evidence. Alternatively, it argues that the initiation of a second set of proceedings based on the same evidence should be considered as an abuse of process. It concludes by offering some suggestions for reform.