Current procedures for the surrender of fugitives to and from Singapore and Malaysia are discussed in some detail, with particular emphasis upon the nature of the evidence required from requesting states, the various restrictions upon the surrender of fugitives and the methods by which the legislation is applied to particular states. The underlying theme is the appropriate balance of functions between the judiciary and the executive in extradition proceedings. Some procedural reforms are also suggested.

This article examines leading cases in the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, South Africa, India, Singapore and Malaysia (all of which have borrowed this provision from the same British source) in order to establish the circumstances in which courts exercise these powers. The cases seem to demonstrate that courts do, in the majority of cases, exercise restraint in invoking discretion and take particular care not to interfere either in the contract embodied in the articles and memorandum or to take sides in factional intra-corporate struggles. However, the cases in which courts have interfered with the arrangement in the articles seem to suggest that the power conferred on courts to convene meetings should be expressly limited, to prevent any such unjustified assumption of judicial power.

'Legitimacy' is a notoriously elusive term, over-used and under-specified. So the first thing I will do is to explain the sense in which I plan to use 'legitimacy' in this essay. Do not, lease, argue with me and say: "That is not 'legitimacy'! It means something else!" This is how I plan to use it, and I hope to convince you that it is a useful way for articulating something terribly important about the present crisis and the current state of European integration.