The defence of qualified privilege has developed in the defamation law of many countries that share English legal heritage. Malaysian cases have applied, in particular, English or Australian developments in qualified privilege. However, Malaysian judgments have not engaged in a close analysis of how the foreign changes arise under Malaysian law. This article explains how the Australian developments appear difficult to apply within the Malaysian context, while the English developments offer a clear avenue for Malaysian defamation law's modernisation. The key reason for this is the way in which the English Reynolds privilege can be seen to have its origins, at least in part, within the common law as well as within European human rights standards. The common law aspects of Reynolds, apparent from a wide range of English judicial statements, offer a doctrinal basis for the existing and future application of the Reynolds defence in Malaysian defamation law.

It is a widespread phenomenon that online platforms which enable users to upload copyright-protected content use software-based tools that automatically identify and restrict copyright-infringing user uploads based on algorithms – so-called upload filters. The European Union is currently at the forefront of the development to govern upload filters through legislation, both with regard to requiring platforms to filter infringing content (Art 17 of the Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market) and with regard to mitigating risks of automated filtering (especially through the newly adopted Digital Services Act). Against this background, this article analyses the European approach to algorithmic enforcement of copyright and compares it with the situation in the United States. After laying out the legal foundations from which the necessity to engage in algorithmic enforcement results, this article focuses particularly on legal approaches to avoiding the restriction of permissible content (“overblocking”).

Like Baloo of The Jungle Book, I have been involved in the teaching of law (and more specifically, Company Law) for a long time. Company Law is considered to be an essential subject for all lawyers in Singapore. This is borne out by its inclusion as a compulsory paper in Part A of the Bar Examination conducted by the Singapore Institute of Legal Education ("SILE") for graduates of foreign universities intending to be called to the Bar, even though it is not mandatory in many LLB courses abroad. This short piece is a distillation of my experiences not only as a teacher of law but also as a legal practitioner in both the public and private sector over a period of more than thirty years, as well as a member of the board of directors of several listed and non-listed companies. On the basis of that experience, may I proffer the following thoughts on the teaching of Company Law specifically and on legal_x000D_ teaching generally, in the hope of provoking some reflection and discussion.

Section 34 of the Penal Code has proved remarkably complicated and difficult for courts having to consider whether an accomplice should be held liable for an offence actually perpetrated by another. It will be suggested here that the problems experienced in interpreting this section could have been avoided from the very inception of the Code, and that the current position is still unsatisfactory, notwithstanding attempts by the courts to settle the issue of interpretation. In the first part of this article, an outline of the background history of section 34 will be given, and it will be argued that the section was intended to be read in conjunction with the succeeding provisions set out in sections 35 to 38, rather than to stand by itself. An alternative construction of these sections will be offered in the light of this argument. In the second part, some consideration of the treatment the sections have actually received from the courts will be given. In the final part, the analysis offered will be compared with the current state of the law, in order to arrive at a conclusion as to what future interpretation should be placed on these provisions, and what reform of the law may be necessary.