The sangam (confluence) of foreign investment, multinational corporations (MNCs) and human rights raises new challenges for the developing countries in Asia. Though development is the underlying current behind this sangam, there is a fundamental tension in how the three streams intermingle. For example, the trend of investment-driven development often compels developing countries to allure foreign investments by MNCs, even if it brings negative effects on human rights realisation and development of the majority. A "race to the bottom" for securing foreign investment amongst developing countries further reduces their bargaining position vis-à-vis MNCs. Taking India as an example of developing countries of Asia, this article explores the individual and collective strategies that developing countries could employ to exercise a control over the flow and direction of foreign investment. It argues that developing countries should realise their place in an interdependent world, be guided by an approach of "diversified integration", rely on human rights norms, and foster alliances with civil society organs in order to control the flow and direction of foreign investment.

Trade mark law is motivated in part by the goal of protecting certain consumer understandings. But courts typically treat such consumer understanding as a pre-determined, relatively fixed, fact to which the template of trade mark law can be applied and from which answers to the relevant legal questions thus inevitably flow. Prof Dinwoodie challenges this approach as descriptively incomplete and prescriptively harmful. He argues that trade mark law should be less fixated on ascertaining, acting upon, and declaring, empirical realities of consumer association and confusion. Instead, courts need more openly – and more fully – to understand trade mark law as a normative project. In this climate, efforts to enhance the quality of factual input to particular trade mark disputes should be a lower priority for trade mark law. And, if over-emphasised in ways that downplay the normative character of trade mark law, such well-intentioned efforts at improved empiricism may even be counterproductive.

This article argues that an agreement on the proper law of a contract is not a free-standing promissory term but merely has the effect of a presumption that the express choice is the proper law. If this iskept firmly in view, there are more similarities than differences between the nature of the proper law of a possibly unformed contract, the floating proper law, and the changing proper law. In all cases,reliance may be placed on an express choice of law unless it would be substantially unjust to thenon-relying party or would occasion him substantial hardship.

This article considers the dilemma that constitutional judicial review presents to the most wellmeaning of judges—that of navigating the narrow and difficult road between parliamentary supremacy and judicial oligarchy. It examines the Singapore Court of Appeal's delineation of legal and extra-legal considerations in view of Ronald Dworkin's theory of adjudication in determining the constitutionality of s 377A of the Penal Code in Lim Meng Suang v Attorney-General [2015] 1 SLR 26 (CA). It proposes an alternative natural law approach to constitutional judicial review based on Radbruch's formula, which helps courts to avoid the pitfalls of judicial idiosyncrasies and usurpation of legislative mandate while staying true to constitutionalism.

In some circumstances, common law or equitable rules may allow the presence of an initial duty owed by A to B to have an effect on a third party, C. This is the case, for example, where C is under a duty not to procure a breach by A of a contractual duty owed by A to B; it is also the case where A's initial duty gives B an "equitable property right". Such cases may seem to call into question the fundamental distinction between personal rights and property rights. Nonetheless, this article argues that we can account for the common law and equitable methods by which an initial duty is allowed to affect a third party whilst preserving that fundamental distinction. To do so, we need to recognise one other category of rights (here called "persistent rights") and a sub-division of personal rights (here called "protected personal rights").

The narrative of this piece is a simple one: the IP journey of NUS Law closely mirrors the IP journey of Singapore. If IP teaching barely featured at NUS Law for almost the first half of its history, this was when IP was unimportant in the old economy of Singapore and in fact the political leaders were even suspicious about IP rights. If IP teaching started at NUS Law in 1985, this coincided with Singapore shifting gears in the 1980s to move up the value chain into higher-technology sectors where IP rights matter. If NUS Law broadened and deepened its IP curriculum over the next three decades, this was in tandem with Singapore's construction of an increasingly sophisticated IP infrastructure that is needed for a new knowledge-based economy. This narrative is a tale of how a national law school_x000D_ played a supportive role in nation building.

This article focuses on some problems arising from applying the product due diligence requirement of the suitability rule to complex financial products. The article draws several conclusions. First, the 'not unsuitable' test should be adopted to reduce legal uncertainty. Second, the comparative risk approach is a better choice in assessing the suitability of investment products. However, there must be further elaboration of the classification of product risk. Third, there must be a balance between risk and return to avoid risk mismatches in product design. Fourth, what have been termed minibonds raise the problem of documentation suitability. Though it is difficult to define suitable documentation, it may be worthwhile for regulators to establish some minimum standards that might have a great influence on product risk. Financial regulators may consider differentiating between financial products in assessing their suitability rather than adopting a one-size-fits-all approach.

In Marex and Miao Weiguo, the majority of the UK Supreme Court and the Singapore Court of Appeal opted for simplicity in the form of a bright-line preclusion against recovery of reflective loss by shareholders, ie, losses taking the form of a diminution in the value of shareholding and/or distributions. This article examines the law prior to these significant decisions, sets out the key points and reasoning of the courts, and upon critical examination, respectfully suggests that the law is seeing something that does not exist: there is no such thing as an independent principle of ‘reflective loss’.