The narrative of this piece is a simple one: the IP journey of NUS Law closely mirrors the IP journey of Singapore. If IP teaching barely featured at NUS Law for almost the first half of its history, this was when IP was unimportant in the old economy of Singapore and in fact the political leaders were even suspicious about IP rights. If IP teaching started at NUS Law in 1985, this coincided with Singapore shifting gears in the 1980s to move up the value chain into higher-technology sectors where IP rights matter. If NUS Law broadened and deepened its IP curriculum over the next three decades, this was in tandem with Singapore's construction of an increasingly sophisticated IP infrastructure that is needed for a new knowledge-based economy. This narrative is a tale of how a national law school_x000D_ played a supportive role in nation building.

In some circumstances, common law or equitable rules may allow the presence of an initial duty owed by A to B to have an effect on a third party, C. This is the case, for example, where C is under a duty not to procure a breach by A of a contractual duty owed by A to B; it is also the case where A's initial duty gives B an "equitable property right". Such cases may seem to call into question the fundamental distinction between personal rights and property rights. Nonetheless, this article argues that we can account for the common law and equitable methods by which an initial duty is allowed to affect a third party whilst preserving that fundamental distinction. To do so, we need to recognise one other category of rights (here called "persistent rights") and a sub-division of personal rights (here called "protected personal rights").

In Marex and Miao Weiguo, the majority of the UK Supreme Court and the Singapore Court of Appeal opted for simplicity in the form of a bright-line preclusion against recovery of reflective loss by shareholders, ie, losses taking the form of a diminution in the value of shareholding and/or distributions. This article examines the law prior to these significant decisions, sets out the key points and reasoning of the courts, and upon critical examination, respectfully suggests that the law is seeing something that does not exist: there is no such thing as an independent principle of ‘reflective loss’.

This article focuses on some problems arising from applying the product due diligence requirement of the suitability rule to complex financial products. The article draws several conclusions. First, the 'not unsuitable' test should be adopted to reduce legal uncertainty. Second, the comparative risk approach is a better choice in assessing the suitability of investment products. However, there must be further elaboration of the classification of product risk. Third, there must be a balance between risk and return to avoid risk mismatches in product design. Fourth, what have been termed minibonds raise the problem of documentation suitability. Though it is difficult to define suitable documentation, it may be worthwhile for regulators to establish some minimum standards that might have a great influence on product risk. Financial regulators may consider differentiating between financial products in assessing their suitability rather than adopting a one-size-fits-all approach.

In the aftermath of Douglas v. Hello! Ltd., in which pictures surreptitiously taken of a New York wedding were published in a United Kingdom magazine, it is becoming increasingly apparent that privacy invasions are not restricted by national borders. The equitable doctrine of breach of confidence, which gave a remedy in that case, has shown adaptability in the face of changing circumstances and practices. The challenge for the future will be ensuring greater international harmonisation of substantive legal protection of privacy. Already there are some positive signs.

This article considers the general tax avoidance provision contained in section 33 of the Singapore Income Tax Act in the context of similar provisions in other countries, particularly in Australasia (i.e. Australia and New Zealand). This article first looks at some of the terms in section 33, and at how they might be interpreted. It then considers, in the light of the Australian and New Zealand experience, some of the difficulties of producing definitive interpretations of provisions like section 33. finally, the application in Singapore of the doctrine of fiscal nullity is discussed. Its likely exclusion by the existence of section 33 is noted. Its possible application to some transactions involving dealings with countries with which Singapore has double tax agreements is also considered.

The mens rea or mental element of crime exists in a spectrum of strictness. Strict liability is only one of many points in this spectrum. With this in mind, this articles examines some recent pronouncements on the reason for strict liability. It also discusses recent legislative attitudes towards strict liability and judicial views on the effect of presumptions of knowledge on the mental element of crime. Finally, a reconciliation between the contrasting approaches of the Penal Code and the Common Law is attempted, with the result that the courts are given maximum freedom to impose the appropriate mens rea where the Legislature has chosen not to specify what it is to be.

This article provides an insight into some aspects of the possessory lien in admiralty actions in rem. In particular, the article discusses the authority of a demise charterer to subject the chartered vessel to a ship-repairer's lien and to what extent, if at all, this authority is affected by the presence of "non-lien" clauses in demise charterparties. The matter of what constitutes the res subject to the possessory lien of the ship-repairer is also examined.