Last year, the then-Minister for Education intimated that in Singapore, research by university researchers in the fields of social science and humanities should not be evaluated and recognised based on the same metrics as for research in the STEM fields. This article seeks to expand on the Minister’s points by focusing on the specific context of research in the field of law by: firstly, explaining what is so different between the nature of law research (generally, and specifically in Singapore) and the nature of STEM research; secondly, elaborating on why we should not evaluate and recognise law research by Singapore law academics generally based on the same metrics as for STEM research; finally, offering some modest suggestions on how we might better assess whether a piece of law research from a Singapore law academic is good research and whether it translates into tangible outcomes for the good of Singaporeans.

The Faculty of Law, National University of Singapore has been deeply involved in the teaching, research and practice of criminal law in Singapore since its early days. Pioneer members of the faculty developed teaching and resource materials which subsequent generations of scholars have built on. This paper charts the evolution of teaching at the law school and highlights the centrality of criminal law to the teaching and practice of law as well as our conceptions of justice. Criminal law has a profound impact on law students, and at NUS Law, it is a matter of pride that its students have an equally profound impact on criminal law in Singapore—as students, practitioners and leaders.

This article tries to say as simply as possible why we must take seriously the project of constructing a law of unjust enrichment. It answers those who might assert that the twentieth century success of the law of restitution has rendered that project redundant. It says how the law of unjust enrichment differs from the law of restitution and warns against allowing the language of unjust enrichment to be understood in a sense which would erode or eliminate those differences. The twenty-first century law of unjust enriched will emerge from the law of restitution, but something must be left behind. The butterfly will differ from the caterpillar.

The article examines a question that frequently arises when a State faces a disaster which threatens the lives of its nationals. Is the State in such a situation under an obligation to allow international humanitarian organizations onto its territory to assist those in need of help? The issue pits the notion of State sovereignty against the sanctity of human life

The papers published in this special issue were initially presented at the inaugural meeting of The Research Forum on Basic Legal Positions held in Lisbon in September 2023. The Research Forum on Basic Legal Positions has been established as a joint venture by Lisbon Legal Theory (a research cluster within the Lisbon Public Law Research Centre in the University of Lisbon) and the Centre for Legal Theory (Faculty of Law in the National University of Singapore). Its aim is to promote the investigation of elements common to all legal systems at the level of individual legal positions, where a party’s conduct is normatively regulated by the law. The analysis of such positions clarifies practical legal problems, informs a scientific understanding of law, and illuminates normative controversies over the status individuals should enjoy under the law. The forum provides a collaborative environment in which civilian and common-law scholars can address theoretical issues of fundamental concern to all contemporary legal systems.

The idea of “inalienability” is normally thought of as providing the strongest level of protection that a right (and hence its right‑holder) can possibly enjoy. Whereas an “ordinary” fundamental right is supposed to be protected first of all against the State (“vertical” protection), and secondly also against other private citizens and entities in general (“horizontal” protection), some rights are supposed to be so important that they are protected, it seems, even against the choices and decisions of the very right‑holder. While the idea of an inalienable right is well known in legal, moral, and political philosophy, it is not entirely clear what it means for a right to be inalienable — and whether an inalienable right is really a right after all. By using a Hohfeldian conceptual framework, this essay tries to provide an analytical inquiry into the concept of an inalienable right, and to explore under what conditions it is conceptually possible to talk of inalienable rights.

This article seeks to demonstrate that under the LTA there are no impediments to the satisfaction of an equity based on a claim in proprietary estoppel and its enforceability against third parties. That there are problems in these two respects is misconceived in light of case law and the relevant statutory provisions in the LTA. As for the satisfaction of the equity, it is argued that a principled approach must be adopted notwithstanding the wide discretion conferred on the courts on the matter.

Sections 215A to 215J of the Companies Act were enacted to facilitate the amalgamation or merger of Singapore companies. These provisions also enable an acquiror to achieve full ownership of the target company by indirectly buying out the shares held by minority shareholders, even if such shareholders have voted against the amalgamation at the shareholders’ meeting. This author argues that the amalgamation procedure, as compared with the other forms of compulsory acquisition, may have the unintended effect of unduly favouring the majority shareholders at the expense of the minority shareholders. The problem is partially mitigated by the fact that the provisions allow for shareholders to apply to the court for relief if the amalgamation would lead to unfair prejudice. Alternatively, shareholders may bring a petition under section 216 of the Companies Act, on the ground that the amalgamation is oppressive, unfairly discriminatory or otherwise prejudicial to their interests. This article explores the circumstances in which the court would intervene and it is argued that the basis of any intervention is to ensure that the requisite shareholder approval is fairly obtained.