The Present essay surveys the life and work of the first Dean of the Law Faculty, Professor LA Sheridan. It traces his initial career and his subsequent work in establishing the local law school. In this latter respect, this essay examines Professor Sheridan's visions and goals - and how these were realised in a tangible manner through his prodigious efforts in the directions of staff and student recruitment, the establishment of an appropriate curriculum and the law library, as well as his encouragement of legal research through the production of not only books and periodical articles but also the establishment of the then University of Malaya Law Review (now renamed the Singapore Journal of Legal Studies). Professor Sheridan's own amazing range, quality as well as quantity of scholarship is then described. The title of the present essay attempts to capture both these strands, viz, the pivotal role he played in the foundation of the local law faculty and his sterling scholarship, which he continues to produce even today, many years after his retirement.

Many theorists aim to argue for certain moral or human rights on the basis that they protect something of great value or a weighty interest. What I argue here is that this type of argument cannot justify the kind of right that its proponents often envisage, ie, a human right with a certain peremptory force. More specifically, I argue that, on this view, rights are not deontic relations between two parties that hold regardless of the circumstances; they are best seen as goals to be aimed at, which may or may not give rise to specified duties on others. Moreover, rights, on this view, cannot have the degree of peremptoriness required to distinguish them from mere reasons for action; cashing them out as exclusionary reasons may offer a distinctive account but it should be noted first, that this is at odds with the picture of rights as goals and second, with their grounding in (prudential) value. Given these implications of the argument, it becomes unclear why one might want to invoke rights in the first place rather than simply argue for the protection of interests.

This paper discusses the legal framework governing the employment of foreigners in Indonesia as well as the recruitment of Indonesians for employment abroad. It also sets out in detail the necessary procedures for obtaining a work permit.

Trade mark owners have increasingly been acting similarly to those they accuse of infringement or dilution of their marks. They are acting as “ownfringers”. They have been engaging in previously unheard-of competitor collaborations, collaborations with businesses in distant spaces, and self-parody. These trends typify how trade mark owners are increasingly behaving like the third parties they pursue for infringement. How should trade mark law think about these new, prevalent behaviours by mark owners? Perhaps it is just par for the course because mark owners have the right to use their marks in commerce in ways that would constitute infringement if done by third parties. Even so, by engaging in ownfringement, trade mark owners are potentially altering the balance or calculus of a number of fundamental aspects of trade mark doctrine. I explore three important doctrinal impacts of ownfringement: on likelihood of consumer confusion, trade mark distinctiveness and self-dilution, and the parody defence.

Under section 73 of the Conveyancing and Law of Property Act, the insured can easily create a trust of the life policy taken out by him. Unfortunately, however, problems often occur. Such a statutory trust has in many a case been unwittingly created by the life assured without his ever realising the full consequences of what he had done. The present article discusses how this unwarranted situation can arise (including the different kinds of interests thereby constituted) as well as how the resulting trust may drastically restrict the insured's rights and options under the policy.

By an examination of the legal test which sets the standard of care in medical negligence cases - the so-called "Bolam test" - and its application by the courts in the resolution of three basic questions raised by the treatment of patients, this article maintains that English judges have tended to reduce questions about what the law ought to be to questions about what doctors, or a body of doctors, actually do or think. This tendency will be criticized as the delegation of judicial responsibility, a delegation which is particularly inappropriate when the matters delegated to medical opinion fall outside medical competence.