In “Legal Reasons, Sources and Gaps”, Joseph Raz points out that statements of reasons – mainly, conclusive legal reasons – are the most basic category of legal analysis. The conceptual importance of statements of legal reason implies that legal philosophers must use them to explain other legal concepts. In this sense, Raz claims that conclusive reason is a useful analytical tool for dealing with a classic problem of legal philosophy: gaps in the law. Raz defends a particular form of indeterminacy of law, which are ordinary gaps produced by the imprecision of the concepts used in the formulation of legal norms (when the law speaks with an uncertain voice) or by specific conflicting legal reasons (when the law speaks with many voices). In such cases, judges have discretion to resolve legal disputes. However, he denies that the law can have genuine gaps (when the law is silent) and, in those cases, judges lack discretion. In this paper, I criticise Raz’s arguments for denying the existence of genuine gaps in the law and suggest an alternative which partially preserves Raz’s intuitions but does not compromise with their implausible consequences.

This paper confronts the continued viability of two entrenched features of administrative law in Singapore. First, it argues that the taxonomy for organising the grounds of judicial review (illegality, irrationality and procedural fairness) is likely to be incrementally tested in Singapore through the development of newer grounds of judicial review. This paper looks at three particular grounds of review to exemplify this: review for errors of law; review for errors of fact and the doctrine of substantive legitimate expectations. Secondly, and related to the first, the paper interrogates the continued utility of the 'truism' that courts should only review the 'legality' and not the 'merits' of executive decision-making. It argues that this may no longer be an optimal way of balancing the various competing constitutional imperatives at play when determining the appropriate scope of judicial review by courts. Following this critique, the paper provides preliminary thoughts on two modest proposals for how administrative law can move forward to account for the developments that are testing these features of the law. It proposes: (a) a gradual and incremental move away from a taxonomy or categorisation of grounds of review to an approach organised around varying the nature and intensity of review to demarcate the scope and boundaries of judicial review; and (b) a more intentional and careful consideration of the way in which remedies are pleaded by applicants and framed by the courts in their rulings.

In 2005, the archaic laws of sedition were summoned to counteract speech considered offensive to racial and religious groups in Singapore. Under the Sedition Act, it is seditious to, inter alia, promote feelings of ill-will and hostility between different races or classes of the population. In a later case involving religious proselytisation, a Christian couple was charged and convicted of sedition under the same section. This article examines this new phenomenon. It investigates the manner in which these laws have been employed and jurisprudentially developed to restrain speech on race and/or religion in Singapore. The article argues that the current state of the law is highly problematic for its adverse impact on free speech as well as for its conceptual confusions with alternative bases for restraining speech. It contends that failure to extricate the existing conceptual confusions is adverse to free speech and community integration in the long run. A threefold legal framework is proposed to provide clearer guidance on inter-racial and inter-religious interaction within the Singaporean society.

Since 1981, Singapore courts have the power, upon granting a decree which terminates a marriage, to order the division between the spouses of matrimonial assets which they had acquired during the course of the marriage. This article discusses this power as part of the law on the effect of marriage upon the ownership of assets. It examines the scope of the power as it has been developed by the courts and suggests improvements should an amendment be contemplated.

I wish in this article to deal with some difficult questions of constitutional theory in relation to the evolution of Singapore’s constitution. I hope also in the process to present an exegesis of Singapore’s constitutional history which will provide a basis for further consideration of constitutional matters of a more practical kind. I do not advance so far as to consider institutions as such, or to consider the future development of the Constitution. I believe, however, that after eighteen years of stability under a democratic system of government, it is now necessary for Singaporeans to examine their institutions carefully, especially as the Republic, after progressing from precarious survival to economic success, will soon be entering a new phase in her history under new leaders.

A term commonly used in both common law and civil law jurisdictions and in domestic_x000D_ and international tribunals is the Latin term amicus curiae or a 'friend of the court'. Who is this friend of the court and what is his role in legal proceedings? Largely because of the remarkable manner in which this ancient institution has developed in different legal systems and been used differently even in countries sharing a common legal tradition, such as the United States and the Commonwealth countries, the important question is whether the amicus curiae can still be considered a 'friend' of any tribunal or decision maker. Has this friendship been well maintained or significantly abused over the years?

Can a lender take a security interest over an orbiting satellite? This article addresses this question under the laws of Australia, the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China, and Singapore. The results of this comparative inquiry highlight the legal challenges that reduce the attractiveness of satellite security interests and, as a corollary, the prospects for asset-based satellite financing. More generally, this inquiry indicates the need for space-focused law reform across the region, given the technical and commercial changes underway in the current ‘NewSpace’ era.