Since 1981, Singapore courts have the power, upon granting a decree which terminates a marriage, to order the division between the spouses of matrimonial assets which they had acquired during the course of the marriage. This article discusses this power as part of the law on the effect of marriage upon the ownership of assets. It examines the scope of the power as it has been developed by the courts and suggests improvements should an amendment be contemplated.

I wish in this article to deal with some difficult questions of constitutional theory in relation to the evolution of Singapore’s constitution. I hope also in the process to present an exegesis of Singapore’s constitutional history which will provide a basis for further consideration of constitutional matters of a more practical kind. I do not advance so far as to consider institutions as such, or to consider the future development of the Constitution. I believe, however, that after eighteen years of stability under a democratic system of government, it is now necessary for Singaporeans to examine their institutions carefully, especially as the Republic, after progressing from precarious survival to economic success, will soon be entering a new phase in her history under new leaders.

A term commonly used in both common law and civil law jurisdictions and in domestic_x000D_ and international tribunals is the Latin term amicus curiae or a 'friend of the court'. Who is this friend of the court and what is his role in legal proceedings? Largely because of the remarkable manner in which this ancient institution has developed in different legal systems and been used differently even in countries sharing a common legal tradition, such as the United States and the Commonwealth countries, the important question is whether the amicus curiae can still be considered a 'friend' of any tribunal or decision maker. Has this friendship been well maintained or significantly abused over the years?

Can a lender take a security interest over an orbiting satellite? This article addresses this question under the laws of Australia, the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China, and Singapore. The results of this comparative inquiry highlight the legal challenges that reduce the attractiveness of satellite security interests and, as a corollary, the prospects for asset-based satellite financing. More generally, this inquiry indicates the need for space-focused law reform across the region, given the technical and commercial changes underway in the current ‘NewSpace’ era.

This paper makes a medium-term forecast of the future of banking and financial law and lawyers internationally. It expresses the view that the law is essential to societies and that the basic purpose of the law is survival. It explains the rationale of banks as intermediaries for credit, discusses the important role of banking and financial law in the hierarchy of law, shows that there has been a very rapid increase in the size of the law, commencing from 1830 onwards, offers some reasons for the growth of the law and legal risk, such as globalisation and the intensification of regulatory regimes, proposes that there will be a strong demand medium-term for banking and financial lawyers of outstanding competence who can put the world together legally, explains the families of law, discusses various classes of legal risk and explains the high responsibilities undertaken by lawyers_x000D_ in their role in societies.

The complex relationship between negligence and autonomy is of increasing practical and theoretical interest, as is shown by recent cases such as Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11, Shaw v Kovac [2017] EWCA Civ 1028 and ACB v Thomson Medical Pte Ltd [2017] SGCA 20. My discussion of this relationship divides into three parts. In the first part, I make some general observations about the relationship between negligence law and autonomy. In the second part, I argue that interference with autonomy per se should not be recognised as a form of damage that grounds a negligence claim, although I acknowledge that it may be useful for the law to recognise specific forms of autonomy loss as damage in this sense. And in the third and final part, I consider the uneasy relationship between negligence doctrine and patient autonomy in the law of liability for medical non-disclosure, and argue that as a result of recent developments, this may no longer be properly described as liability for negligence.

This paper analyzes the role of multiculturalism in the exercise of administrative discretion. Whether the setting is national security or social welfare eligibility, standards of justice rise or fall on the judgments of individual "front-line" decision-makers. Such decision-makers are the human face of the state. Against this contextual backdrop, this paper addresses a series of critical questions, including: To what extent is the exercise of discretion specifically, and the character of the administrative state more generally, determined by culture and identity? Will decision-makers in a representative public service treat members of their own communities differently than members of other communities? Administrative culture and culture of the society at large are deeply entangled in the exercise of discretion. The reasons for discretionary decisions, in other words, must grapple with and not sidestep the values, beliefs and administrative structures which underlie them. This approach is elaborated in the Canadian context, with particular emphasis on the policy of the federal government to achieve a multicultural public service and the development of impartiality and fairness standards in Canadian administrative law.