Inherent in any public housing system which seeks to provide subsidised housing for sale is the need to impose restrictions on ownership and alienation in order to prevent abuse by those who would seek to exploit those subsidies for profit. In Singapore, section 51(10) of the Housing and Development Act restricts the operation of resulting and constructive trusts over property sold by the Housing and Development Board ("HDB"). It has been accepted since the 2009 decision of Tan Chui Lian v Neo Liew Eng that under this provision, a person "ineligible" to acquire an interest in a HDB flat may not become entitled to a flat under a resulting or constructive trust. However, recent cases have questioned the focus on eligibility and cast doubt on the effect of section 51(10) on the underlying trust. This article examines these developments and proposes a framework for the reconciliation of common law equitable doctrines with the provisions of the Housing and Development Act.

In recent years, there has been a proliferation of international consumer, employment and ‘gig’ economy contracts, many of which come with arbitration agreements. Although arbitration agree- ments are generally given legal effect, courts often refuse to enforce them on the basis of unconscio- nability if they are particularly disadvantageous to the consumer or worker. After surveying the state of the law of unconscionability in the United Kingdom (under English law), Singapore, Canada, Australia and the United States, we identify problems with the doctrine in the context of arbitration agreements, namely that its vague and confusing nature has the potential to undermine the doctrine of competence-competence, the predictability of arbitration agreements and ultimately the parties’ freedom of contract. As we suggest, these problems could, without legislative intervention, mark the end of arbitration in the context of consumer, employment and ‘gig’ economy contracts. We propose two ways in which courts could make the doctrine of unconscionability more manageable and less problematic: by requiring that the victim have an identifiable frailty and by clarifying that independent advice for the victim usually assuages inequalities. We conclude by arguing that each of these reforms is consistent with the five most prominent theoretical justifications that have been offered for the doctrine of unconscionability.

Since the crypto winter began in early 2022, several market crashes and institutional collapses have ravaged the innovative financial ecosystem. Among global regulators, the major discourse is no longer the full prohibition of crypto-related activities but the protection of traditional financial systems from a “great” crypto crisis capable of disrupting financial stability. However, existing regulatory frameworks lack clarity on major aspects of the crypto ecosystem, especially relating to new associational risks and its potential to drive systemic risks among crypto conglomerates. This article examines the anatomy of recent crypto crashes and highlights the limitations of existing global regulatory developments toward preventing these threats from potentially spreading to traditional financial systems. To these emerging concerns, the article argues for the adoption of an entity-based approach to crypto regulations. Specifically, it proposes the application of adjusted prudential regulations to a new category of systemically important crypto intermediaries (SICIs) like traditional systemic institutions.

This article explores some of the changes that the 4th Industrial Revolution brings to our understanding of money. Our analysis does not suggest that the only valid form of money is that provided or backed by the state.We rather argue that it is unlikely that money-like means of payment will prove sustainable in the long-term if not perceived as being vested with some form of legality. Still, mere legality will not prove to be sufficient for the new payment instruments to qualify as money. They must also prove to be able to serve as means of exchange/payment. A sharp reduction in value will diminish the credibility of the payment promise and thus user confidence/trust. Like acceptance of payment on sight, the use of money as a common measure of value is one of the most important properties of fiat (and metallic) money. Retention of value in times of stress is fundamental as regards the new assets' ability to act as a measure of value and its ability to fit with common perceptions of money. The requisite enquiry should be based on empirical studies of the intertemporal behaviour of the instrument. We suggest that fiat money aside, instruments that could eventually qualify as_x000D_ “money" ought to pass the dual test of legality and relative retention of value. This approach does not suggest a return to the metallic rule, which would limit free circulation of money. It is rather a pragmatic reformulation of the characteristics that means of payment, which do not enjoy the backing (will) of the state, must exhibit to enjoy quasi-money or money-like status. Assets that display high volatility are, thus, unlikely to fulfil the functions of “money" and should instead be dealt under the law of investments if they qualify as such.

As comparative lawyer Otto Kahn-Freund observed in the mid-1970s, there is a "far reaching free trade in legal ideas. Far reaching, not all embracing". We see this manifested in the law of privacy, whether understood in the traditional sense of freedom from intrusion into private life or some more extended sense of, for instance, control over personal information or physical or sensory integrity stretching beyond the enjoyment of an intimate interior private life. On the one hand, there is a great deal of cross-fertilisation across jurisdictions as elements of the law of one are copied in others, allowing certain broad groupings to evolve. On the other hand, there are still many differences between and within these groupings which may be partly due to the different legal contexts of the laws, but are also partly due to factors having to do with different social-cultural histories and norms, as well as different political environments within which laws are developed, interpreted, and enforced. These tensions have ongoing implications for the protection of privacy in the digital century. Yet there are hopeful signs of the possibility of convergence around legal standards of privacy protection in the future, as in the present and past—for all the legal, social-cultural and political differences that remain and for all the new challenges to privacy that we can expect to see.

Section 4(1)( c ) of the Singapore Trustees Act gives trustees the power to invest in land, as does the corresponding provision of the Malaysian Trustee Act. However, the power is subject to restrictions and, although it has existed for over fifty years, there are no reported cases on it. This article reviews the restrictions on the trustees' powers to invest in land in the light of the legislative history of the provision and concludes with a recommendation for reform of the law.