Transnational crime must be seen as a by-product of globalization. The same technological means which integrate the world's markets are used in the commission of crimes that have global effects. The need for the evolution of common rules and procedures to combat them is now coming to be recognized through the formulation of conventions and treaties containing common rules and strategies. These international standards have to be translated into domestic law, thus giving rise in the criminal law systems of states to a distinct body of crimes that are not dependent on the morality or the security of that state alone but on the concerns of other states and the global community as a whole. This would necessarily create a new limb in every criminal law system. The development of this new limb of the domestic criminal law will increasingly be dictated by events outside the state. This article is an effort at detailing the parameters of this new limb and at outlining the course of its possible future development.

This article discusses the changing ways in which information is produced, stored, and shared—exemplified by the rise of social-networking sites like Facebook and controversies over the activities of WikiLeaks—and the implications for privacy and data protection. Legal protections of privacy have always been reactive, but the coherence of any legal regime has also been undermined by the lack of a strong theory of what privacy is. There is more promise in the narrower field of data protection. Singapore, which does not recognise a right to privacy, has positioned itself as an e-commerce hub but had no law on data protection until the passage of the Personal Data Protection Act 2012. The passage of that law suggests the possibilities and limitations of an approach to data protection that eschews both the European Union's privacy-rights-based approach and the ad hoc sectoral patches_x000D_ that characterise the U.S. approach to the subject.

How a court responds to an ouster clause or other attempts to curb its jurisdiction, which seeks to exclude or limit judicial review over a public law dispute, is a reflection of the judicial perception of its role within a specific constitutional order. Article 4 of the Singapore Constitution declares the supremacy of constitutional law over all other forms of law—whether statutory, common law or customary in origin. The courts have judicially declared various unwritten constitutional principles which are of particular relevance to the question of the scope of judicial review, particularly, the separation of powers and the rule of law.With comparative references where illuminating, this article examines the scope of judicial review in Singapore administrative law, in the face of legislative intent that it be partially truncated or wholly excluded, with a view to identifying and evaluating the factors_x000D_ that have been judicially considered relevant in ascertaining the legitimacy of an ouster clause,_x000D_ including the Article 93 judicial power clauses and the inter-play of other constitutional principles.

Below is a brief account of some of the legislation passed by Parliament and the treaties entered into during the period January-October 1990. Recent court decisions of significance during the period are also noted. A brief account of the work of the Regional Centre for Arbitration in Kuala Lumpur is also given. The report concluded with a list of some of the legal conferences/seminars held during the period, together with the paper/s presented.

Public bodies are endowed with far-reaching administrative powers to formulate and implement policy. Administrative law focuses upon the extent of these powers, the way in which they are exercised and controlled, and on the relationship between public bodies and those who are affected by decision-making. With the growth of executive power, judicial review has emerged as a necessary counterweight to assure accountability in the decision-making of government authorities. Against such a background, this article evaluates the contribution which judicial review has made to combating air pollution in Hong Kong to date. It essays a variety of reasons to do with Hong Kong's colonial past as to why judicial review has, in general, been a dilute force for accountability of administrators and especially so when a decision has environmental implications.

In criminal cases, it has been emphasised repeatedly that our Court of Appeal is a creature of statute and is hence only seised of the jurisdiction that has been conferred upon it by the relevant provisions in the legislation creating it. This has resulted in the Court of Appeal steadfastly refusing to reopen criminal cases already disposed of finally by way of appeal. However, in the arena of civil cases, the Court of Appeal possesses an inherent jurisdiction, which it uses to achieve a variety of results. Given that the inherent jurisdiction of the Court flows (arguably) not from the nature of cases it is hearing but the status of the Court itself, this article poses the question as to whether the distinction of the Court's inherent jurisdiction across criminal and civil cases is necessarily a sound one, and seeks to provide a possible answer.

It is recognised here that normative systems do not confer the position of not being targeted by an agent without power, which then implies that nobody can properly claim, from the internal perspective, to be the holder of an immunity. In its Hohfeldian meaning, the word “immunity” is just a mere linguistic resource used to describe some consequences coming from the absence of power. Since there is no normative way to confer an immunity, namely because a “norm of incompetence” is not a norm, speaking about an immunity as a legal position is to confuse norms with norm propositions. And once an immunity is seen as a mere deontic nothingness, there is no possible use of the word beyond the description of such a normative absence.

Discovery is a fundamental feature of the civil suit because of its impact on the course and outcome of the litigation. This article examines the development of the discovery process from the time of the first statutory code governing civil procedure, the Civil Procedure Ordinance, 1878, to the Rules of the Supreme Court, 1970. The article also measures the effectiveness of the process during this period, and considers the viability of the traditional policies which had governed it for so long.

To add life to the years that have been added to life._x000D_ _x000D_ By 2030, Singapore's elderly will make up a staggering 19% of the population. With such a large proportion of people becoming old, it is timely to pay some attention to the broad spectrum of legal issues surrounding elders. Several sociological and statistical studies have been done on the elderly Singapore, yet relatively little has been written on the law relating to them. Much of the present legislation which directly or indirectly addresses the problems of the elderly in Singapore relate to their financial arrangements. Examples of these are provisions relating to withdrawal of Central Provident Fund ("CPF") monies and the age of retirement_x000D_ _x000D_ This article explores selected issues relating to financial support of Singapore's elderly, and highlights some areas in which the law does and can further play an effective role to safeguard their interest. Other equally important issues on housing, succession, divorce, capacity, elder abuse and crimes that impact the elderly are left for discussion elsewhere.

The core context of duress considered here is where one party (the 'duressor') threatens to do something, to avoid which the party threatened (the 'duressee') accedes to the duressor's demands and contracts with him on his terms. If what the duressor threatens to do is unlawful, the contract can be set aside, and restitution can be had of any benefits transferred. Unlawful act duress includes duress to the person, duress of goods, and threatened breach of contract. Do the same consequences follow if what the duressor threatens to do is lawful in itself? This is lawful act duress.