How a court responds to an ouster clause or other attempts to curb its jurisdiction, which seeks to exclude or limit judicial review over a public law dispute, is a reflection of the judicial perception of its role within a specific constitutional order. Article 4 of the Singapore Constitution declares the supremacy of constitutional law over all other forms of law—whether statutory, common law or customary in origin. The courts have judicially declared various unwritten constitutional principles which are of particular relevance to the question of the scope of judicial review, particularly, the separation of powers and the rule of law.With comparative references where illuminating, this article examines the scope of judicial review in Singapore administrative law, in the face of legislative intent that it be partially truncated or wholly excluded, with a view to identifying and evaluating the factors_x000D_ that have been judicially considered relevant in ascertaining the legitimacy of an ouster clause,_x000D_ including the Article 93 judicial power clauses and the inter-play of other constitutional principles.

Below is a brief account of some of the legislation passed by Parliament and the treaties entered into during the period January-October 1990. Recent court decisions of significance during the period are also noted. A brief account of the work of the Regional Centre for Arbitration in Kuala Lumpur is also given. The report concluded with a list of some of the legal conferences/seminars held during the period, together with the paper/s presented.

Public bodies are endowed with far-reaching administrative powers to formulate and implement policy. Administrative law focuses upon the extent of these powers, the way in which they are exercised and controlled, and on the relationship between public bodies and those who are affected by decision-making. With the growth of executive power, judicial review has emerged as a necessary counterweight to assure accountability in the decision-making of government authorities. Against such a background, this article evaluates the contribution which judicial review has made to combating air pollution in Hong Kong to date. It essays a variety of reasons to do with Hong Kong's colonial past as to why judicial review has, in general, been a dilute force for accountability of administrators and especially so when a decision has environmental implications.

In criminal cases, it has been emphasised repeatedly that our Court of Appeal is a creature of statute and is hence only seised of the jurisdiction that has been conferred upon it by the relevant provisions in the legislation creating it. This has resulted in the Court of Appeal steadfastly refusing to reopen criminal cases already disposed of finally by way of appeal. However, in the arena of civil cases, the Court of Appeal possesses an inherent jurisdiction, which it uses to achieve a variety of results. Given that the inherent jurisdiction of the Court flows (arguably) not from the nature of cases it is hearing but the status of the Court itself, this article poses the question as to whether the distinction of the Court's inherent jurisdiction across criminal and civil cases is necessarily a sound one, and seeks to provide a possible answer.

It is recognised here that normative systems do not confer the position of not being targeted by an agent without power, which then implies that nobody can properly claim, from the internal perspective, to be the holder of an immunity. In its Hohfeldian meaning, the word “immunity” is just a mere linguistic resource used to describe some consequences coming from the absence of power. Since there is no normative way to confer an immunity, namely because a “norm of incompetence” is not a norm, speaking about an immunity as a legal position is to confuse norms with norm propositions. And once an immunity is seen as a mere deontic nothingness, there is no possible use of the word beyond the description of such a normative absence.

Discovery is a fundamental feature of the civil suit because of its impact on the course and outcome of the litigation. This article examines the development of the discovery process from the time of the first statutory code governing civil procedure, the Civil Procedure Ordinance, 1878, to the Rules of the Supreme Court, 1970. The article also measures the effectiveness of the process during this period, and considers the viability of the traditional policies which had governed it for so long.

To add life to the years that have been added to life._x000D_ _x000D_ By 2030, Singapore's elderly will make up a staggering 19% of the population. With such a large proportion of people becoming old, it is timely to pay some attention to the broad spectrum of legal issues surrounding elders. Several sociological and statistical studies have been done on the elderly Singapore, yet relatively little has been written on the law relating to them. Much of the present legislation which directly or indirectly addresses the problems of the elderly in Singapore relate to their financial arrangements. Examples of these are provisions relating to withdrawal of Central Provident Fund ("CPF") monies and the age of retirement_x000D_ _x000D_ This article explores selected issues relating to financial support of Singapore's elderly, and highlights some areas in which the law does and can further play an effective role to safeguard their interest. Other equally important issues on housing, succession, divorce, capacity, elder abuse and crimes that impact the elderly are left for discussion elsewhere.

The core context of duress considered here is where one party (the 'duressor') threatens to do something, to avoid which the party threatened (the 'duressee') accedes to the duressor's demands and contracts with him on his terms. If what the duressor threatens to do is unlawful, the contract can be set aside, and restitution can be had of any benefits transferred. Unlawful act duress includes duress to the person, duress of goods, and threatened breach of contract. Do the same consequences follow if what the duressor threatens to do is lawful in itself? This is lawful act duress.

Singapore has seen a proliferation of contemporary art exhibitions and auctions in recent years. Installation art, like the infamous shark suspended in a tank of formaldehyde, can be worth millions of dollars in the world of contemporary art. This article examines whether installation artworks can satisfy the requirements for the subsistence of copyright in Singapore. The intrinsic characteristics of installation art, including the transient nature of particular works and its frequent use of ready made and natural objects, seem to be in conflict with the statutory definition of an 'artistic work' and with the copyright subsistence requirements of fixation and originality. The authors argue that there should not be a per se rule either against the recognition of installation works as sculptures—a specific category of artistic works—or more generally as artistic works. It will examine three of the most famous—and controversial—Turner Prize-nominated and winning works as illustrative case_x000D_ studies. The article also suggests that 'artistic purpose' is likely to have a more prominent role in the_x000D_ evaluative criteria used by courts for the classification of 'artistic works', particularly in the courts'_x000D_ approach to non-propositional installation works.

The profit element features as a central component in the definition of a partnership. Indeed, profit sharing between the parties has been singled out for statutory prima facie presumption of a partnership. As to how important this factor of profit sharing serves as an indicium of partnership - whether such a presumption can actually stand on its own or whether it has to be placed in its proper perspective as it interacts with other indicia in the totality of the circumstances before one can conclusively infer the existence of a partnership (with all the ancillary advantages and liabilities) - is an issue that will be discussed at length in this present paper.