Judicial case management is a delicate work of art. On one hand, it is said that justice hurried is justice buried. The courts must carefully adjudicate each case based on its merits to ensure that an accurate outcome would be realised. To this end, judges are often concerned with obtaining all available evidence before assessing each claim. Yet, on the other hand, it has been remarked that justice delayed is justice denied. As such, the courts are also mindful that cases must move along in a fairly expeditious manner. The prevailing attitude of both English and Singapore courts is therefore to balance the enforcement of procedural discipline with the imperative to judge a case on its substantive merits. This article argues that such a "balancing" approach is not the most appropriate philosophy to adopt. Instead, it proposes a "lexical priority" approach where procedural discipline occupies a prior position to substantive justice, preceding the latter by way of a precondition. It offers justifications for the "lexical priority" approach and exposes the shortcomings of the "balancing" approach by examining the English and Singapore jurisprudence on case management.

The right to confront one's accusers is granted widely by international and European human rights conventions, as well as by the US Constitution's 6th Amendment, though not recognised, at least explicitly, by Singapore law. This article argues for a non-instrumental view of that right, ie one not solely designed by reference to the hearsay rule, enlisting the remarkable trial of SirWalter Raleigh, in 1603, for treason to support the case, in principle, for such a view being taken. The article goes on to consider the confrontation right in three jurisdictions, namely the US, the European Court of Human Rights and England, where very different views of it have been taken. It then raises the possibility that some recent reforms to Singapore law entail confrontation issues. It concludes that, whatever else is done about the right to confrontation, it should, just like other human rights, be taken seriously.

The common law represents an ongoing negotiation between past precedents and present-day principles and policies. If, as will be argued, the basis of the common law and judicial review in particular is the courts' duty to protect the individual from the effects of dominant power, then we must look to where that dominant power will increasingly reside. In the past, that power resided predominantly with the state. The future promises to be one with metanational private organisations disrupting that monopoly of power through their contractual relationships with us. Not if but when that situation materialises, the public-private function distinction that presently delineates the application of judicial review principles will increasingly sound quaint. We should therefore turn our attention to examining how judicial review principles—developed over centuries to control dominant statebased power—can be adapted to regulate the contractual relationships between powerful private organisations and us. This has possible wide-ranging implications, including a growing irrelevance of judicial review procedure, and contract law doctrines exerting at least an anchoring effect on how judicial review principles evolve.

This article undertakes a comparative study of the Malaysian and Singaporean systems of private caveats on the following three areas: the priority of unregistered interests, the entry of further caveats and the requirements to sustain a caveat. It seeks to determine the jurisdiction which best facilitates the policy objectives of the Torrens system of land registration in the three areas discussed.

The Singapore High Court can grant financial relief only when it is granting a decree of divorce, separation or nullity of marriage. It has no jurisdiction to grant such relief when a marriage has already been dissolved by a foreign court. This article examines the difficulties faced by ex-spouses who wish to seek financial relief in Singapore after a foreign divorce.

In an era where the private sector increasingly assumes functions which hitherto have been performed by the state, questions are being asked whether public law in its present form should not be revised to safeguard the interests of the citizens. It is against this backdrop that the article seeks to examine some of the basic questions of public law. Part I will consider approaches used both in England and in Singapore in defining the scope of public law. Part II will seek to examine some implications which may result from a recognition of the present limits of public law when placed against the changing functions of the state, and to consider the purpose for which public law ought to achieve.

Notwithstanding that s. 216 of the Singapore Companies Act, on a literal construction, extends the oppression remedy to debentureholders of a company, there have to date been no reported cases in Singapore involving any attempted use of the oppression remedy by debentureholders. This article first explores the origins of the references to 'debentureholders' in s. 216. This article then proceeds to examine the scope of the s. 216 remedy in a debentureholder context, and concludes by discussing a number of principles upon which a fairness analysis in a debentureholder context may be undertaken.

Guardianship and custody in family law regulates the relationship between a child and the adults who exercise authority over him or her. This article attempts to restate the basic principles. The concept of guardianship should be understood in relation with parenthood. The settled family law meaning of the guardian should be preserved to maintain the appropriate balance of authority between the parents, the guardian and casual minders of the child. The welfare principle is ubiquitous to resolve all guardianship applications. The courts should exercise their powers in guardianship applications to preserve parental responsibility. The law works optimally when these basic principles become firmly established.

This paper looks at the recommendation by the Securities Industry Council to revise the mandatory bid threshold in the Singapore Code on Take-overs and Mergers from the present 25% to a higher level. It is suggested that the price formation process in Singapore be studied and the welfare implications of such changes be considered before embarking on such revisions.

The doctrine of consideration has come under increasing attack. In Gay Choon Ing v. Loh Sze_x000D_ Ti Terence Peter, Andrew Phang Boon Leong J.A. of the Singapore Court of Appeal raises the_x000D_ spectre of its replacement with the doctrines of economic duress, undue influence, unconscionability and promissory estoppel. In response to the reasoning of Phang J.A. and others, I argue that: _x000D_ (i) consideration is not a meaningless doctrine; in particular, the adequacy of consideration is relevant to the enforceability of an agreement and 'practical benefit' can be made a meaningful concept;_x000D_ (ii) contract law does not, and should not, enforce all seriously intended undertakings; and (iii) the vitiating factors do not simply interrogate the presence of contractual intention and cannot replace the functions performed by consideration.