Expenses incurred in the production of gross income would be deductible so that it would only be net income which would be subject to income tax. Expenses, to be deductible, must satisfy certain statutory requirements under the Income Tax Act. This article examines the general principles of deductibility under the Act and identifies and addresses potential problems in the application of these statutory requirements.

In this article, I critically examine the evolution of fraudulent sex criminalisation in Singapore and make two contributions. First, I demonstrate that the major amendments to the relevant Penal Code provisions (ie, in 2007 and 2019) were made pursuant to an attempted importation of English legal provisions, without due regard to the synergetic relationship between the imported provisions and the existing provisions in both the Penal Code and the English statutes. Second, I normatively assess the 2019 reform. I argue that the 2019 reform is desirable for two reasons: (1) the reform finally brings the plain-wording of the statutory provisions in line with what the government is prepared to fully enforce; and (2) the ostensible decriminalisation of fraudulent sex is mitigated by the broadlyworded cheating offences and the undisturbed broad judicial interpretation of how "fear of injury" may vitiate sexual consent.

The Land Titles Act permits limited application of the law of acquiring title by adverse possession to registered land. This article examines the provisions of the Act and recent cases on the interpretation of these provisions. The Land Titles Bill 1992 proposes to abolish acquisition of title by adverse possession altogether in regard to registered land. The proposed amendment and the transitional provisions are also considered.

A unifying principle underlying the economic torts - interference with contract, conspiracy, intimidation and unlawful interference with trade or business - has yet to be authoritatively recognised by the courts. For this reason, the development of the underlying legal and policy bases of liability and non-liability with respect to these torts has been hindered to a considerable extent. The current boundaries of their operation are consequently also unduly restricted, and they co-exist somewhat uncomfortably with analogous and overlapping principles of liability in other areas of the law, principally equity. This article offers some suggestions as to the rationalisation and resolution of some of these issues and attempts to map what, in the writer's view, is the best way forward. In particular, it is submitted that a general principle of liability for intentionally inflected non-physical harm, subject to a sufficiently wide and pliable defence of justification, should be recognised by the common law.

In the current race towards the staking of claims in the new life sciences, some of the most important and fundamental legal and ethical questions relating to rights and property in the human body, organs, tissue and other human by-products remain unanswered. This paper explores the current approach of the common law to the question of rights to the human body and human body tissue or organs. Relevant existing statutory provisions in Singapore are also examined. Is it possible to assert a legal right to property in the human body at common law? Is there a distinction between organs and tissues obtained from cadavers, and from that which is obtained from living donors? What is or should be the proper balance of rights between tissue donors, commercial concerns and end users? What is the proper object of public policy in relation to the protection of individual dignity and the encouragement of biotechnological advances? In section I of this article, the underlying assumptions of the common law are examined. In section 2, the impact of the absence of clear law in this area is explored in the context of the Bristol Royal Infirmary Inquiry case. In section 3, the dimension of consent to the taking of human tissue is explored, and its relevance to claims to rights to retention, and of property. In section 4, relevant Singapore statutory provisions are examined. In section 5, the rights of living donors in the common law are considered. Section 6 deals with living donors and their rights under the statutory law.

This article focuses on choice of law in the context of Internet defamation with reference to a recent Australian High Court decision, Dow Jones v. Gutnick. The case raised a myriad of issues ranging from comparative defamation laws (and values systems) of the United States versus Australia, the meaning of "publication" and the need for Internet-specific legal reforms. These issues interact with and have an impact upon the choice of law problem. This article discusses the various alternatives for resolving the choice of law problem. It concludes by tentatively recommending some choice of law rules in the context of Internet defamation.

Deemed "the first severe and readily transmissible new disease to emerge in the 21st century", Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome ('SARS') took the world by shock. Originating from Guangdong province in the People's Republic of China in mid-November 2002, the disease spread to some 30 countries within a matter of weeks. By August 2003, the World Health Organisation had reported 8422 cases of confirmed SARS, of which 916 resulted in death of the patient. This article examines the legislative changes the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of China government implemented in its fight to contain the disease, regional initiatives taken, and the border control measures adopted by the Hong Kong Government in order to prevent the transmission of SARS. Finally, the article discusses the effectiveness of such measures and provides recommendations in the anticipation of another SARS or SARS-like epidemic.

This article examines the theoretical justifications, historical origins and contemporary scope of the constitutional liberty of religious propagation, against the competing interests clothing it with a controversial character. To elucidate the quality of religious freedom within a secular democracy and the meaning of associated concepts of 'tolerance', 'pluralism and citizenship, in Singapore, it examines how the state regulates this external dimension of religious liberty, whether through legislative sanction or soft constitutional lawnorms seeking to promote compliance with non-binding government articulated standards. Two recent 'cautionary tales' are analysed to ascertain the contours of religious propagation in practice: the 2009 decision of PP v. Ong Kian Cheong where religious propagation fell afoul of sedition law, and the non-judicial management of the 'Lighthouse Evangelism' controversy_x000D_ where the authorities received complaints from offended Buddhists, Taoists and unaffiliated_x000D_ netizens about a church website video containing 'insensitive' comments.

The recent Court of Appeal decision in BNP Paribas v. Jurong Shipyard Pte Ltd is a landmark decision on the insolvency tests in s. 254 of the Companies Act. Although the court did not expressly decline to follow English law, various propositions in the judgment mark the beginning of a distinct Singaporean jurisprudence on the meaning of the insolvency tests. This article explains the old law, which is poorly understood due to a lack of discussion, and examines the extent to which that has been altered by BNP.