This article deals with the ambit of the scope of the term 'common gaming house', found in section 2 of the Common Gaming Houses Act (Cap 49, 1985 Rev Ed). The ambit of the term is important, as many activities are made an offence by the Act only if they occur on premises that are deemed by the Act to be a 'common gaming house'.

Singapore's broadly-worded general anti-avoidance rule ("GAAR") borrowed heavily from the antitax avoidance provisions of Australia and New Zealand. It was Parliament's intention that local courts be guided by the case law of these jurisdictions in interpreting and applying the GAAR. This article discusses the different approaches that the judiciary in these two countries had adopted in interpreting and applying their respective anti-avoidance provisions, and suggests that this divergence could be attributed to a fundamental difference in the level of importance accorded to the Duke of Westminster principle. It is unclear from the Singapore High Court decision of UOL Development (Novena) Pte. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Stamp Duty whether one approach is to be preferred over the other. This article argues that it is imperative to bear in mind the reason behind the different approaches of both Australian and New Zealand courts in charting the course for a local GAAR jurisprudence.

The par value regime has always been accepted as one of the cornerstones of our company law. The functions of the par value of shares are to fix the maximum liability of a shareholder and to protect the creditors of a company. However, the regime also entails many shortcomings, which have prompted many law commissions to suggest for its abolishment. Australia is the latest country that has done away with the par value regime. This article reviews the problems posed be the par value regime and evaluates the alternative regimes.

There has been much judicial and academic debate over the proper scope of and rationale underlying the principle in ex parte James, and in particular its conferral of de facto insolvency priority on the successful claimant. This article attempts to review the principle's operation in the context of the function and principles of insolvency law, determine the actual role that it plays in dealing with post-insolvency claims and accordingly identify the justifications that can be offered for this role. It argues that the principle is better seen as an application of the liquidation expenses principle or the fair treatment of certain post-insolvency claims.

A key element of tort of breach of confidence is the nature of the relationship between the plaintiff and defendant. Recent English cases suggest that the test to be applied to determine this relationship may not be entirely clear. This article examines these cases and attempts to consider the appropriateness and consequences of the tests suggested on the law of confidence.

This article is partly historical and partly theoretical. The first part traces the history of legal professional privilege as applied in the common law and chancery courts from the sixteenth to the middle of the nineteenth century. It shows that the manner in which the purpose and role of the privilege were conceptualized had an impact on the evolution of the rule. The many judicial theories identified in the historical account are assessed at the broader level in the second part. Of all the different justifications, the privilege, it is argued, is best seen as a principle of process fairness.

On an objective interpretation of section 300(c) of the Penal Code, an offender may be convicted of murder, and the death penalty imposed, if he or she intentionally inflicts even a minor injury, which happens to cause death. This article defends the view that the objective approach is indefensible both legally and theoretically, and offers in its place a qualified subjective approach, which imposes liability under section 300(c) only where the offender intends to inflict what is subjectively known to be a serious injury that might possibly cause death.

ASEAN, an organisation for regional cooperation, will be celebrating its twenty-fifth anniversary in 1992. this is a propitious moment to reflect on the direction and pace of ASEAN progress and achievements during the past quarter of a century. Writing from the perspective of one who has been closely connected with ASEAN since its inception in 1976, the writer seeks to examine the history of ASEAN, its reocrd of achievements and its bilateral relations with some countries.

In this article, I focus on the role of law in constituting what I call 'legal charity' as a mode of social action. I begin by reflecting on how law has played a key role historically in defining a charity sector with its own distinctive character. I then turn to recent developments putting pressure on the doctrine by which law has constituted legal charity as a distinctive mode of action. Finally, I explore how law should respond to these recent developments, imagining several possible futures for the charity sector as I go, and considering whether law should continue to constitute legal charity as it has done historically, or now allow legal charity to wither and die in favour of other modes of social action.

Whilst mortgagees do not owe mortgagors any general duty of care, they may come under specific duties of care, such as the duty to take reasonable steps to obtain the market price when they exercise their power of sale. This is trite law in Singapore. However, it has recently been suggested that mortgagees ought to owe mortgagors a general duty of care whenever there is no conflict of interest between them. This would effectively impose upon mortgagees a duty of care in deciding whether and when to sell the mortgaged asset. This article supports the status quo on grounds of precedent, principle and policy. The case for a general duty of care is flawed. This article argues that no general duty of care ought to be imposed on mortgagees; in particular, mortgagees should owe mortgagors no duty of care in deciding whether and when to sell.