This article essentially examines the question as to whether there is any basis, in principle, for the existence and application of an extra-statutory defence based on the general public interest in the law of copyright in Singapore. The article begins by tracing the history of the defence of public interest that is sometimes raised by defendants in actions for copyright infringement in England. It looks at how the defence at common law- and whether correctly or not- found its way into the U.K. Copyright, Design and Patents Act 1988 and examines the interpretation accorded to it by the English courts. Adopting a comparative approach, the article then examines the issue from the Australian perspective and concludes by asking how Singapore should approach the question of public interest in our domestic law of copyright.

There is the controversy over whether human rights are a western concept. Western countries often seek to impose their standards through human rights. It is contended that human rights are alien to Asian culture. The article examines some of the issues in the Asian context and concludes that human rights are nothing new, but have long been nurtured and cherished by Asian societies, and have a strong religious and social backing in such societies, further, it is pointed out that the attempt by western powers to utilise human rights as an instrument of political pressure is resented and due regard should be paid to regional particularities.

The dichotomy traditionally drawn in copyright law between literary works and artistic works has to be reviewed in the light of recent cases, from England and Singapore, holding that circuit diagrams and the like qualify as a literary work and as an artistic work. This article examines the implications arising from the overlap between literary copyright and artistic copyright in this area.

This article explores the legal risks involved in depositing cryptocurrency with crypto-custodians such as crypto-exchanges. These risks materialise most acutely in case these crypto-custodians fall insolvent, which has happened over the last decade in several instances. Recent years have witnessed the demise of crypto-exchanges such as Cryptopia (New Zealand), QuadrigaCX (Canada), BitGrail (Italy) and a host of other crypto-exchanges around the world. These cases reveal that the qualification of the contractual and property law rights of crypto-investors is problematic. This is why this article discusses which rights crypto-investors can and should be able to assert in case a crypto-custodian falls insolvent. To answer this question, the (legal) qualification of bitcoin is analysed (can it be owned and if so, how can such ownership be created and transferred?) and the status of deposited_x000D_ bitcoins is discussed (do stored crypto-assets form a part of the crypto-custodian's insolvency estate or can they be revendicated by customers?). Private international law aspects form the starting point of the legal analysis (which court has jurisdiction to open insolvency proceedings and hear cryptoinvestors' claims, and what law applies to such claims?) and the analysis is based on the current terms and conditions of major crypto-custodians.

It is often said that the separate personality of a company may be ignored if the company is a mere 'sham' or 'facade'. In this article, it is submitted that the use of such metaphors masks the true issues. The separate personality of a company should be pierced if public policy makes it undesirable to recognise such a separate personality, and then only to the extend of avoiding the undesirable effects.

This report is a continuation of the survey on the more important developments in the area of commercial law in Indonesia published in previous editions of the Singapore Journal of Legal Studies. The present survey covers the period from January 1992 to May 1994.

The validity of statutory demands which specify a sum greater than the truly owing by the debtor is an issue which has arisen frequently in both the corporate liquidation and bankruptcy contexts. By analysing the relevant legislation, the authorities and arguments based on both policy and principle, this article attempts to show that the over-statement of the amount in a statutory demand does, in itself, result in the invalidity of the demand

This article makes two broad arguments in relation to the procedure for judicial review in Singapore. First, it argues against the traditional view that O. 53 of the Rules of Court is a separate and exclusive procedure, confined to its express provisions. The correct view should be that the other Rules of Court and the powers of the court are not excluded unless contrary to the express provisions of O. 53. Second, the article considers the effect of a little-noticed amendment which has expanded the scope of the Government Proceedings Act to include proceedings for judicial review against the Government. The practical effect of both arguments in relation to the procedure for judicial review is also discussed.

This article deals with the ambit of the scope of the term 'common gaming house', found in section 2 of the Common Gaming Houses Act (Cap 49, 1985 Rev Ed). The ambit of the term is important, as many activities are made an offence by the Act only if they occur on premises that are deemed by the Act to be a 'common gaming house'.

Singapore's broadly-worded general anti-avoidance rule ("GAAR") borrowed heavily from the antitax avoidance provisions of Australia and New Zealand. It was Parliament's intention that local courts be guided by the case law of these jurisdictions in interpreting and applying the GAAR. This article discusses the different approaches that the judiciary in these two countries had adopted in interpreting and applying their respective anti-avoidance provisions, and suggests that this divergence could be attributed to a fundamental difference in the level of importance accorded to the Duke of Westminster principle. It is unclear from the Singapore High Court decision of UOL Development (Novena) Pte. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Stamp Duty whether one approach is to be preferred over the other. This article argues that it is imperative to bear in mind the reason behind the different approaches of both Australian and New Zealand courts in charting the course for a local GAAR jurisprudence.