In the current race towards the staking of claims in the new life sciences, some of the most important and fundamental legal and ethical questions relating to rights and property in the human body, organs, tissue and other human by-products remain unanswered. This paper explores the current approach of the common law to the question of rights to the human body and human body tissue or organs. Relevant existing statutory provisions in Singapore are also examined. Is it possible to assert a legal right to property in the human body at common law? Is there a distinction between organs and tissues obtained from cadavers, and from that which is obtained from living donors? What is or should be the proper balance of rights between tissue donors, commercial concerns and end users? What is the proper object of public policy in relation to the protection of individual dignity and the encouragement of biotechnological advances? In section I of this article, the underlying assumptions of the common law are examined. In section 2, the impact of the absence of clear law in this area is explored in the context of the Bristol Royal Infirmary Inquiry case. In section 3, the dimension of consent to the taking of human tissue is explored, and its relevance to claims to rights to retention, and of property. In section 4, relevant Singapore statutory provisions are examined. In section 5, the rights of living donors in the common law are considered. Section 6 deals with living donors and their rights under the statutory law.