

SINGAPORE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

THIS section comprises two sub-sections. The first is intended for articles, notes and comments on issues relating to both private and public international law. This sub-section is not featured in this issue. The second comprises materials and information which illustrate Singapore's approach and attitude on questions of international law. The materials in the second sub-section are presented under the following headings:

- I. Policy Statements
- II. Legislation*
- III. Judicial Decisions*
- IV. Treaties (other than ASEAN Instruments)
- V. Association of South-East Asia Nations (ASEAN) Treaties, Declarations and other Instruments*
- VI. Singapore in the United Nations and other International Organisations and Conferences.

The materials are compiled from various sources, including Singapore Government Press Releases. It should be stressed that any text reproduced herein is not to be regarded as officially supplied to the Malaya Law Review. As far as possible, speeches and statements of policy are reproduced in full, but they may be edited to omit opening statements and other unrelated details.

B. MATERIALS ON SINGAPORE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

I. POLICY STATEMENTS

- (g) *OIL TRADE WITH SOUTH AFRICA: Ministry of Foreign Affairs Statement issued on 15 September 1989 (Singapore Government Press Release No. 34/SEP, 09-0/89/09/15)*

The Singapore Government is unequivocally opposed to apartheid and the racist policies of the South African Government. It has consistently supported United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolutions condemning the repressive policies and practices of the Pretoria regime.

In compliance with UNGA resolutions calling for the complete cessation of the supply of petroleum and petroleum products to South Africa, and with the Commonwealth Accord on Southern Africa calling for an oil embargo against

*There are no materials under these headings in the issue.

South Africa, the Singapore Government is banning the carriage of oil to South Africa by Singapore-flagged ships with effect from 15 September 1989. Shipping companies owned by the Singapore Government will include "end-user" clauses and other conditions in their charter agreements to ensure compliance with the embargo. Singapore-registered ships violating this ban are liable to have their registrations cancelled. An administrative ban on the export of oil and petroleum products to South Africa will also come into effect on 15 September 1989. The Trade Development Board has issued a circular (copy attached) informing companies trading in petroleum and petroleum products in Singapore of this administrative ban.

All imports from South Africa are already banned under the Prohibition of Imports (South Africa) Order, 1965. The Singapore Government firmly discourages contacts of any kind, including political, economic, military, cultural and sports, with South Africa. It is ready to cooperate in any collective international effort that will effectively prevent oil trade with South Africa and isolate the Pretoria regime.

- (h) *EVENTS IN BEIJING: Statement by Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew on 5 June 1989 (Singapore Government Press Release 12/JUN, 02-0/89/06/05)*

My Cabinet colleagues and I are shocked, horrified and saddened by this disastrous turn of events. We had expected the Chinese Government to apply the doctrine of minimum force when an army is used to quell civil disorder. Instead, the fire-power and violence used caused many deaths and casualties. They were totally disproportionate to the resistance unarmed civilians offered.

A China with large sections of her people, including her best educated, at odds with the Government, means trouble, with people resentful, reforms stalled, and economy stagnant. Because of her size, such a China could create problems for herself and her neighbours in Asia.

We hope wiser counsels will prevail to pursue conciliation, so that the Chinese people can resume the progress which the open door policies have brought them.

- (i) *PERMANENT RESIDENCE FOR HONG KONG PEOPLE: Ministry of Home Affairs Statement on 10 July 1989 (Singapore Government Press Release No. 21/JUL, 11-0/89/07/10)*

ENLARGING SINGAPORE'S WORKFORCE

The Singapore Government has decided to liberalise its rules governing permanent residence to be more attractive in competition with developed countries when recruiting skilled workers, technicians and professionals. Singapore's growing economy requires more such people than are being produced domestically. Shortage of talent means fewer foreign investors establishing businesses here, slower growth and fewer opportunities for Singaporeans. Singapore

therefore welcomes foreign immigrants who can contribute to Singapore's economy and be integrated into our society.

EXTENSION OF PERMANENT RESIDENCE SCHEME

Up to now, graduates, professionals, and entrepreneurs and their families can settle in Singapore under the Permanent Residence Scheme. The Government has now decided to offer permanent residence to technicians, craftsmen, skilled workers, white-collar workers and self-employed persons who:

- (1) have a secondary education, earn at least S\$1,500 a month and have five years of working experience; or
- (2) have at least five GCE 'O' levels or equivalent qualifications; or
- (3) acceptable trade certificates or equivalent qualifications.

Such persons will easily find similar jobs in Singapore to support themselves and their families at standards of living comparable to those they enjoy in Hong Kong, especially in view of the much lower cost of housing in Singapore.

The guidelines for investors and entrepreneurs will also be liberalised. Presently, they obtain PR by investing S\$1 million under the Deposit Scheme. This scheme will now be extended to businessmen who intend to set up and manage any business, even if the capital sum invested is less than S\$1 million, provided the project is approved by Singapore's Economic Development Board (EDB).

Successful applicants will be granted in-principle approval for permanent resident status to be taken up within five years. If they do not wish to leave Hong Kong, they can get further extensions for up to five years at a time. The entire family, including the applicant, will immediately be granted permanent residence if the family decides to relocate ahead of the candidate. The scheme will meet the needs of those who want a place of abode only if the need arises, but wish to register themselves and their family earlier, to assure themselves of this opportunity.

Entrepreneurs and businessmen can apply to the EDB Hong Kong office. All other applicants can register with SMC, a Singapore Government Company specialising in executive search and migration counselling.

- (j) *USE OF SINGAPORE'S MILITARY FACILITIES BY THE USA:
Parliamentary Statement on US Site Survey Team's visit to
Singapore by BG George Yeo, Minister of State (Finance and
Foreign Affairs) on 4 August 1989 (Singapore Government
Press Release No. 16/AUG, 08-28908/04)*

Mr Speaker Sir, I would like to keep Parliament informed of the ongoing discussions between the US Government and Singapore on the future of the US military presence in the region, and of the visit of a US site survey team to Singapore in June.

Singapore endorses the ASEAN consensus to establish a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) over the long term. However, it also recognises that until this is achieved, a continued US presence in South East Asia is desirable. This is why it has always expressed its support for a continued US presence in the region.

The impressive economic growth and prosperity enjoyed by ASEAN countries, including Singapore, over the last two decades have been made possible in large part by the stabilising influence of the US presence in Asia, including the US bases in the Philippines and the periodic visits of warships from US Seventh Fleet and aircraft from the US Air Force. At a time of considerable fluidity in international relations, a sustained US presence will maintain the balance of power in the wider region, reinforce the stable and peaceful regional environment, and enable the non-Communist countries in South East Asia to concentrate their resources on economic development.

The Philippines Government has publicly stated its desire for other ASEAN countries to share in hosting US military facilities in the region. Philippines Foreign Affairs officials have said that if other ASEAN countries are prepared to host some US facilities, they would be able to assure the Filipino people that they are not alone and that there are others who are prepared to “share the political burden” of hosting US bases. Singapore has publicly supported the presence of US bases in the Philippines. Singapore is prepared to host some US facilities to make it easier for the Philippines to continue to host the US bases there.

Both the Singapore and US Government agree that Singapore’s facilities could not possibly replace the large US facilities at Clark Airbase and Subic Naval Base. Singapore lacks both the space and the strategic location to do this.

The US and Singapore have discussed the possibility of greater US military use of some facilities in Singapore. This would not be unprecedented: the US Navy currently calls at Singapore for bunkering and repairs, US fighter aircraft have been deployed to Singapore for exercises with the RSAF and US transport aircraft use Singapore as a transit point.

The US Government sent a site survey team in June to Singapore, to study our naval and air facilities, and determine what US forces might use. The survey team comprises technical personnel, headed by a Rear Admiral from the Headquarters of the Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC).

Singapore and the US agreed that the survey team’s visit would be strictly exploratory and fact-finding, and would imply no commitment by either side to the deployment of US forces in Singapore. Its findings would not be binding, and would only form the basis for further discussions.

Singapore’s hosting of the site survey team in no way lessens Singapore’s commitment to the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA), nor should it weaken the FPDA, which will continue to contribute to regional stability. It is also consistent [*sic.*] with the principles of the Non-Aligned Movement, to which Singapore belongs, as any increased US military presence in Singapore would be to strengthen regional stability, and not for the advancement of great power rivalries.

Singapore advised all the other ASEAN and FPDA governments of the site survey before the team's visit.

- (k) *USE OF SINGAPORE'S MILITARY FACILITIES BY THE USA:*
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Statement on 18 October 1989
(Singapore Government Press Release No. 40/OCT, 09-0-89/0/8)

At the sitting of Parliament on 4 August 1989, the Minister of State for Finance and Foreign Affairs, BG George Yeo, informed Parliament of the visit of a US site survey team to Singapore in June to study our naval and air facilities and to determine what the US might use.

Singapore and the US have agreed on the increased use of Singapore's facilities. There will be more use of Singapore's maintenance and repair facilities by US naval vessels and short-term visits on a rotational basis of US aircraft to Paya Lebar Air Base. There will be a modest increase of current US use of our facilities, commencing in early 1990. Arising from this, the small number of US support personnel at present in Singapore will in due course increase to about 170.

The Singapore Government has informed the governments of the other ASEAN countries and the other members of the Five Power Defence Arrangements about the use of its facilities by the US.

- (l) *WITHDRAWAL OF VIETNAMESE FORCES FROM CAMBODIA:*
Comments by Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokesman on 26 Sep. 1989
(Singapore Government Press Release No. 52/SEP, 09-0/89/09/26)

This is not the first time that Vietnam has announced a withdrawal of its forces from Cambodia. In fact it is the eighth time in almost as many years that the Vietnamese are claiming a withdrawal, and yet the fighting continues. Those of us who have heard such claims before must therefore be excused if we view this latest announced withdrawal with some skepticism. It is regrettable that Vietnam's cynical attempt to turn its latest claim of withdrawal into a media event will do nothing to ease the long agony of the Cambodian people. Vietnam has also carefully qualified its announced withdrawal by keeping open the possibility of its army reinvading Cambodia. This has added to serious doubts about Hanoi's sincerity.

Vietnam could have dispelled all doubts about its announced withdrawal if it had agreed to a comprehensive political settlement at the Paris Conference, which would have included a strong international control mechanism under UN auspices. In the absence of a comprehensive political settlement, whether Vietnam intends to retain control over Cambodia's destiny either through Vietnamese soldiers in disguise or Vietnamese settlers or through its proxy, Hun Sen, must remain an open question. Given Cambodia's difficult terrain and poor infrastructure, it is difficult to see how a disparate group of journalists and Vietnamese sympathizers, taken on a carefully guided tour of selected areas of Cambodia, can credibly verify the announced Vietnamese withdrawal. Except for Vietnam's allies, no government has accepted Vietnam's invitation to dignify its announced withdrawal with observers.

Vietnam's refusal to agree to a comprehensive political settlement at the Paris Conference is also the root cause for any subsequent conflict following its withdrawal. A foreign invading army must dismantle any quisling regime set in place by it. Vietnam's refusal to do so and its refusal to agree to national reconciliation and effective power-sharing among all Cambodian factions has left the nationalist forces no choice but to carry on their armed struggle. Vietnam must be held responsible for the continued suffering of the Cambodia people.

- (m) *CAMBODIA AFTER PARIS: Speech by Mr. Wong Kan Seng, Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Council of Foreign Relations on 26 Sep. 1989 (Singapore Government Press Release No. 54/SEP, 09-1/89/09/26)*

The failure of the Paris International Conference on Cambodia has once again underscored the central fact of post-war Indochinese history. That is: It is difficult to influence developments in Indochina. This was the lesson that was painfully learnt successively by the French, Americans and Chinese. In Paris, it was also clear that the normalization of Sino-Soviet relations and rapprochement between the US and the Soviet Union could not by themselves ensure the Conference's success. The convergence of great power interests may have been a necessary but proved to be an insufficient condition for peace in Cambodia.

The key to peace in Cambodia thus lies in Hanoi. This is not intended to be apolemmical or partisan statement. The uncontrovertible fact is that Vietnam is the single-most important state in Indochina. In the post-war period Hanoi's policies have been the single-most important factor affecting the evolution of events in Indo-china. This is hardly a factor that needs to be emphasized to an American audience. But this was also for example, a lesson that the Khmer Rouge learnt painfully. Pol Pot could not have seized power in Cambodia in 1975 without Hanoi's support. Until months before the invasion of Cambodia, the Vietnamese went on exchanging fraternal greetings with Pol Pot. In April 1978, Mr Pham Van Dong congratulated Pol Pot on his "ardent patriotism", "spirit of self-reliance" and "fine achievements", including presumably his killing fields. The record shows that Vietnam did its best to keep on good terms with Pol Pot. Until late in 1978, Vietnam and its friends blocked attempts by the international community to condemn human rights violations in Cambodia. Without Vietnamese support, the history of Pol Pot's Cambodia may have been different. But when the Khmer Rouge had the temerity to challenge Vietnam, they were overthrown by the Vietnamese.

This was the sole and simple reason for Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia in 1978. I must confess to some degree of sympathy for Vietnam. Hanoi does have some legitimate interests in Cambodia and Pol Pot certainly was a vicious neighbour. Pol Pot and his clique must be condemned for their policies and practices.

But what was totally unacceptable was the means whereby Hanoi chose to pursue its interests. Armed intervention in a neighbour, however obnoxious, can never be acceptable. It sets a dangerous precedent for all small states everywhere. Worst still, it simply does not work. Ten years of war in Cambodia has not brought Hanoi greater security. War in Cambodia has only brought Vietnam to the brink of total economic collapse. It was not in Vietnam's own best interest.

This fact is slowly dawning on Vietnam's leaders. A settlement in Cambodia will have to await a revaluation by the Hanoi leadership of Vietnam's real interests in Cambodia and the means to secure them. The failure of the Paris Conference demonstrates that the revaluation is not yet complete.

Ten years of war failed to subdue the nationalist resistance. The announcement on 5 April this year that Vietnam would withdraw its troops from Cambodia by the end of September was a welcome first indication that Vietnam had learnt, somewhat belatedly and ironically in view of its own experience, that military force cannot defeat nationalism. This was also the experience of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.

As has become fashionable in the socialist world, Vietnam's leaders now profess a commitment to economic reforms. It is questionable, however, whether Vietnam has accepted what Gorbachev has called "new thinking" in Soviet foreign policy; the realisation that the quest for absolute security or absolute dominance is both an illusion and a snare. I believe Vietnam has re-evaluated its tactics but not yet redefined its goals.

In my assessment, the Vietnamese hoped that the Paris Conference would legitimize the Hun Sen regime and thus allow Hanoi to maintain its dominance over Cambodia without direct and costly expenditure of blood and treasure. But at the Paris Conference the majority of countries made it clear that they would not repeat the mistake made during the negotiations on Afghanistan by accepting anything less than a comprehensive political settlement. When this became evident, Hanoi in effect abandoned the conference. On 6th of August, only a week after the Conference began, Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach told the French Foreign Minister that Vietnam would be "as flexible as steel". The outcome of the conference was then inevitable.

Hanoi would not accept a comprehensive settlement because it believed this would erode its total dominance over Cambodia. In retrospect, it is open to question whether Hanoi had any intention of negotiating seriously in Paris.

One of the central aspects of a comprehensive political settlement and a key issue at Paris was the question of interim power sharing arrangements between the various Cambodian parties. When the Paris Conference began, all participants had accepted Prince Sihanouk's argument that the only means of ensuring durable peace would be to find, pending free elections, some means of integrating all Cambodian parties into the governmental structure. This would give all parties an interest in preserving that structure and raise the costs of trying to overthrow it. Even Hun Sen had proposed the inclusion of the Khmer Rouge in a quadripartite Supreme Council. The issue yet unresolved in Paris was the specific nature of the governmental structure and the quantum of power to be allocated to each party, in particular the Khmer Rouge. The French proposed a two-tier structure which envisaged a quadripartite government between Hun Sen and Sihanouk at the second tier, with Hun Sen in control of the government as Prime Minister. The French proposal was in fact tilted in favour of Hun Sen. It would have given him *de facto* control of the state apparatus, reducing Sihanouk to a largely symbolic role as Head of State. It was therefore not surprising that Sihanouk did not accept it. What was baffling was that Vietnam and Hun Sen also rejected the French proposal.

We can only speculate as to why they did so. Vietnam's government is one of the most opaque in the world. But it is relevant to note that midway through the Paris Conference, the Seventh Plenum of the Vietnamese Communist Party Central Committee met in Ho Chi Minh City from 15-24 August. In his closing statement, the General Secretary of the Vietnamese Community Party, Mr Nguyen Van Linh, among other things, said:

"This plenum of the party Central Committee has clearly shown a very high level of unanimity in not accepting bourgeois liberalization, pluralism, political plurality, and multi-opposition parties aimed at denying Marxism-Leninism, socialism, and the party's leadership. We cannot fail to see that this is a reactionary political scheme of the enemies of the class and the nation. We resolutely refuse to allow ourselves to be duped by the cunning scheme of the imperialists and reactionaries of all stripes."

It was a clear signal. A leadership that it so adamantly opposed to even an extremely modest degree of political dissent that was timidly emerging in Vietnam among junior cadres was unlikely to accept anything less than total control of Cambodia or agree to even the most skewed power-sharing proposal.

Mr Nguyen Van Linh's statement has been generally regarded by most observers as reflecting Hanoi's concern over recent political developments in the socialist states of East Europe and skepticism over Gorbachev's policies of political reform. It was notable that Gorbachev was not mentioned by name in the statement. The only fraternal socialist leader that was so honoured was none other than Fidel Castro, another die-hard hold-out against Perestroika.

But the seventh Plenum also revealed a more fundamental ambiguity. Read in its entirety, Nguyen Van Linh's address seems like a relic from another age. He described the plenum as dealing with "ideological work in the face of the current internal and international situations" and reaffirmed Marxism-Leninism as the "lodestar guiding us on our path". Nguyen Van Linh conceded that Vietnam had made mistakes in economic development, indirectly affirmed that attempts to reform the economy would continue and admitted that the people of "capitalist society" enjoyed "higher standards of living and more modern daily life amenities" than Vietnam. In the same breath, however, he argued the continuing relevance of Marxism-Leninism and the existence of "contradictions" between the socialist camp and the capitalist camp and between the working class and the bourgeoisie and pointed to "strikes and demonstrations staged frequently to demand jobs and higher pay in capitalist countries" as "eloquent proof of these contradictions". Vietnam's leaders may be the last true believers in the inevitable decline of capitalism.

Those of us who have less than total faith in Marxism-Leninism might perhaps be pardoned for wondering whether Nguyen Van Linh's address was itself not rife with "contradictions" of another kind. The irony is all the more pointed if we recall that his speech came at a time when he and his colleagues were also eagerly trying to woo "imperialist" capital to invest in Vietnam.

Vietnam's internal politics is most commonly described in terms of a struggle for supremacy between "reformers" and "hardliners". The Seventh Plenum has generally been regarded as a triumph for the hardliners. I can accept

the labels as a convenient means of describing a political dynamic that is obviously far more complex. But we must bear in mind that they are only convenient labels. I suggest that we use such labels with caution. Nguyen Van Linn himself has hitherto been considered one of Vietnam's foremost "reformers". If there are differences in Vietnam's leadership, and this is by no means self-evident, it may well be only over tactics, not goals. Unlike in the Soviet Union and East Europe, there has been no basic change of political generations in Vietnam. No Vietnamese "Gorbachev" has yet emerged. All the men in power in Hanoi are basically of the same political cohort as Vietnam's first generation leaders. It is as if Stalin's successors still ruled in the Kremlin or Brezhnev were in charge of Soviet economic reform.

It is an open question whether such men have fully grasped the complexities and implications of genuine economic reform. Clearly, there is a profound ambiguity in their attitude. Vietnam's leaders do not seem to have clearly conceptualized their own priorities. Stated simply, while they may recognize that their economy is in desperate straits and want the benefits of economic reform, they still seem unwilling to accept the inevitable costs of such reform. They do not appear to have recognised the need to make the hard choices that economic reform demands. They seem to believe that they can have their cake and eat it.

I need hardly convince this audience that they are mistaken. Running a modern economy is fundamentally incompatible with tight political control on the Stalinist model. Since 1917, no communist state has ever succeeded in matching the democratic states in improving the welfare of their people. But the cast of mind betrayed by Mr Nguyen Van Linn's speech is directly relevant to the Cambodian situation. In Cambodia, Vietnam also still believes that it can have its cake and eat it.

The failure of the Paris Conference to legitimize Hun Sen has once again caused Vietnam to change its tactics without re-evaluating its goals. Recently, there have been a number of stories in some major American newspaper suggesting that with the victory of the "hardliners" at the Seventh Plenum, the position of the "moderates" needs to be bolstered by large injections of Western aid and investment. Vietnam would of course like us to believe this. But it is part of a continuing and sophisticated propaganda effort by Hanoi, designed to allow Vietnam to maintain its dominance over Cambodia while eluding the costs of doing so.

Vietnam's propaganda strategy involves two inter-related elements. The first is the announced 26 September unilateral withdrawal. There has been some thinning out of the Vietnamese troop presence in Cambodia. Some further thinning out will occur this month, with the accompaniment of appropriate media orchestration. The number of Vietnamese troops currently in Cambodia is itself a matter of some dispute. Estimates range from about 50,000 to over 100,000. The Vietnamese themselves say that there are only 26,000 and all will be withdrawn by the end of September. But without an effective UN presence to supervise and monitor the withdrawal, there will be no means of ascertaining whether all Vietnamese forces have left. It is worth bearing in mind that even under the best of circumstances, an international control mechanism would be hard pressed to adequately monitor the Vietnamese withdrawal, given Cambodia's difficult terrain and poor infrastructure.

Secondly, the announcement of unilateral withdrawal has been accompanied by an increasing effort to play up the Khmer Rouge menace. You have all read the newspaper stories. They were again no coincidence. It is somewhat ironical that after ten years of dismissing the resistance as inconsequential, Vietnam is now among the most enthusiastic boosters of the strength of the resistance, in particular the Khmer Rouge. Why does Vietnam now emphasise the Khmer Rouge menace? The emphasis of the Khmer Rouge serves to bolster Hun Sen's international legitimacy as the only effective bulwark against the Khmer Rouge's return to power. It also prepares international opinion for the eventuality that Hun Sen is unable to hold his own against the resistance and a second Vietnamese invasion becomes necessary. The Hanoi leadership has been careful to qualify their announced withdrawal and made it clear that they would re-invade if they thought it necessary.

The Vietnamese leadership hopes that the combination of the announcement of unilateral withdrawal and emphasis on the Khmer Rouge menace will erode international concern over their domination of Cambodia and open the floodgates for the Western aid and investment they desperately need. In effect, Hanoi's leaders hope that they can persuade the West to pay for their continued control of Cambodia. This is not entirely an unrealistic expectation on their part. Hun Sen has already become the darling of some sectors of the American media.

We should be prepared for a few more dramatic public relations announcements in the weeks ahead. I would not at all be surprised if Hanoi suddenly reverses its position and announces that it is now in full support of a UN Peacekeeping Force for Cambodia. This will make Vietnam sound reasonable, but we must examine the fine print. Vietnam will bank on the fact that the general public in the West would not understand that in the absence of a comprehensive political settlement, and in particular an internal settlement satisfactory to all Cambodian parties, a UN Peacekeeping Force simply cannot work. In fact, at the Paris Conference, specialists on international peacekeeping operations who were part of the UN Secretary-General's delegation, clearly told us that peacekeeping force can only be effective if there is an internal political settlement. In the absence of such a settlement, a UN Peacekeeping Force would simply not be effective.

By drawing attention to Vietnam's propaganda offensive, I am not suggesting that we should not be concerned about the Khmer Rouge. But this is no longer the key issue. There is consensus that while the Khmer Rouge must have a role in any future Cambodian interim government, it must not have a dominant or even an equal role. At the Paris Conference, the Khmer Rouge and China agreed that following a ceasefire, all armed Cambodians should be grouped in bases and disarmed. China and the Khmer Rouge also supported a strong and effective UN International Peacekeeping Force and in the context of a comprehensive settlement agreed that the Khmer Rouge would not insist on equal power sharing in the interim coalition government. These are substantively new positions that have not been given sufficient attention.

I do not naively take these commitments at face value. I do not believe that the Khmer Rouge has suddenly undergone a change of heart. But whether or not the leopard has changed *[sic]* its spots is not the relevant question. The Khmer Rouge may be psychotic, but they are not stupid. I earlier referred to the painful

lesson that the Vietnamese invasion taught the Khmer Rouge. They now know that any attempt to seize power by force of arms or turn upon their own citizens would only invite a second Vietnamese invasion. This time there will be no international support for the resistance or outcry against Vietnam. It is not in the Khmer Rouge's own interest to allow this to happen. I therefore believe that they have come to recognise that compliance with a comprehensive political settlement is in their own self interest. There are thus realistic grounds for believing that an interim independent Cambodian government, with Khmer Rouge participation, need not be a menace to its neighbours or presage a return to the killing fields.

I can understand and sympathise with the moral revulsion of large sectors of the American public and media at the prospect of any kind or level of Khmer Rouge participation in the government of Cambodia. I share their revulsion with the Khmer Rouge. But there is no realistic alternative to some degree of Khmer Rouge participation in an interim Cambodian Government. There are no morally ideal solutions to the Cambodian problem. The American public and media must recognize that by promoting Hun Sen they are also taking a morally ambiguous position.

I am not only referring to Hun Sen's own past record as a loyal member of the Khmer Rouge. There are only three real choices in Cambodia today. The first is to take the position that Hun Sen should enjoy total monopoly of power in Phnom Penh. If we accept this, in effect we would have rewarded the aggressor. This would make a mockery of the most basic principles of international law and the UN Charter. The second is a near monopoly of power for Hun Sen, with the exclusion of the Khmer Rouge and the token inclusion of Sihanouk and the non-communists. This is the Vietnamese position. If you choose this, you are simply rearranging sides in the civil war. The Vietnamese and Hun Sen know that this will happen. They may not mind as it would give them the pretext to re-establish direct military control over Cambodia, this time without bearing the costs of doing so. The third alternative is to take the position that all four Cambodian parties, including the Khmer Rouge, have to be included. This is an alternative that many in the West are reluctant to accept because of their moral revulsion for the Khmer Rouge. The Vietnamese and Hun Sen exploit this revulsion and therefore force many in the West to take the position of total exclusion of the Khmer Rouge. By doing so, they are obliging the West to support their desire for a civil war.

ASEAN and Singapore do not want the return of the Khmer Rouge. But after ten years, the Vietnamese have failed to eliminate the Khmer Rouge. The Khmer Rouge will continue fighting. Therefore, those who advocate the exclusion of the Khmer Rouge from a political settlement will only prolong the bloodshed in Cambodia. The solution is to ease the Khmer Rouge out in a way that would also enable China to drop its support.

A more promising approach would be to hold free and fair elections under international supervision to choose the future government of Cambodia. Let the Khmer Rouge submit themselves to an electoral test. If they lose, as we expect them to, it will provide a graceful way for China to withdraw support. The international community can rally to the elected government, whoever leads it. As fair elections cannot be held under the control of the Phnom Penh regime, all

the Cambodian parties should share power in an interim government which will organise and hold free, fair elections under international supervision and UN auspices.

There is also a final and perhaps most important consideration. I had earlier said that despite the failure of the Paris Conference I am not totally pessimistic about the outcome in Cambodia. Vietnam's position is in the long run not sustainable. Its economy is on the brink of total collapse. Sooner rather than later the old men in Hanoi must face up to the unpleasant realities of their position and make the hard choices that they have so far been reluctant to make. Sooner rather than later they must realize that they cannot have their cake and eat it. It is a question of simple survival. If they cannot improve the well-being of their people, they will lose power. But they cannot do this without relinquishing control over Cambodia. No matter how much the Vietnamese leaders may wish to deny it, in Vietnam, as in the Soviet Union, China, Hungary and Poland, there is a powerful and ultimately irresistible yearning to break loose from the ideological shackles that had held back these societies.

If the West holds firm, refuses to recognize Vietnam's so-called unilateral withdrawal and the Hun Sen regime as legitimate, and continues to deny Vietnam aid and investment, then very soon the Hanoi leadership will be forced to genuinely compromise on Cambodia and make the hard choices that they have so far avoided. It is in all our interests to encourage real and orderly change in Vietnam and other communist states. A Vietnam that has learnt to live at peace with its neighbours and whose innate dynamism and creative energies are focussed on the welfare of its people will be a powerful stabilizing factor for the region. But only a genuine change in the basic attitudes of Hanoi's rulers can break the cycle of violence in Indochina and ensure long-term stability for the region. Those in charge in Hanoi will not discard the mental habits of a revolutionary lifetime easily. They will only do so if given no other choice. It will not happen if the West, acting out of sympathy and hope, rushes to provide aid in quantities sufficient to exempt them of the need to make such a choice.

If Vietnam succeeds in its effort to persuade the West to pay for its continued control over Cambodia, its leaders will be reinforced in their belief in the correctness of their assumption that no fundamental change is necessary in their foreign or domestic policies. If the West acts in too precipitous a manner to rescue Vietnam from its own failures, and thus preserves it from the necessity of liberalisation, we will all be the losers.

The people of Vietnam and Cambodia will continue their long agony. In the long run, the pent-up forces of change cannot be denied and could burst forth in potentially destructive torrents. Hanoi's leaders will have to resort to even greater internal repression or external adventure to contain domestic discontent. More immediately, Vietnam's leaders will be encouraged in their belief that domination is the ultimate solution and that aggression pays. In either case, such a Vietnam will continue to pose a threat to the stability of non-communist Southeast Asia.

IV. TREATIES (OTHER THAN ASEAN INSTRUMENTS)

- (a) *INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT INCOME AGREEMENT BETWEEN SINGAPORE AND THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES: Speech by BG (Res.) George Y.B. Yeo, Minister of State (Finance and Foreign Affairs), at the signing ceremony on Friday 27 October 1989 (Singapore Government Press Release No. 63/OCT, 08-2/89/10/27)*

Close and mutually beneficial relations already exist between the United Arab Emirates and Singapore. The conclusion of an Agreement for reciprocal exemption of international air transport income from taxes is another important milestone in the relation between our two countries.

Like the United Arab Emirates, Singapore is a focal point for many regional and international air transportation routes. The need for a reciprocal exemption agreement attests to the considerable success achieved by both our countries in this area of air transportation.

The provisions of the Agreement are designed to fully eliminate instances of double taxation for the airlines of our countries. This is achieved through reciprocal exemption of income derived from international air transport and related operations. The Agreement also provides for the reciprocal exemption of interest derived from deposits with banks, where the deposits are from funds directly connected with the operation of aircraft in international traffic, the reciprocal exemption for income derived from training schemes, management and other services rendered to an air transport enterprise.

Freed from any concern of double taxation, our airlines will be able to concentrate their efforts and energies on what they do best, that is to achieve operational excellence and maximum profitability. The provisions for reciprocal exemption of income derived from training schemes, management and other services rendered to an air transport enterprise would encourage cross-flow of expertise in the management of air transport enterprises.

I am confident that the Agreement will generate very positive results for our airlines and indeed of our national economies. I am, therefore, delighted to join Your Excellency in signing this Agreement.

- (b) *ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE REPUBLIC OF MALI: Ministry of Foreign Affairs Press Statement on 29 August 1989 (Singapore Government Press Release No. 69/AUG, 09-0/89/08/29)*

The Government of the Republic of Mali and the Government of the Republic of Singapore, wishing to strengthen and develop friendly relations between them, have agreed to establish diplomatic relations between the two countries at Ambassadorial level with effect from 29 August 1989.

- (c) *ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE REPUBLIC OF KIRIBATI: Ministry of Foreign Affairs Press Statement on 7 September 1989 (Singapore Government Press Release No. 01/SEP, 09-0/89/07)*

The Government of the Republic of Kiribati and the Government of the Republic of Singapore, wishing to strengthen and develop friendly relations between them, have agreed to establish diplomatic relations between the two countries at Ambassadorial level with effect from 7 September 1989.

- (d) *ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE REPUBLIC OF GHANA: Ministry of Foreign Affairs Press Statement on 11 October 1989 (Singapore Government Press Release No. 21/OCT, 09-0/89/10/11)*

The Government of the Republic of Ghana and the Government of the Republic of Singapore, wishing to strengthen and develop friendly relations between them, have agreed to establish diplomatic relations between the two countries at Ambassadorial level with effect from 11 October 1989.

- (e) *ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH MAURITIUS: Ministry of Foreign Affairs Press Statement on 27 October 1989 (Singapore Government Press Release No. 64/OCT, 09-0/89/10/27)*

The Government of Mauritius and the Government of the Republic of Singapore, wishing to strengthen and develop friendly relations between them, have agreed to establish diplomatic relations between the two countries at Ambassadorial level with effect from 27 October 1989.

VI. SINGAPORE IN THE UNITED NATIONS AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS AND CONFERENCES

- (a) *NEW DIRECTIONS FOR A NEW AGE: Speech by Mr. Wong Kan Seng, Minister for Foreign Affairs at the Conference of Heads of State of Government of Non-aligned Countries on 7 September 1989 in Belgrade (Singapore Government Press Release No. 10/SEP, 09-1/89/09/06)*

... Twenty-eight years ago, the first Non-Aligned Summit was held here in Belgrade, a pivotal event which charted a direction for our young Movement. It was a period of great turbulence in international relations. The Cold War was at its height, threatening to engulf the whole world and to jeopardize its very existence. The historical document which emerged from our first Summit meeting clearly formulated the principles and objectives of non-alignment as an independent path in world affairs. Now in an era of great global changes, it is entirely appropriate that our Movement should meet again in Belgrade to chart new directions for a new era. The presence of so many guests and observers bears testimony to the importance of the Ninth Summit, which is widely expected to be a turning point in the history of our Movement.

In speaking of a turning point in history, we refer to recent political and economic events which have the capacity to change world history. The key event is the dramatic improvement in Soviet-American relations. For many countries, the Soviet-American relationship is the key variable in world politics, the thermostat which controls the world's political temperatures. It is also the *raison d'être* of our Movement, which originated from the desire not to be drawn into either camp headed by each superpower. So long as these two camps were in conflict, our Movement had greater coherence, stronger definition and a clearer path.

Our dilemma began when the two superpowers started the process of detente and conciliation which has so changed the world political configuration. In the process, our members raised questions on how our Movement should respond to these historic changes. What is the meaning of non-alignment when the two camps were re-aligning? What is the role of non-alignment in an age of detente?

Before we become too euphoric about global trends, we must read the terrain of the new political landscape correctly so that we will not be ambushed as we chart out a new course for ourselves. We must realistically recognise that the new political climate does not mean an end to great power rivalry. In a book entitled *The Global Rivals*, two well-known Soviet specialists Seweryn Bialer and Michael Mandelbaum, predict that "the global rivalry will not disappear, but there is for the first time a chance that it will be considerably less acute, less dangerous than in the past" (page 172). Indeed, they argue that the Soviet Union will continue to be "the pre-eminent rival of the US, and vice versa, far into the 21st Century" (page 5). This then is the backdrop against which political interaction must be seen.

Three Challenges

In the next decade, our Movement will be challenged by three important political trends. First, there will be a de-emphasis on ideology in both camps. Both superpowers face compelling domestic economic crises which dictate a rapprochement with the other camp, which can only succeed when ideology is de-emphasized and pragmatic, conciliatory policies are adopted. As President Gorbachev stated at the UN in December 1988: "The new phase requires the de-ideologizing of relations amongst states".

This less ideological approach will be pertinent not just between the Great Powers and their allies, but also equally applicable to their relations with the Third World. We should however remain vigilant and conscious that the Great Powers will continue to compete for political and economic influence in the Third World even though ideological factors may be less salient.

The second major challenge is the emergence of a multi-polar political and economic system. With the weakening of the rival economies, burdened by heavy arms expenditures and the heavy costs of maintaining alliances and clients, and with the emergence of other power centres, the former bipolar world has been irrevocably changed. The diffusion of military, political and economic influence will continue and will create greater pluralism in the international political system.

For smaller member states of the Movement, this now political configuration will require more attention and agility because of the rise of medium powers which are interested in expanding their political and economic influence. The lessening interest of the superpowers in regional conflicts may thus create opportunities for medium powers to exert their weight. Can the Movement deal with this?

The third major challenge is a new trend towards closer cooperation amongst countries of the North, whether capitalist or socialist. Major examples of this trend are the formation of the Single European Market by 1992; the US-Canada Free Trade Association; and the G-7 Paris Summit pledge to help some Eastern European countries.

NAM's Responses

How then should NAM respond to the challenges of our times?

It is imperative in the new fluid international context that NAM member states demonstrate that they are willing to abide by the Movement's principles. To enhance the cause of peace in the world, we must live by the Five Principles of peaceful co-existence ourselves. These principles are clearly defined in the Bandung Declaration. If we ourselves do not observe the principles of peace we advocate, we should not expect others to do so. In short, NAM member states should not seek to exercise hegemony or domination over others, nor engage in conflict with other member states. This should be our first and fundamental response.

Second, NAM must address the new issues appearing on the international agenda. These non-traditional issues are fast becoming politically sensitive - issues such as the problems of debt, drugs and the environment, to list only a few. The UN Secretary-General, in a speech delivered recently at Cambridge University, called these "a new generation of problems which easily cross boundaries". NAM should participate in the global debate on these new issues in order to define our interests and responsibilities and cooperate with others where possible. If we ignore these issues, we will find others defining the solutions for us.

Indeed, more than ever today, the issues of debt, drugs and the environment, to list only a few. The UN Secretary-General, in a speech delivered recently at Cambridge University called these "a new generation of problems . . . which easily cross boundaries". NAM should participate in the global debate on these new issues in order to define our interests and responsibilities and cooperate with others where possible. If we ignore these issues, we will find others defining the solutions for us.

Indeed, more than ever today, the issues of debt, drugs and the environment are of specific importance to NAM. In many instances, these problems have become threats to our political stability. The debt problems of developing countries has been a serious obstacle to economic progress for nearly the entire decade of the 1980s. According to World Bank and International Monetary Fund estimates, the total debt for the developing countries grew 10 times from \$130

billion to \$1,300 billion from 1973 to 1989. During the period 1985 to 1988, the 17 countries with the largest debts made a net transfer of \$98 billion to their creditor nations. Such a situation underscores the critical nature of the debt problem. As the Chairman of the South Commission, HE Mr Julius Nyerere, in a letter to the Paris Summit stated: "The economies of the South degenerate, the living standards of the poor are further depressed, and the land in which they eke out a precarious existence is further degraded. To pay debts, even the unborn are being robbed." The Movement should not only express its political support for its indebted member states; it should also put forward clear, practical and realistic proposals which could help to resolve the debt crisis.

The drug menace also deserves the close attention of the Movement as it is an international problem, with deleterious consequences for the social and political structures of many member states. Political will and commitment need to be expressed in the form of concrete measures to tackle both ends of the problem, that is, the sources of drug supply as well as the demand for drugs. The developed world is strong on measures to control the supply of drugs. It has paid nominal attention to curbing demand. Yet, we know there are two sides to the problem. If there were no demand, the supply would correspondingly shrink. We urge governments the world over to put their minds and political will to control the unending demand for drugs by their populations. We in NAM must be particularly concerned as countries caught in the snare of drugs will find their precious human resources wasted and development elusive.

The issues of environmental degradation and the necessity to preserve the global ecological balance have gained greater attention in recent years. The first worldwide survey on the environment, commissioned by the United Nations Environment Programme, showed that people in both developed and developing countries alike are very concerned about the deteriorating quality of the environment. In recent years, there has also been a growing realization that it is impossible to separate economic development issues from environmental issues. The recent G7 Summit meeting underlined this view when it emphasised "the necessity to take into account the interests and needs of the developing countries in sustaining the growth of their economies and the financial and technological requirements to meet environmental challenges".

Agriculture, forestry, energy production and mining generate at least half the gross national product of many developing countries. Most of these countries face enormous pressures, both international and domestic, to over-exploit their environmental resource base. As a consequence of the debt crisis in Africa and Latin America, natural resources are now being used not for development but to meet financial obligations to creditors abroad. To aggravate matters, trade barriers erected by developed countries, including massive agricultural subsidies, have made it difficult for many developing countries to sell their manufactured goods and agricultural produce for reasonable prices, thereby putting more pressure on the ecological system. It was no wonder that the World Commission on Environment and Development, in its renowned report entitled "Our Common Future" stated, "It is therefore futile to attempt to deal with environmental problems without a broader perspective that encompasses the factors underlying world poverty and international inequality". Our Movement must take into account these factors when defining our position on environmental issues. We

should put forward proposals which will meet the environmental challenges without compromising the economic and development needs of our members.

Conclusion

We stand at a moment of history which calls for original, realistic and courageous responses. The events in the recent past conspire to make us irrelevant if we are locked into old rhetoric of condemning one power or another. All these years we have pronounced but not persuaded. They have heard but they have not listened. They may need to listen to us yet, but let's start by making the Non-aligned Movement more relevant to our own problems.

- (b) *44TH SESSION OF THE U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY: Speech by Mr. Wong Kan Seng, Minister for Foreign Affairs on 4 October 1989 (Singapore Government Press Release No. 08/OCT, 09-1/89/10/04)*

... Last year was an exceptionally good year for the United Nations. For the international community long used to the unending eruption of war, dispute and conflict, never had the promise of peace been so near to realization. There were agreements reached to end the war in Afghanistan and to establish a ceasefire between Iran and Iraq. In December, agreement was also reached to usher in Namibia's transition to independence. The UN Peacekeeping Force was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in recognition of its contributions to peacekeeping. Multilateral diplomacy was patently yielding results. The prestige of the UN had never been greater.

This year, in 1989, we are little less euphoric, we are sobered by the realities and difficulties of conflict resolution among nations. While some progress has been achieved on several fronts, we are keenly aware of the problems that still stand in the way of peace. Eight months after Soviet troops have withdrawn from Afghanistan, the fighting and the killing have not abated. The talks to end the Iran-Iraq conflict have stalled. We are alarmed by the worsening situation in Lebanon and the stalemate, if not retrogression, in spite of earlier progress in the resolution of the question of Palestine. We await the long overdue birth of independence in Namibia with the keenest interest. Singapore feels privileged to be able to contribute to the achievement of this goal through our participation in the UNTAG police contingent. We are honoured that the leader of our police contingent, Superintendent Lee Kok Leong has been appointed as Chief Electoral Officer to oversee elections in Namibia. But we are disturbed that there are attempts by South Africa to circumvent the implementation of some key aspects of the United Nations plan for Namibian independence as contained in Security Council Resolution 435. We should continue our vigilance to ensure that nothing will derail the transition to independence and prevent the full implementation of free and fair elections in November. After Namibia, the international community should help to hasten the pace of fundamental change in South Africa, to put an end to the abhorrent and evil apartheid system.

The Secretary-General of the UN, Mr Javier Perez de Cuellar, when he summed up the problems of peacemaking in his Report on the Work of the

Organisation, said: "I am all too conscious how thorny is often the path leading to a just and lasting settlement and how hard is the resistance encountered". I fully agree with him. If there is a lesson to be learnt in all this, it is that there is no quick fix to peace.

When a major power comes to the conclusion that military power cannot be used to achieve political objectives, and dialogue with a global rival is more fruitful than Confrontation, it ushers in a more auspicious international climate. But we have learnt very clearly this year that even when the major powers are prepared to settle their conflicts, it is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the attainment of peace. The key that unlocks the door to peace in regional conflicts often lies in the hands of the parties directly involved. All you need is one inflexible and intransigent party and the peace process can be jammed.

We are also aware that even as we have to work harder on the problems of international and regional conflict, a new generation of problems compelling urgent attention has come on our agenda - problems such as drugs, the environment, refugees and debt. These problems recognize no borders and if left unattended, could complicate and threaten the wider and long term security of the international community and our search for peace.

Among nations in Southeast Asia, ASEAN as a whole has done well. We progressed because our national stability has allowed each of us to concentrate our attention on our internal political, economic and social developments. This in turn contributes to ASEAN's resilience and cohesion. We had wished that the same peaceful and stabilizing conditions were obtained in Indochina. But alas, the Cambodian conflict remains an intractable problem. It is now eleven years since the Cambodian issue first brought before the UN Security Council in January 1979 after Vietnamese forces invaded Cambodia on Christmas day of 1978.

For ten years, the international community spoken through the UN resolutions calling upon Vietnam to put an end to its occupation of Cambodia and to accept a comprehensive political settlement which would bring lasting peace to the region. Such a comprehensive political settlement would provide for, among other things, the withdrawal of foreign forces under effective international supervision and control, the creation of an interim administrative authority, the promotion of national reconciliation under Prince Sihanouk and the right of the Cambodian people to choose their own leaders free from outside interference.

Our efforts at the UN were not without impact. Initially Vietnam denied that its troops had invaded Cambodia. Later when this untruth was exposed, Vietnam arrogantly declared that "the situation in Cambodia was irreversible". But continued UN pressure and international isolation, denying Vietnam valuable aid and investment, forced it to concede for the first time in 1986 that "it was prepared to reach a political solution". What Vietnam had not taken into account was the strength and resilience of the Cambodian nationalist resistance. The high cost of foreign occupation brought its economy to the brink of bankruptcy. Now that the Soviet Union is keen to reduce its burdens abroad, the option of a continued Vietnamese presence in Cambodia cannot be endured, Vietnam has reached a point where it has to reconsider its strategy.

On April 5 this year, Vietnam dramatically announced to the world its intention to withdraw all its troops from Cambodia by the end of September. In

recent days, we have seen photographs and newspaper reports of Vietnamese soldiers departing in military trucks. It is certainly a major media event, but what are we as responsible governments to make of this announced "withdrawal"? Are we to conclude that the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia ended on September 26 as Vietnam claims it did? Are we to conclude that the Problems of Cambodia are now all resolved? Is there no further need for the United Nations to continue to debate and discuss the issue of Cambodia?

The most significant point to note about the announced withdrawal is that firstly, it is a unilateral withdrawal undertaken without a comprehensive political settlement in place. The withdrawal of the Vietnamese troops has not been effectively verified. We have no way of knowing if the withdrawal is genuine and total. There was only handful of media journalists, several observers from some non-governmental organizations and representatives of the few countries that have diplomatic relations with the Hun Sen regime who had gone to Phnom Penh to observe the Vietnamese departure. This motley group could not honestly verify that there are now no more Vietnamese troops in Cambodia. Indeed, the UN technical fact-finding mission despatched on agreement by the Paris Conference on Cambodia, reported that even in the best of circumstances, it would be difficult to verify satisfactorily the exit of the Vietnamese troops. The terrain, the poor infrastructure and transportation system in Cambodia makes systematic supervision and control very difficult.

Secondly, this is the eighth time that the Vietnamese are claiming to have withdrawn their forces from Cambodia. In the past, such as in July 1982, May 1983, June 1984, April 1985 and May 1986, Vietnam had said that it was withdrawing its troops from Cambodia. But each time, we learnt that those "withdrawals" amounted to no more than a rotation of troops. We are therefore justified in being skeptical about the present "withdrawal". Our skepticism is supported by an article in the September 27, 1989 issue of the *Bangkok Post* which reported that some East European sources had told its correspondent, Mr Jacques Bekaart, that some Vietnamese troops have been left behind in Cambodia.

Thirdly, there still remains the vital question of Vietnamese soldiers who are staying behind as militia of the Hun Sen regime and as "settlers". Vietnam has not contested the existence of Vietnamese settlers in Cambodia. The argument is over the numbers, Vietnam claims that there are only 80,000 Vietnamese settlers in Cambodia, Prince Sihanouk says there are nearly 1.3 million. Some Western diplomats in the region estimate the figure to be between 300,000 to 400,000. The issue of the number of "settlers" is important as this determines who has a right to vote in the internationally supervised free and fair election that comes with a comprehensive settlement, and therefore the right to choose the government of Cambodia.

In any case, Vietnam has not entirely relinquished its right to intervene again in the affairs of Cambodia. In several statements made since the April 5 announcement of Vietnam's intention to withdraw by the end of September, Vietnam has asserted its right to send its troops or whatever assistance to Phnom Penh, if it felt that the survival of its puppet regime is threatened by resistance guerrillas.

There are therefore considerable doubts whether the Vietnamese have completely withdrawn from Cambodia. However, even if we could document that

Vietnam had completely withdrawn its forces, I submit that the UN should still continue to debate and discuss the Cambodian issue. Some may argue that the UN's role should be limited to discussing violations of the UN Charter and when foreign intervention has "ended" in Cambodia, UN interest should cease. To understand the fallacy of this argument, let me cite an analogy.

If the South Africans decided to withdraw their forces from Namibia but insisted on leaving in place the Windhoek regime as the exclusive government of Namibia, without giving SWAPO the right to compete in fairly held elections, we would immediately denounce South Africa and declare that the Windhoek regime had no legitimate right to rule Namibia since it was installed by foreign occupation forces.

This is precisely what Vietnam is trying to do in Cambodia. After withdrawing most of its forces, it continues to insist that the Hun Sen regime, which was put in place by foreign occupation forces, should continue to rule Cambodia.

This is why the Paris Conference failed. The three Cambodian parties led by Prince Sihanouk, who are recognized as the legitimate representatives of the Cambodian people at the UN, were willing to share power with Mr Hun Sen in an interim quadripartite coalition government until free, fair and democratic elections were held under UN supervision. They were prepared to allow the Cambodian people to determine who should rule them, demonstrating their commitment to the most fundamental principle of the UN Charter that a people's right to self-determination should never be diminished.

Vietnam and Mr Hun Sen opposed this, declaring that Mr Hun Sen should enjoy monopoly or near monopoly of power in Phnom Penh. They knew that by doing so they would give the nationalist forces led by Prince Sihanouk no choice but to launch a military struggle to secure their legitimate right to self-determination. Both Vietnam and Mr Hun Sen want to trigger off this civil war. We are sad that the Cambodian people, who have now suffered for almost twenty years, continue to live in agony. But it is Vietnam and Mr Hun Sen who are responsible for this state of affairs. They should be condemned for it.

After raising the hopes of the Cambodian people through our principled stand over the past ten years, we cannot disappoint them by abandoning them at this crucial hour when they are so near to securing a real liberation. The UN can and should help the Cambodian people by insisting that there be a comprehensive political settlement of the Cambodian problem. The international community must insist that it can never accept anything less than this. Such a comprehensive political settlement must give the Cambodian people the right to determine their own future in free, fair and democratic elections under international supervision. Only this will end the civil war and allow the Cambodian people to breathe freely again.

The exercise of self-determination in Cambodia must be based on national reconciliation of all Cambodian parties. All parties must have a stake in the future of Cambodia. To attempt to exclude any party as a precondition for national reconciliation is unrealistic and irresponsible. It is tantamount to inciting the prolongation of conflict and bloodshed. This is why Prince Sihanouk has wisely and realistically called for the formation of an interim quadripartite government

will have the responsibility of organizing free and fair elections. Since all parties will be involved in organizing the elections, all will be bound by the results.

No matter what we, as individual countries, may think about any particular Cambodian party, only the Cambodian people have the moral and political right to determine who should or should not rule Cambodia. Nobody else has that right. In exercising their right to self-determination through free and fair elections, the Cambodian people will finally be able to pass their verdict and judgement on the Khmer Rouge. The international community has the obligation to help create conditions that will enable the Cambodians to freely exercise their political choices, and to respect that choice, whatever it may be. The international community should recognize that the Cambodian people will have the wisdom to choose wisely.

Let me restate the central issues of the Cambodian problem. They are, firstly, the need to have the total withdrawal of all Vietnamese troops verified by the United Nations as only the United Nations can provide an effective international supervisory, monitoring and control mechanism; secondly, the need to ensure that the Cambodian people have the opportunity to exercise the right of self-determination which is a basic right of all peoples under the UN Charter; thirdly, none of the Khmer parties should be excluded from the opportunity to stand for the elections under the comprehensive political settlement as only the Cambodians have the right to decide who should govern them. The exclusion of any party should not be made a pre-condition for a settlement agreement.

My country, Singapore, does not have any historical animosity with Vietnam. But why have Singapore and our ASEAN partners championed the cause of Cambodia so energetically in the past decade? We have done so because Vietnam's invasion and occupation of Cambodia has threatened the peace and stability of Southeast Asia. We have also done so because Vietnam's action, if not repudiated, would set a very unfortunate precedent. Vietnam must not be allowed to get away with only partially solving the problem. If it succeeded, it would have demonstrated that aggression pays. It would be shown to others that it is possible for one country to invade another country with impunity, set up a client regime and after a long enough interval walk away from the mess it has created, leave a resistance war raging and go back to business-as-usual with the rest of the world. For all peace-loving states of the international community, it is a dangerous precedent. It puts our security in jeopardy if this should become acceptable international behaviour.

The Cambodian issue has been a success story of the United Nations. This may sound paradoxical but it demonstrates that international moral pressure does work. Through the UN resolutions adopted year after year, with increasing support, we have forced Vietnam to change its position over time. We have come this far. Vietnam is taking the first step towards the resolution of the Cambodian question by thinning out its troops in the field. But the problem is far from being solved. We at the UN must continue with our moral suasion to convince Vietnam that it has the responsibility to settle the Cambodian question comprehensively in the interest of a just and lasting peace for the Cambodians and in the interest of regional security and stability. When Vietnam contributes to the comprehensive political settlement of the Cambodian issue, peace will return to Indochina. When there is peace in Indochina, the international community will help in its

reconstruction. Vietnam will finally be able to concentrate on its internal economic and social development and reap the fruits of prosperity.

- (c) *CAMBODIA VOTE: Comments by the Minister for Foreign Affairs on 17 November 1989 (Singapore Government Press No. 52/NOV, 09-1/89/11/17)*

I am very pleased with the record number of positive votes this year. The international community has sent a clear signal of support for ASEAN and Prince Sihanouk. It shows that the world understands ASEAN's argument that a comprehensive political settlement is the only way to bring a just and durable peace in Cambodia and is not prepared to accept an unverified Vietnamese withdrawal. There is an international consensus that the UN must play a role in this respect.

The vote is an endorsement of ASEAN's efforts over the last ten years to find a political settlement that allows the Cambodians to exercise their right to self-determination, free from both the horrors of Pol Pot and Vietnamese domination.

We sincerely hope that Vietnam will accept the decision of the United Nations in the right spirit. We have never set out to humiliate Vietnam. Instead, we have always tried to encourage it to heed the overwhelming voice of the international community. The time has now come for Vietnam to sit down and negotiate seriously with the Cambodian parties and other members of the Paris Conference a compromise settlement that takes into account the interests of all parties, including Vietnam's.