

PEACE-KEEPING BY U.N. FORCES FROM SUEZ TO THE CONGO. By Arthur Lee Burns and Nina Heathcote. [Princeton Studies in World Politics No. 4. London: Pall Mall Press. 1963. ix + 256 pp. 30s.]

Dr. Burns and Miss Heathcote of the Australian National University at Canberra have provided a reasoned study of *Peace-keeping by U.N. Forces from Suez to Congo*. In fact, in so far as the latter operations are concerned their monograph is almost a day-by-day survey. Of the entire volume, only 17 pages are devoted to the Suez, Lebanon and Jordan issues, but these are enough to indicate the fundamental difference between the earlier operations and that in the Congo. UNEF was not called upon to establish peace, but merely to "police the U.N. mandate", while the units sent to the other two Middle Eastern countries were to observe and not even police. In Congo, on the other hand, the task of the United Nations was to help secure internal peace and order, without resorting to any military initiative or any intervention in domestic and political matters. This dichotomy of purpose inevitably led to clashes between those who represent the United Nations in its civil as distinct from its military operations. This was particularly true when Hammarskjold was in control. He apparently did not consider secession to be a crime by its very nature. U Thant, however, soon showed that in his view secession would be deplorable and he rapidly applied the United Nations presence to averting such a possibility. Under him, the military purpose of the Force was not merely self-defence, but victory in a defensive campaign. Given this type of approach, it is clear that "once the U.N. has become involved in a struggle against internal forces, it may have to see the internal conflict through, even though external intervention is no longer a threat".

The learned authors clearly bring out the point that a U.N. military operation is very different from a national operation. Not only does the Force have to observe the normal rules of war, it has to pay more attention the humanitarian and emotional ideals and, rather than risk a non-military objective being damaged accidentally in the course of a legitimate operation, may have to call the operation off. In addition, it is limited by the legal interpretation of the U.N. resolutions under which it is operating, and this in turn is affected by the political rivalries of the members of the Organization.

Among the lessons to be learned from the operations is that "for the prevention of strife involving such intertribal conflict [as occurred in the Congo], one requisite is quick deployment of sufficient and appropriately trained U.N. troops, under the command or with the assistance of skilled administrators of the 'District Officer' type; but care should be taken to avoid the misleading 'colonialist' associations of that kind of title.... [Further,] the Congo experience indicates that ability to withdraw military assistance [by the States contributing forces] is in fact a more effective instrument for limiting the scope of U.N. political action than is raising difficulties about finding the money for it."

Whenever issues arise in the United Nations concerning 'colonialism', there are attempts to persuade the United Nations to take strong measures to ensure the overthrow of the administration or to restrict its powers to preserve itself — unless of course the administrator is itself a newly independent State, as in the case of the Congo or Indonesia and West Irian. It should be remembered that "if the U.N. should set about using force to achieve political objectives — say, the elimination of colonialism or foreign domination — it would implicitly be promising more than it could perform. The preponderant might of the great powers would forbid it to conduct such a campaign universally, so that it would be acting as an international policeman only against the minor 'criminals'. The policy would also be overambitious insofar as the U.N. seems unlikely for the next decade or so to be able to cope with more than a very few Congo-type situations." On the other hand, if the Congolese central government is now able to establish itself and preserve order without further external assistance, the United Nations "may appear to be an ideal instrument for transforming postcolonial situations to the shape desired by the Afro-Asian powers — and therefore an invaluable tool from the U.S. viewpoint for weaning the Afro-Asians away from their habit of looking to Moscow in such cases".

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This volume will prove of great value to students of the Congo situation and will serve as an example for further case-studies. It is to be regretted, therefore, that although the various Council and Assembly Resolutions are printed in an appendix, the agreements relating to the status and rights of the various Forces as well as the Secretary-General's views on their functions are omitted. It is equally regrettable the work contains no index and no bibliography

L. C. GREEN.