SSLT 2025: Intrinsic Duties and Constitutional Goods

In the seminar “Intrinsic Duties and Constitutional Goods” held on 26th August 2025, Associate Professor Lael Weis of the University of Melbourne explores the underexamined concept of intrinsic duties and its significance for theorising constitutionally guaranteed goods. Building on the moral philosophy of Joseph Raz, Weis challenges the dominance of rights-based frameworks that have long shaped constitutional and moral theory. Rather than deriving legal and moral duties from individual rights or interests, Weis situates intrinsic duties as obligations grounded in collective goods that possess intrinsic—though not necessarily ultimate—value.

This reframing exposes the limitations of conventional constitutional reasoning, where duties are often justified only through the protection of rights. By contrast, Weis argues that certain state duties, such as those found in directive principles, environmental and cultural protections, and “third generation” constitutional guarantees, are better understood as intrinsic rather than derivative of rights. In doing so, the paper reconceptualises constitutional morality as a system sustained not solely by entitlements, but by duties that express and constitute intrinsic values themselves. Ultimately, Weis’s analysis offers a compelling theoretical foundation for re-evaluating how constitutional law articulates collective well-being, suggesting that the moral architecture of constitutional goods may be more coherently explained through the language of intrinsic duties than through the grammar of rights