Description

In 2023, the plan for Australia to acquire nuclear-powered submarines under the Australia-UK-US (AUKUS) trilateral security partnership looks to be going ahead. The notion that a non-nuclear weapon state like Australia will have nuclear powered vessels in its navy gives rise to a raft of legal and political issues relating to nuclear non-proliferation. By examining relevant international law relating to nuclear weapons and nuclear energy, this paper explores the legal status of nuclear-powered submarines and critiques the implications of AUKUS for nuclear non-proliferation. There are significant gaps and other weaknesses in the nuclear non-proliferation legal regime that will allow Australia to acquire nuclear-powered submarines despite the danger this poses for global security. The paper engages with the idea that the nuclear-related international legal regime is flawed by design. This regime gives maximum flexibility to states to exploit loopholes and broad provisions that actively undermine the non-proliferation objective. The paper explores whether and how international law could be strengthened to prevent the normalization of nuclear-propulsion in military activities and attendant non-proliferation dangers.