Description

Divided societies have always posed a challenge to constitutional design. In creating a constitutional order, constitutional drafters not only have to create a viable political order, they also have to ensure inter-group cooperation among groups that may not always desire peaceful coexistence, or more specifically, equal coexistence. Constitutional divisions of power will therefore need to take into account how best to create inter-group power-sharing and accommodate differing group interests. Many constitutional proposals that have been adopted around the world, whether falling within centripetal, consociational, and group representation types, have not achieved their desired purpose of ensuring lasting inter-group cooperation. Problems include what Donald Horowitz identifies as degradation of electoral arrangements and immobilism. Indeed, recent studies of constitutional practice in divided societies increasingly question whether pragmatism, delay, and/or obfuscation may sometimes be better strategies in creating constitutional order in divided societies. This Roundtable engages with these questions by critically evaluating power-sharing arrangements in several diverse, and often divided, societies in Asia (specifically India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Singapore, and Sri Lanka). Together with expert commentators, participants at the Roundtable will interrogate various limitations on constitutional design options, identify gaps in constitutional design theories, and propose future trajectories for constitutional design in such societies.

About The Speakers & Commentators

Jaclyn L. Neo (Convenor / National University of Singapore); Donald L. Horowitz (Duke University); Mario Gomez (International Centre for Ethnic Studies); Kevin YL Tan (National University of Singapore); Eugene KB Tan (Singapore Management University); Rehan Abeyratne (The Chinese University of Hong Kong); Dian A.H. Shah (National University of Singapore); and Nyi Nyi Kyaw (National University of Singapore).