Song Yihang
National University of Singapore
Faculty of Law

Following Wuhan’s lockdown in January, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) Government swiftly implemented similarly stringent control measures throughout the nation, in their attempt to stem the spread of the COVID-19 virus.

However, enforcing such drastic measures in the world’s most populous country cannot be performed solely by the Central Government – much of the legwork would have to be devised and implemented by local authorities and officials. In order to ensure that political supervision permeates throughout China’s immense bureaucracy amidst this unprecedented crisis, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) needed to employ institutional safeguards at all levels of government – ranging from the largest province to the smallest county.

This institutional “monitor” came in the form of the National Supervisory Commission (NSC;国家监察委员会) and the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI;中央纪律检查委员会), and their crucial roles in the country’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic cannot be overstated.

What are the NSC and CCDI?

Traditionally, the main organ tasked with combating corruption and malfeasance in China was the CCDI. However, the CCDI has been seen as ineffective and lacking legal basis in discharging its supervisory functions, since it is ultimately a branch of the ruling party instead of a state organ.

In March 2018, the National People’s Congress – China’s Legislature – established the NSC, an anti-corruption branch of government that stands on the same footing as the likes of the Judiciary and the State Council. The Supervision Law of the PRC was also enacted to consolidate anti-corruption responsibilities and powers that were previously scattered among multiple state agencies. The NSC is also a member of the Asian Ombudsman Association and has been presented to the region as China’s public sector ombudsman.

At present, it is clear that the NSC operates as a state arm, while the CCDI remains a branch of the CCP. However, the two organization works in tandem to exercise extensive supervisory powers over the entirety of China’s governance structure (in fact, they share the same website and office buildings). While the CCDI already possessed the power to investigate and detain CCP members, the NSC fills up any residual gap, by having jurisdiction over a broad church of public officials and relevant personnel. Under Article 15 of the Supervision Law, the NSC is able to supervise all personnel managed by the Civil Servant Law of the PRC, as well as others who merely perform public duties in accordance with the law.

Following President Xi Jinping’s instructions at the dawn of the COVID-19 outbreak, which emphasized on the “importance and urgency of epidemic prevention and control”, the NSC and the CCDI immediately tightened their monitoring of authorities in the grassroots. On 30 January 2020, a notice was published, pronouncing the duo-agencies’ strict approach towards “investigating and dealing with violations of discipline and law”. These violations include the dereliction of duty and misappropriation of state resources meant for pandemic relief. In doing so, the NSC and the CCDI discharged their duties in three ways: First, as the public sector ombudsman; Second, ensuring the Central Government’s control over local authorities during the pandemic; Lastly, fostering public confidence in the government’s response and anti-corruption efforts.

Inevitably, as local officials scramble to combat the pandemic in the following months, many fell on the receiving end of the NSC and CCDI’s joint supervisory powers.

Zhang Guoming was one such example. As the director of a local county’s Centre for Disease Control (CDC) in the Negawa Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture of Sichuan Province, Zhang had returned to his hometown for the Lunar New Year holidays by mid-January, just like most of his colleagues around the country.

For the most part of the year, Zhang’s position as CDC director of the isolated county takes him more than 500 kilometers from his hometown. The annual break over Lunar New Year is one of Zhang’s precious opportunities to reunite with his son, who he only sees for small pockets of time each year. Little did he know, however, that an unprecedented pandemic was about to cut-short his long-awaited reunion.

On the evening of 23 January, the Sichuan provincial government issued a Level 1 Public Health Emergency Response and ordered all CDC personnel to return to their posts by the following day. However, Zhang only returned to his county’s CDC two days later, with NSC and CCDI officials already waiting at his doorsteps.

Zhang’s initial indifference towards the recall order was not without reason. Not only was the county situated in an isolated part of the prefecture, it was hardly expecting any external visitors during the winter season. Hence, the risk of viral transmissions did not appear material. Furthermore, Zhang was reluctant to end his long-awaited break prematurely and failed to appreciate the gravity of the outbreak, until it was too late.

As punishment for his blunder, the NSC and CCDI suspended Zhang’s appointment as CDC director and commenced disciplinary proceedings. The gaffe was also extensively reported in state media, which portrayed Zhang as a tardy official who failed to “lead on the frontlines” in this “war against the epidemic”.

Another case study can be seen in Leqing city of Zhejiang Province, where the local CDC was found to be negligent in its collation of data regarding close contacts to confirmed cases of COVID-19. As a result of the oversight, the CDC failed to report seven cases of linked community transmissions to the government.

The director of Leqing city’s CDC was found to bear direct responsibility for the mistake and was promptly removed from his appointment. However, the NSC and CCDI did not stop there. Instead, they moved up the “chain of command”, further implicating the Party Secretary of the city’s Hygiene and Health Department, as well as the Deputy Mayor. Although these two individuals were not directly responsible for, nor were they privy to the CDC’s negligence, they were also punished due to their “failures as a superior” (负有领导责任). The Party Secretary was stripped of his appointment, while the Deputy Mayor was internally reprimanded by the CCP.

In discharging their function as “supervisors” at all levels of government, the NSC and CCDI adopted a two-pronged approach. Besides the “public shaming” and the “chain of command extermination” strategies, they also sought to valorize certain officials for their “sacrifices” in the “war against the epidemic” – particularly those who gave their lives in the process.

Valorization of “heroes” amidst the pandemic.

Li Miao was paraded as one such “heroic” figure. As a county official of the Uighur Autonomous Region of the Xinjiang Province, Li toiled on the ground continuously for 37 days since the beginning of the outbreak. On 2 March, Li attended back-to-back meetings and site visits from 10am to 7.30pm. Despite having pre-existing health conditions that require timely medication, Li chose to attend further meetings that night – he died from overwork on the same night, leaving behind his stricken wife and a gravely ill mother.

In Inner Mongolia, official Wen Zhanchao’s responsibilities included the supervision of multiple quarantine zones in isolated, rural regions of the locality. After returning to his post on the second day of the Lunar New Year, Wen persisted in his duties for more than 50 days, before passing on at the early age of 43.

Many of such similar stories were identified by the NSC and CCDI as templates of “officials leading the fight against COVID-19”. These tales typically center around grassroot officials who worked tirelessly throughout the outbreak, eventually perishing from overwork or related illnesses. In the words of the duo-agencies, these are “matyrs” who “went against the fleeing crowd” and “stood firm on the frontlines” for the sake of the masses. On 4 April, China held a national mourning for these citizens who “died in the fight” against the COVID-19 outbreak.

Conclusion

The NSC and CCDI’s mission during this outbreak was to ensure that “political supervision follows wherever the CCP’s decisions and policies are implemented” (要坚持党中央决策部署到哪里，政治监督就跟进到哪里). By utilising their two-pronged approach of “public shaming” incompetent officials and establishing “heroes” among the government ranks, the duo-agencies are able to compel the compliance at all levels, while fostering public confidence in the CCP administration. Nation-wide policies could then be implemented in-line with the party’s political leadership, thereby achieving their intended effect.