Journal Name: The American Journal of Jurisprudence

Volume Number: 65

Issue Number: 2

Abstract:

This article aims to dispel the confusion over no-right by drawing attention to three straightforward points, and by examining a neglected source of complexity. The former embrace the practical significance of a no-right within Hohfeld’s scheme; the important difference between the practical significance of a normative position and the theoretical status of the concept representing it; and, the relationship between logical duals and contradictories when applied to normative positions. The complexity is associated with liberty as the correlative of no-right, and involves recognizing a connection with the operators of deontic logic. The conventional interdefinability of permission and obligation is challenged; “liberty” is regarded as an inadequate label for the normative position signifying the absence of duty, and, as a distinctive position, is not a true correlative of any other position. Implications are noted for the theoretical problem faced by deontic logic when confronting normative relations between individuals, and for the solution of practical problems within a (legal or moral) normative system.