Fundamentals of Criminal Law (“Fundamentals”) was completed in Singapore during lockdown in 2020. But it will never really be finished. The project that it undertakes is sufficiently wide-ranging that there will always be opportunities for disagreement and refinement. Even if one accepts its core informing principles, eg that D should not be convicted of a criminal wrong unless D is culpable for that wrong, one might well harbour doubts about how those principles apply in the context of particular doctrines. Can inadvertent negligence be culpable, for instance, in the way that many legal systems assume it is? In his essay for this symposium, James Manwaring does not deny that it can: “Sometimes inattention and forgetfulness evidence insufficient care for others.” But he denies that the evidential link is a robust one. Drawing on recent studies in the psychological literature, he concludes that such failings of attention or memory, relative to an average person, do not supply robust evidence of a moral failing on D’s part. More specifically, they do not offer sufficiently reliable evidence of D’s culpability to warrant the kind of condemnatory and punitive response that is inflicted by criminal law. “From the fact that the defendant failed to do what the reasonable person would do, it requires a fragile inference to reach the conclusion that they evinced insufficient care [for the interests of those they harmed].” Yet Manwaring accepts that the inference may be strengthened by relativising the so-called “reasonable person” to more of the defendant’s own attributes. He does not offer an account of how that might be done; such an account would be well beyond the scope of a single essay. What he does show, however, is that the existing literature is incomplete. There is more work to be done.

In Fundamentals of Criminal Law, Andrew Simester offers a limited defence of the use of negligence in criminal law. Simester does not claim that negligence – nor any mens rea element – is inherently culpable. Rather, Simester claims that negligence – with all other mens rea elements – provides evidence from which we may infer culpability. I will retrace Simester’s account to consider how (and why) we may infer culpability from mens rea in general (Part 1), then how we may infer culpability from negligence specifically (Part 2), and finally, how we may infer culpability from the underlying traits which cause us to become negligent (Part 3). Ultimately, I think that the evidence of culpability to be derived from negligence is too weak to meet Simester’s requirements.

The article suggests a way to overcome the reluctance to grant a defence for culturally motivated non-compliance with the criminal law by recognising various kinds of cultural defences. Cultural defence as an excuse enables courts to both declare the expectation that the minority will adjust their practices to criminal law prohibitions by perceiving the culturally motivated non-compliance as wrong, and nonetheless excuse the defendant on the ground that the cultural motivation negates her culpability. Cultural defence as a justification conveys a respect for cultural autonomy by permitting the defendant to adhere to cultural practices despite its infringement of the criminal law prohibition. Classifying the cultural motivation as an offence modifier implies that the reasons for criminalisation do not apply to the cultural practice. The variety of cultural defences would have to be subject to a normative constraint for cases in which the cultural practice infringes upon the polity’s fundamental values.

This paper engages with fundamental questions about the categorisation of the insanity defence in relation to other defences and about the moral and legal significance of satisfying its requirements. Firstly, it defends Simester’s account of insanity as an exemption from moral assessment against Marcia Baron’s argument that insanity is really an excuse. Secondly, it argues that we must distinguish conceptually between cases of insanity based on involuntariness, and cases of insanity where the defendant’s conduct was not involuntary. It tentatively suggests that certain defendants who, under Singapore’s revised insanity defence, successfully plead that they have no “power to control” their actions, should be treated as failing to satisfy the criminal law’s underlying voluntariness requirement.

Under what conditions are we justified in acting? This paper considers an answer that, to my knowledge at least, goes largely unexplored in the literature. According to the answer in question, D has a justification for performing an act only if two conditions are met. First, there must be an undefeated reason for D to perform the act. Second, it must be the case that, were D to lack this reason, D would have an excuse for performing it. So understood, the conditions of justification incorporate the conditions of excuse—one satisfies the former by satisfying the latter, and by satisfying an additional condition. Justifications, simply put, are excuses plus.

In this paper, I offer some thoughts inspired by Andrew Simester’s magisterial book, Fundamentals of Criminal Law. The starting point is Simester’s account of culpability as grounded in moral vice. The initial parts of the paper examine this account, and the language of “morality” and “vice” contained within it. Of particular concern is the legitimising role of invocations of morality and the complexities that come with that role. The latter parts of the paper raise two puzzles and examine their implications: the first is when moral judgements and legal judgements of blameworthiness come apart; the second when there is a gap between crime seriousness and individual culpability. Both puzzles allow us to tease out aspects of Simester’s theory and their implications for sentencing.

Do results matter in criminal law? Many say “No” and recommend redrafting crimes in “the inchoate mode”. Others answer “Yes” and defend the division between complete and attempted offences. This paper considers a third (non-general) answer: “Sometimes”. Could it be that in some contexts results matter significantly more than in others? Murder and fraud are contrasted; while the former appears to be a “hard sell” for the inchoate mode, the latter has, at least in one major jurisdiction, passed into law and bedded down with apparent ease. Perhaps results matter in murder in a way they do not in fraud. Two contrasts are drawn, first that murder is a “horrific crime”, while fraud is not, and secondly, that the core of the wrong of kinds of fraud might be contained in the attempt. Maybe the mistake is to seek for a general answer to the question of whether results matter.

Simester has defended the following conclusions: (1) an omission to ϕ can cause outcome x; but (2) an omission to θ (where θ-ing would have prevented x) cannot relieve another agent of causal responsibility for x. In relation to (1), I contend that a fuller explanation of why the law should recognise omissions as causes, rather than as an independent head of responsibility-attribution for results, is required, and that any such explanation will raise questions regarding Simester’s distinctions between causal elements. Conclusion (2) follows from Simester’s view that “direct” causation is sufficient for causation of x. It will be argued that Simester has not yet made the case for preferring this model over a more familiar one, whereby an initial finding of “factual” causation is always open to being defeated by doctrines of intervening causation to ensure that responsibility for outcomes is doled out appropriately by the criminal law.

This study examines the extent to which “an interest in the proceeds of sale of land” is able to be protected by a caveat, under s 115(3)(a) of the LTA. To this end, the history of the LTA and case law are studied to identify the legislative intent behind s 115(3)(a). Various issues such as the scope of a caveatable interest and lack of definitions in the LTA, among other challenges, are identified and consolidated. This study then proposes the use of the “definite entitlement” test as an extension of the statue for greater clarity.

A common thread underlying many clinical legal education initiatives – to support access-to-justice imperatives – is interwoven with broader policy initiatives within a legal system to develop its pro bono legal service channels for the benefit of the wider community. The former can make meaningful contributions towards the pursuit of the latter, while the flourishing of the latter can create valuable opportunities for the growth of the former. This article explores the potential for a closer alignment between the pro bono activities of Community Legal Clinics and the development of clinical legal education initiatives within Singapore’s law schools, analysing empirical data from the author’s experience volunteering at a legal clinic alongside undergraduate law students to formulate recommendations that may generate desired outcomes on both fronts.