Several regulators have taken steps to strengthen operational resilience of crypto and Decentralised Finance (“DeFi”) systems. We inquire into the effectiveness of such policy approaches against the background of the EU’s Digital Operational Resilience Act (“DORA”). To further legitimate cybersecurity and national security concerns, DORA relies on a risk management pyramid with financial institutions at the top and ICT service providers below. Using DeFi lending and internationally launched stablecoins as examples, we show that both centralised crypto and DeFi systems are rooted in cooperation and decentralisation. By mandating hierarchical risk management in its pursuit of resilience, DORA-style legislation undermines crypto’s ambition of achieving the same goal through horizontal financial infrastructures, potentially sacrificing groundbreaking innovations for incremental gains. Taking the EU Markets in Crypto-assets Regulation (“MiCA”) as a regulatory blueprint, we reconcile the policy paradigms of DORA and crypto and propose policy steps that ensure cyber resilience in crypto networks.

In Celestial Aviation Services Ltd v UniCredit Bank GmbH, London Branch and Kuvera Resources Pte Ltd v JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., the English and Singaporean courts, respectively, entertained disputes regarding the intersection of letters of credit and sanctions. This note examines how the two core developments arising from these cases (that is, a prohibition against payment arising from sanctions laws and regulations and the use of sanctions clauses, respectively) have introduced uncertainty and unpredictability to payment in international trade. It investigates salient aspects of both cases and offers support for the appeal court judgments insofar as they promote harmony between sanctions laws and regulations on the one hand, and established principles of international trade on the other. It is suggested that both cases may serve as useful guidance for other legal systems in pursuing such harmony, particularly insofar as letters of credit are concerned.

In East Coast Podiatry Centre Pte Ltd v Family Podiatry Centre Pte Ltd, the Singapore Court of Appeal addressed trade mark infringement in the context of Google advertisements and online search advertising. The Court of Appeal reaffirmed Singapore’s use-centric threshold of “trade mark use” under s 27 of the Trade Marks Act 1998 (2020 Rev Ed), declining to adopt the EU’s effect-centric “functions” approach. In addition, the decision also contained obiter on whether websites may feature in the confusion analysis for trade mark infringement, appearing to take a more expansive view towards extraneous considerations in infringement cases, in contrast to the prior decision of Staywell Hospitality Group v Starwood Hotels. This comment examines the implications of this decision especially in light of Singapore’s shared TRIPS obligations, and the possibility of future development of trade mark law in the digital marketplace.

In D’Aloia, the English High Court was presented with a crypto assets fraud dispute that was highly complex and technical, but found the evidence of both expert witnesses to be unhelpful. Neither expert witness had formal qualifications in computer science, and the court found the evidence of one expert witness to be chaotic, inconsistent and contradictory, which made it difficult for the court to apply the relevant laws cogently. This case highlights the necessity of having strong, accurate and coherent expert evidence, especially in complex cryptocurrency matters. This comment aims to expound and analyse the deficiencies in the presentation and understanding of the complicated functioning of the technology of blockchains, which impacted the court’s ability to distil the correct facts, undermining its capacity to accurately apply the laws of tracing and following.

Singapore’s drug laws are a ubiquitous part of our criminal justice system. Drug offences are among the most litigated criminal offences, and convictions for drug trafficking account for very many of the executions in Singapore. Ask any criminal defence lawyer, and they will say they have had experience, perhaps many experiences, with clients accused of drug offences. Ask them whether they believe those offences serve a valuable purpose, and the answer will probably be “yes”. Ask further whether the existing legal framework is the best way to further those purposes, and the response may be more equivocal.

Reimagining Health Law is an edited volume in which the editors, Atina Krajewska and Jean McHale, both of Birmingham University, have brought together a cross-disciplinary team of experts to rethink how health law as a field has been – and should be – conceptualised. The central question, which kicks off the introductory chapter is succinct: “What constitutes health law today, both as a set of legal principles and as an academic field?” The book addresses this question in two distinct parts. The first lays the foundation of health law with the editors drawing insights from selected primary areas of law that interact with and shape health law. The second part of the book studies health law from cross-disciplinary perspectives, mapping the boundaries and borders of the field.

To act or not to act. To intervene or stand aside. Are these only moral questions, or should they also be legal ones? They arise when a doctor withdraws treatment, when a passer-by fails to help someone in danger and increasingly, when machines are designed to make choices on our behalf. As autonomous systems become more common and societies grapple with issues of ageing populations and end-of-life care, the line between doing harm and allowing harm to occur is likely to become even more controversial. Dr Roni Rosenberg’s Act and Omission in Criminal Law: Autonomy, Morality and Applications to Euthanasia takes this long-standing problem as its starting point. Despite what the title suggests, the book is not only about euthanasia. Its central concern is a deeper question about the distinction between acts and omissions and what justifies that distinction. At the heart of the analysis, Rosenberg considers the relevance of identifying a duty to act as an anchor for justifying criminal liability in omissions.