If a contracting party cannot pay in US dollars, can they pay the equivalent in Euros? Set against the backdrop of force majeure, the conclusion reached by the UK Supreme Court in RTI Ltd v MUR Shipping BV was, perhaps surprisingly, no. The court held that reasonable endeavours provisos in force majeure clauses can never require a party to accept non-contractual performance (ie, performance on different terms from the contract). This comment has two aims. First, it explains why the holding should be reconsidered, and in so doing sets out a preferable approach to interpreting reasonable endeavours provisos in force majeure clauses. Second, it makes suggestions on the approach to interpreting force majeure clauses more generally. In this regard, references and observations will also be made on the position in Singapore.

In Hui Chun Ping v Hui Kau Mo (2024) 27 HKCFAR 634, the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal considered whether an agent who acquired a secret profit in breach of fiduciary duty could raise a limitation defence. Lord Hoffmann NPJ decided that the claim against the agent did not fall within s 20(1)(b) of the Limitation Ordinance and was subject to a limitation period. This Note makes two comments on his reasoning. First, it argues that Lord Hoffmann’s recourse to the historical roots of the limitation statute should be commended, even if his articulation of it was not without its shortcomings. Second, it critiques Lord Hoffmann’s unsatisfactorily equivocal answer to whether the limitation period arose by analogy or directly under s 20(2) of the Limitation Ordinance. It suggests that it would have been desirable for him to clarify that the limitation period in Hui arose by analogy only.

On 8 February 2025, the Singapore Parliament enacted the Workplace Fairness Act 2025, which is the first legal framework against workplace discrimination in Singapore. This comment builds on existing scholarship by focusing on the social implications that might result from three legal characteristics of the WFA: (a) the lack of provisions against conduct that would amount to indirect discrimination in other jurisdictions; (b) that sexual orientation and gender identity are not listed as protected characteristics; and (c) the explicit legalisation of discrimination against relatives and associates. Overall, I argue that while the WFA is a valuable addition to the employment law regime in Singapore, the law needs to be more sensitive to the socio-political consequences that could result from its legal operation.

It is an oft-repeated truism that damages are compensatory. Errant doctrines which recognise the possibility of monetary recovery in excess of loss, such as punitive damages, are marginalised as anomalies. Others, such as negotiating damages, are uncomfortably shoehorned into the Procrustean bed of compensation. Cost-of-cure damages have likewise become a casualty of the law’s apparent fixation on compensation. Despite suggestions to the contrary, these damages are often treated as simply one measure of loss. That approach has thrown up difficult questions about the dual roles of the claimant’s intention to effect cure and the reasonableness of curing. In Terrenus Energy SL2 Pre Ltd v Attika Interior + MEP Pte Ltd [2025] SGHC(A) 4, the Appellate Division of the High Court was called on to revisit these questions, which had previously been confronted in JSD Corporation Pte Ltd v Tri-Line Express Pte Ltd [2022] SGHC 227.

Under s 359(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code 2010, the court can order an offender to compensate the victim with a sum which the victim would have been able to recover in a civil claim in tort against the offender. The courts have used this useful power extensively, though problems remain. One such problem is seen in Ong Eng Siew, where the court declined to make a compensation order. Given the purpose of the compensation system, the court was not correct to hold – in effect – that the purpose of s 359(1) is to benefit only impecunious victims, and that the Prosecution bears the burden of proving that the victim is impecunious. Further, the compensation order should have covered not only medical expenses paid by the victim in cash, but also those paid using Central Provident Fund savings and MediShield Life insurance payouts. This comment also calls for further study of the compensation regime in practice and possible procedural reforms to make it easier for victims to have prosecutors present evidence relevant to the issue of compensation.