This Article focuses upon aspects of title financing in personalty under English Law. Article Nine of the American Uniform Commercial Code is often regarded as a model for solving credit and security problems and has been adopted in some Commonwealth jurisdictions, most notably, in Canada. The article considers some of the difficulties, in the light of the North American experience, associated with an English project for reform. A wider problem here concerns the deficiencies in codification as a successful mechanism for reform in Commercial Law.

There is, at common law, a doctrine “as old as the modern confession rule itself”, which Wigmore called the doctrine of confirmation by subsequent facts and which Cowen and Carter said “might be more felicitously called the doctrine of confirmation by consequently discovered facts”. Whatever this doctrine may be called, the common law is admittedly confused and uncertain. In the Evidence Acts of Singapore and Malaysia,5 the doctrine is seemingly codified in section 27, but section 27 is not free from difficulty either. It is proposed in this article to examine the meaning and scope of the doctrine as expressed in this provision. It is the writer’s contention that this provision, although often involved in cases where a statement to the police is excluded from evidence, is equally often misunderstood.

Implicating a cross-section of property and familial policies, the question of when and whether a spouse acquires a resulting trust interest in realty jointly occupied with another spouse is one of the emotive questions of our times. This article examines the merits of a conventionalistic conception of the resulting trust against competing dogmatic and intentionalistic conceptions, and concludes that it furnishes a better resolution of the impinging policies. As the Court of Appeal decision in Lau Siew Kim is a foremost example of the conventionalistic analysis, attention is focused on various aspects of the decision with a view to defending it against the mixed reception it has received hitherto

Artificial intelligence (“AI”) and other new technologies will shape, and are already shaping, the business models, management, structures and boundaries, and governance of corporations. This article examines selected developments in this area and their potential impacts on corporate law, governance, and regulation, using both theoretical and practical perspectives. The first part discusses AI and corporate leadership, focusing in particular on management structures, liability, and autonomous algorithmic entities. The second part proceeds to theorise firms in light of three specific business-related changes or phenomena induced by AI and other technologies. Finally, this part outlines selected impacts that these changes may have on corporate governance and the regulation of AI and online platforms.

The term “data trust" has recently come into circulation to denote some kind of legal governance structure for the management of data, in particular digital databases, but there is much uncertainty and confusion about what a data trust is supposed to be, legally speaking. This paper examines the nature of data as a possible trust asset, and concludes that the traditional trust, the historical creation of English Equity jurisprudence and now found around the world, is a perfectly sensible vehicle for the management of data, in particular the management of combined datasets for both private and charitable purposes, especially educational purposes. The paper also considers the data protection issues that arise in relation to data trusts.

This article examines the powers of the Supreme Court of Singapore in awarding damages and interest. The powers were recently clarified and expanded by amendments to the Supreme Court of Judicature Act. The changes are examined with reference to the law prior to the amendments, and some suggestions are made for the exercise of the new powers.

Do results matter in criminal law? Many say “No” and recommend redrafting crimes in “the inchoate mode”. Others answer “Yes” and defend the division between complete and attempted offences. This paper considers a third (non-general) answer: “Sometimes”. Could it be that in some contexts results matter significantly more than in others? Murder and fraud are contrasted; while the former appears to be a “hard sell” for the inchoate mode, the latter has, at least in one major jurisdiction, passed into law and bedded down with apparent ease. Perhaps results matter in murder in a way they do not in fraud. Two contrasts are drawn, first that murder is a “horrific crime”, while fraud is not, and secondly, that the core of the wrong of kinds of fraud might be contained in the attempt. Maybe the mistake is to seek for a general answer to the question of whether results matter.

This article explores the interface between vicarious liability and agency authority in the context of misrepresentation. It suggests that while vicarious liability is often a wider concept than agency authority, where the torts of misrepresentation are concerned there should be symmetry between vicarious liability and authority in agency.