The quintessence of the supremacy of the constitution according to Dicey lies in the constitution (1) being written, (2) being rigid, and (3) providing for judicial review. This article examines the existence of these criteria in the constitution of Singapore. As relevant local case law is very limited, an effort is made to interpret the provisions of the constitution, mostly in the context of the experience inn the working of the pertinent provisions of the constitution of India and Malaysia, which are germane to the constitution of Singapore.

Marriage is an equal partnership of efforts so the spouses contribute equally in acquiring property whether by making payment or by homemaking and child caring. A just and equitable division of matrimonial assets, the gains of partnership, at its dissolution should therefore generally be an equal division. This article supports the proposition. First from discussion of a recent decision where the Family Court approved and the High Court on appeal disapproved of it. Then from a more general discussion of the current law in Singapore of the division of matrimonial assets on divorce.

The mandatory bid rule (MBR), one of the basic tenets of takeover regulation, obligates an acquirer who obtains 'control' over a target company to make an offer to acquire the shares of the remaining shareholders. What amounts to 'control' is far from clear; some jurisdictions follow a quantitative approach based on a specific shareholding threshold such as 30% voting rights, while others follow a qualitative approach through a subjective determination based on several factors, such as the specific rights available to an acquirer under a shareholders' agreement or the constitutional documents of a target. The goal of this article is to consider the merits and demerits of these approaches. It seeks to do so by examining various models adopted in jurisdictions for pegging 'control' so as to invoke the_x000D_ MBR. It delves into the regulatory experience in India as that jurisdiction not only adopts a combined approach (taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative tests for control), but has also been subject to a great deal of controversy and litigation in recent years that have helped tease out the jurisprudential contours of the concept. It concludes with a normative assessment that points towards partial harmonisation.

By criminalizing certain forms of private consensual sexual conduct, sections 377 and 377A of the Penal Code disregard the individual's sexual autonomy. They impose a particular set of sexual "morals" on a sexually pluralistic Singapore society. I argue in this article that sections 377 and 377A should be abolished and replaced by laws that do not criminalize such private and consensual conduct.

I would like to start by congratulating all the speakers who have spoken yesterday and up to before the break. After listening to Professor Furmston's welcome address, the Minister's keynote speech defending robustly Singapore's practical conception of the 'rule of law', Professor Tamanaha's magisterial lecture, Professor Weiler's passionate defence of a 'rule of law' that must incorporate the values of democracy and human rights and the Attorney-General and Justice Rajah's moderation of the views of the experts on their respective panels, I have to say that the better part of the symposium is probably over, with apologies to the panellists and speakers coming later. So I will liven upmy lecture by referring to the 'rule of law'news in The Straits Times this morning.

In all the important common lawjurisdictions surveyed here, seditious libel means defiance or censure of constituted authority leading to foreseeable harm to public order. In sharp contrast, the Sedition Act in Singapore, it was recently decided, makes allegations of censure of constituted authority and foreseeable harm to public order unnecessary, with the result that the offence, created by s. 3(1)(e) read with s. 4 of the Sedition Act, is transformed into a hybrid offence of blasphemous libel wider than the offence of blasphemous libel against a group of persons created by s. 153A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and the common law offence of blasphemous libel. This article argues that the decision cannot be defended and that furthermore, where the constitutional freedom of expression of a citizen is implicated, the Singapore Constitution would require the Sedition Act to be modified in order to differentiate between class divisive publications that threaten public order and those that do not.

Environmental laws cover a myriad of topics including pollution, coastal-zone management, forest conservation, parks, wildlife, mineral development and cultural environment. This paper will deal with certain aspects of pollution in Singapore; the causes and sources of pollution, the types of control, particularly the relevant laws and the cost considerations of pollution control. No attempt will be made to define pollution, for the line is often difficult to draw and the delineation varies from person to person; instead the article will focus on forms of pollution such as water pollution, air pollution, noise pollution and pollution through solid wastes.