This article analyses intermediate rights lying between contract and property described by Merrill and Smith and the disclosure and protective strategies they suggest the law has adopted to deal with them. It finds their views confirmed by recent developments in the Singapore law of trusts and secured transactions. For the former, the nascent recognition that a beneficial interest is "a right against a right" has given it the flexibility to deal with both family and commercial trusts by weakening the property-based beneficiary principle and recognizing the separate entity of the trust fund. In the latter, Singapore courts are characterizing more unusual forms of security as a registrable floating charge that is not seen as a proprietary interest. The move towards more function as opposed to form here may reflect a continental drift away from English law towards American law as Singapore adapts to Chapter 11 type provisions introduced in May 2017 into its corporate restructuring legislation.

It was only in 2008 that the Court of Appeal made a seminal restatement of the law on common intention, particularly with respect to liability in so-called ‘twin crime’ situations. The question posed then was posed again recently in Daniel Vijay: what exactly is the required mens rea for the secondary offender in such situations? In 2008, the Court of Appeal said that the secondary offender had to subjectively know that one in his party might likely commit the collateral offence in furtherance of the common intention of carrying out the primary offence. Now, in Daniel Vijay, the Court of Appeal has said that the secondary offender must have had the intention to commit the collateral offence. Has there been a change in the law, and if so, is this for the better?

This paper argues that executive detention must be sanctioned either by Article 149 or 150 of the Constitution. The question of judicial review is considered with a view to showing that:- (i) a court may not inquire into the subjective satisfaction of the Minister or President who has ordered the detention; (ii) but a court may and should inquire whether a detainee has sufficient information with which to raise objections before the Advisory Board.

The defence of ex turpi causa is well-established in contract law, but its application in the realm of tort law is less certain. This article examines the various criteria applied by courts when considering whether or not to invoke the maxim in tort cases, and it also considers the differing approaches taken by courts in determining both the stage at which ex turpi causa should be invoked and the specific role which policy should play in ex turpi causa situations. The article also questions the appropriateness of making ex turpi causa a full, rather than a partial, defence in actions in tort.

This essay engages pedagogy and teaching philosophy in reviewing how constitutional and administrative law ("CAAL") has been taught at NUS over the past 60 years, engaging the themes of mission, method and materials. Gone is the time when foreign academics disinterested in local law thoughtlessly issued readings on Bickel and irrelevant foreign cases; today, most CAAL teachers are active researchers who appreciate the autochthonous, experimental nature of the constitutional order and the changing political context, while staying abreast of comparative and international developments._x000D_ While the dominant party state remains, the governance style has shifted from authoritarianism to a more consultative, participatory approach, befitting of a post-deferential era. Government-driven constitutional amendments continue, constitutional litigation is proceeding apace and public interest in public law is in ascendancy.

This article discusses the scope of the hearsay rule in the light of recent developments. Two issues raised in recent judgements - mechanically-generated evidence and statements of intention - are also analysed. Finally, the article discusses the implications of a trial system without juries on the rules of evidence, in particular, the hearsay rule.

The presumption of advancement has been subject to criticisms by the Singapore courts. Judicial attempts have been made to marginalise and relegate it to an evidentiary rule of last resort which is easily rebuttable. However, the latest Court of Appeal decision, which reaffirms its usefulness, appears to have resuscitated the presumption in Singapore. This article—subjecting the Singapore cases to comparative developments in other jurisdictions—seeks to advance a proper understanding of the underlying rationales of the presumption, clarify its function, and propose suggestions for its more consistent application.

This article evaluates recent trends in the development of constitutional jurisprudence in relation to constitutionally safeguarded fundamental liberties. Particular attention is directed towards the methodology employed in constitutional interpretation in the 1995 Court of Appeal decision of Jabar v PP.