The papers published in this special issue were initially presented at the inaugural meeting of The Research Forum on Basic Legal Positions held in Lisbon in September 2023. The Research Forum on Basic Legal Positions has been established as a joint venture by Lisbon Legal Theory (a research cluster within the Lisbon Public Law Research Centre in the University of Lisbon) and the Centre for Legal Theory (Faculty of Law in the National University of Singapore). Its aim is to promote the investigation of elements common to all legal systems at the level of individual legal positions, where a party’s conduct is normatively regulated by the law. The analysis of such positions clarifies practical legal problems, informs a scientific understanding of law, and illuminates normative controversies over the status individuals should enjoy under the law. The forum provides a collaborative environment in which civilian and common-law scholars can address theoretical issues of fundamental concern to all contemporary legal systems.

The idea of “inalienability” is normally thought of as providing the strongest level of protection that a right (and hence its right‑holder) can possibly enjoy. Whereas an “ordinary” fundamental right is supposed to be protected first of all against the State (“vertical” protection), and secondly also against other private citizens and entities in general (“horizontal” protection), some rights are supposed to be so important that they are protected, it seems, even against the choices and decisions of the very right‑holder. While the idea of an inalienable right is well known in legal, moral, and political philosophy, it is not entirely clear what it means for a right to be inalienable — and whether an inalienable right is really a right after all. By using a Hohfeldian conceptual framework, this essay tries to provide an analytical inquiry into the concept of an inalienable right, and to explore under what conditions it is conceptually possible to talk of inalienable rights.

This article seeks to demonstrate that under the LTA there are no impediments to the satisfaction of an equity based on a claim in proprietary estoppel and its enforceability against third parties. That there are problems in these two respects is misconceived in light of case law and the relevant statutory provisions in the LTA. As for the satisfaction of the equity, it is argued that a principled approach must be adopted notwithstanding the wide discretion conferred on the courts on the matter.

Sections 215A to 215J of the Companies Act were enacted to facilitate the amalgamation or merger of Singapore companies. These provisions also enable an acquiror to achieve full ownership of the target company by indirectly buying out the shares held by minority shareholders, even if such shareholders have voted against the amalgamation at the shareholders’ meeting. This author argues that the amalgamation procedure, as compared with the other forms of compulsory acquisition, may have the unintended effect of unduly favouring the majority shareholders at the expense of the minority shareholders. The problem is partially mitigated by the fact that the provisions allow for shareholders to apply to the court for relief if the amalgamation would lead to unfair prejudice. Alternatively, shareholders may bring a petition under section 216 of the Companies Act, on the ground that the amalgamation is oppressive, unfairly discriminatory or otherwise prejudicial to their interests. This article explores the circumstances in which the court would intervene and it is argued that the basis of any intervention is to ensure that the requisite shareholder approval is fairly obtained.

In this paper I will argue that no such legislative amendment is necessary, at least in respect of initial decisions to detain. I accept without reservation the implication that in this fundamental area of personal liberty the judiciary should have an important reviewing role over administrative acts, but I contend that this may be done quite adequately in proceedings on applications for writs of habeas corpus. This contention is, however, dependent upon the satisfaction of an essential condition—that in performing their functions in habeas corpus applications, the courts exhibit a willingness to utilise the powers available to them to the full. As I will hope to demonstrate, the courts in both Singapore and Malaysia have adopted an unduly restrictive approach to their reviewing role when applications for habeas corpus in respect of preventive detention have been made. This restrictive approach is unjustified, for the authorities which are said to support it can no longer do so, even if they ever could (which in some cases is very doubtful). It is still open to the courts to adopt a more generous attitude—at is only if they refuse to do so that further consideration would need to be given to the Mission’s recommendation.

The enactment of section 67A to the Companies Act of Malaysia allows its publicly listed companies to buy-back their own shares. This was seen as necessary to provide for a stabilization of the supply and demand, as well as the price, of shares that are listed on both the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange and the Malaysian Exchange of Securities Dealing and Automated Quotation. However, although apparently simple in its presentation, section 67A contains a number of unresolved enigmas. This article examines the regulatory framework with respect to share repurchases by listed companies in Malaysia. It commences with an overview of the legal and economic rationale for share buy-backs before proceeding to discuss the pertinent features of the current framework and drawing comparisons with other jurisdictions. The article thereafter elaborates upon specific proposals that are necessary to address the shortcomings that are identified. It concludes with a summary of the principal recommendations which will simultaneously simplify the existing framework as well as enhance the protection of shareholders and creditors of the company.

The article is concerned with the application of trusts law in disputes between home-sharers who are cohabitants in England and Wales. It considers the criticisms made of trusts law in dealing with such disputes, and the proposals of the Law Commission for England and Wales in its 2007 Cohabitation Report. However, as plans to introduce any new legislation have been shelved by the British government, cohabitants must continue to rely on trusts law. In the light of these developments, the aim of the article is to critique Equity's response in disputes over the shared home and, more particularly, whether the remedial approach evinced in recent cases will enable trusts law to respond in a fairer manner in these disputes. The article will, however, argue that trusts law remains gender_x000D_ biased because of its continued emphasis on financial contributions, and will thus discriminate disproportionately against female cohabitants.

This report gives an outline of the more important recent developments in Indonesia, covering primarily the period from August 1991 to December 1991. The topics covered are bilateral agreements and international conventions, regulations issued by the Indonesian Government, special regulations on offshore commercial loans, energy conservation, trade matters, capital market taxation, case law, seminars and workshops and publications.