Fundamentals of Criminal Law (“Fundamentals”) was completed in Singapore during lockdown in 2020. But it will never really be finished. The project that it undertakes is sufficiently wide-ranging that there will always be opportunities for disagreement and refinement. Even if one accepts its core informing principles, eg that D should not be convicted of a criminal wrong unless D is culpable for that wrong, one might well harbour doubts about how those principles apply in the context of particular doctrines. Can inadvertent negligence be culpable, for instance, in the way that many legal systems assume it is? In his essay for this symposium, James Manwaring does not deny that it can: “Sometimes inattention and forgetfulness evidence insufficient care for others.” But he denies that the evidential link is a robust one. Drawing on recent studies in the psychological literature, he concludes that such failings of attention or memory, relative to an average person, do not supply robust evidence of a moral failing on D’s part. More specifically, they do not offer sufficiently reliable evidence of D’s culpability to warrant the kind of condemnatory and punitive response that is inflicted by criminal law. “From the fact that the defendant failed to do what the reasonable person would do, it requires a fragile inference to reach the conclusion that they evinced insufficient care [for the interests of those they harmed].” Yet Manwaring accepts that the inference may be strengthened by relativising the so-called “reasonable person” to more of the defendant’s own attributes. He does not offer an account of how that might be done; such an account would be well beyond the scope of a single essay. What he does show, however, is that the existing literature is incomplete. There is more work to be done.

The following is an edited transcript of a filmed interview I did with Professor Lee Sheridan on 29 December 2014 at his home in Cardiff, Wales. I first met Sheridan back in 1985 when I was a law student at the Faculty of Law, National University Singapore. At the time, I worked through the Law Club to launch a series of lunch-time lectures and talks and through the good offices of Professor Tommy Koh, was able to invite Sheridan to deliver one of these talks. Over the years, I have had many correspondences and interviews with Sheridan. As a result, parts of this particular interview sound like half-finished conversations from an earlier time. I decided to leave them be, rather than edit them out as it gives the reader a better 'feel' of the Sheridan charm and mystique. I do not cover the entirety of Sheridan's academic life or work as that has already been comprehensively documented in Andrew Phang, “Founding Father and Legal Scholar: The Life and Work of Professor LA Sheridan" [1999] Sing JLS 335. What follows is a recollection of the early days of Sheridan's life and of his journey to Singapore to establish its first law school.

Since the crypto winter began in early 2022, several market crashes and institutional collapses have ravaged the innovative financial ecosystem. Among global regulators, the major discourse is no longer the full prohibition of crypto-related activities but the protection of traditional financial systems from a “great” crypto crisis capable of disrupting financial stability. However, existing regulatory frameworks lack clarity on major aspects of the crypto ecosystem, especially relating to new associational risks and its potential to drive systemic risks among crypto conglomerates. This article examines the anatomy of recent crypto crashes and highlights the limitations of existing global regulatory developments toward preventing these threats from potentially spreading to traditional financial systems. To these emerging concerns, the article argues for the adoption of an entity-based approach to crypto regulations. Specifically, it proposes the application of adjusted prudential regulations to a new category of systemically important crypto intermediaries (SICIs) like traditional systemic institutions.

In recent years, there has been a proliferation of international consumer, employment and ‘gig’ economy contracts, many of which come with arbitration agreements. Although arbitration agree- ments are generally given legal effect, courts often refuse to enforce them on the basis of unconscio- nability if they are particularly disadvantageous to the consumer or worker. After surveying the state of the law of unconscionability in the United Kingdom (under English law), Singapore, Canada, Australia and the United States, we identify problems with the doctrine in the context of arbitration agreements, namely that its vague and confusing nature has the potential to undermine the doctrine of competence-competence, the predictability of arbitration agreements and ultimately the parties’ freedom of contract. As we suggest, these problems could, without legislative intervention, mark the end of arbitration in the context of consumer, employment and ‘gig’ economy contracts. We propose two ways in which courts could make the doctrine of unconscionability more manageable and less problematic: by requiring that the victim have an identifiable frailty and by clarifying that independent advice for the victim usually assuages inequalities. We conclude by arguing that each of these reforms is consistent with the five most prominent theoretical justifications that have been offered for the doctrine of unconscionability.

Inherent in any public housing system which seeks to provide subsidised housing for sale is the need to impose restrictions on ownership and alienation in order to prevent abuse by those who would seek to exploit those subsidies for profit. In Singapore, section 51(10) of the Housing and Development Act restricts the operation of resulting and constructive trusts over property sold by the Housing and Development Board ("HDB"). It has been accepted since the 2009 decision of Tan Chui Lian v Neo Liew Eng that under this provision, a person "ineligible" to acquire an interest in a HDB flat may not become entitled to a flat under a resulting or constructive trust. However, recent cases have questioned the focus on eligibility and cast doubt on the effect of section 51(10) on the underlying trust. This article examines these developments and proposes a framework for the reconciliation of common law equitable doctrines with the provisions of the Housing and Development Act.