In both the UK and Singapore, the legislation governing contributory negligence provides that in cases where the claimant has been contributorily negligent his damages should be reduced to such extent as the court considers just and equitable given his share in the responsibility for the damage he has sustained. As this is a rather general exhortation, it offers limited practical guidance. More specific assistance is to be found in a number of authorities, the most notable of which is probably Stapley v Gypsum Mines Ltd, where Lord Reid famously observed that as well as looking at the blameworthiness of both defendant and claimant, it is also necessary, when apportioning responsibility, to consider the relative importance of the claimant's actions. One of the most common situations in which contributory negligence is pleaded successfully is in relation to claims arising from road accidents, and in particular accidents involving pedestrians who are knocked down by drivers. In this context, more specific guidance on apportionment is to be found in decisions such as those of the House of Lords in Baker vWillough by and the English Court of Appeal_x000D_ in Eagle v Chambers, which suggest that, due to the dangers inherent in driving and the disparity in the potential for causing harm between a driver and a pedestrian, a higher burden is likely to be placed on the driver.

Under s 359(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code 2010, the court can order an offender to compensate the victim with a sum which the victim would have been able to recover in a civil claim in tort against the offender. The courts have used this useful power extensively, though problems remain. One such problem is seen in Ong Eng Siew, where the court declined to make a compensation order. Given the purpose of the compensation system, the court was not correct to hold – in effect – that the purpose of s 359(1) is to benefit only impecunious victims, and that the Prosecution bears the burden of proving that the victim is impecunious. Further, the compensation order should have covered not only medical expenses paid by the victim in cash, but also those paid using Central Provident Fund savings and MediShield Life insurance payouts. This comment also calls for further study of the compensation regime in practice and possible procedural reforms to make it easier for victims to have prosecutors present evidence relevant to the issue of compensation.