Vicarious liability claims have often stirred controversy, as liability is being imposed on a party_x000D_ which is not responsible for the tortious conduct. This is especially so, as the law on vicarious_x000D_ liability has been expanding over the past few years to include an increasing scope of relationships and circumstances. This case comment looks at two decisions of the United Kingdom Supreme Court in 2020 which took a step back from this expansionary approach and introduces new constraints. In examining the desirability of these changes and comparing them with the position in Singapore, it is hoped that new perspectives will be gained to clarify this unsettled area of the law.

Due to her colonial history, Singapore has inherited the English common law prohibition_x000D_ against maintenance and champerty. Maintenance refers to the officious intermeddling in litigation. Champerty is a particular form of maintenance where one party agrees to assist another to bring a claim such that the former shall receive a share of what may be recovered in the litigation. Criminal and civil liability for champerty was, however, abolished in England by virtue of the United Kingdom's ("U.K") Criminal Law Act 1967, subject that "any rule of that law as to the cases in which a contract is to be treated as contrary to public policy or otherwise illegal" would not be affected. Subsequently, the U.K. permitted a litigant to employ "a person providing advocacy or litigation services" under a conditional fee agreement,and has, in recent legislative amendments, even allowed damage-based agreements akin to the United States-style contingency fees. These U.K. statutory developments are, however, not applicable to Singapore. Thus, the prohibition against champerty and conditional fees remains firmly part of the Singapore legal landscape, albeit with an important judicial exception to such a prohibition, as the case below demonstrates.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the legality of a prenuptial agreement on division of matrimonial assets and held that it is always subject to scrutiny under section 112 of the Women's Charter. This note deals only with these principles.

In divorce proceedings, a party to a marriage may seek to satisfy the court that the marriage has irretrievably broken down by proving, inter alia, that the other party has committed adultery. But what is the standard of proof for adultery? In WQX v WQW, the General Division of the High Court (Family Division) found that the wife had proved beyond reasonable doubt that the husband had committed adultery, but it queried whether the criminal standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt for adultery, which applied in the past, is still warranted today. It is submitted that there are indeed strong arguments in favour of lowering the standard of proof for adultery from the criminal standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt to the civil standard of proof on a balance of probabilities.

It has been the position for quite some time in English jurisprudence that an agreement_x000D_ to agree and an agreement to negotiate are invalid and unenforceable. This was the_x000D_ position established in Walford v. Miles2 and Courtney & Fairbairn Ltd. V. Tolaini Brothers (Hotels) Ltd.3 The rationale for this was that such agreements were too uncertain to be enforceable. This is certainly true for an agreement to agree; one could not accurately predict whether an agreement is possible in every case especially when there may be structural constraints to the factual matrix that make an agreement impossible.