Religion is almost universally guaranteed as a fundamental liberty and human right, although the scope of religious freedom and understandings of religious identity within secular democracies are informed by the specific model of constitutional secularism practiced. States often evidence an ambivalent attitude towards religion, treating it as Law's Other, that is, a competing normative system which has regulative force on social behaviour and influences conceptions of citizenship and affective loyalties. This article examines the interpretive method of two secular Asian courts, which are meant to be bastions of impartiality, in negotiating questions of religious identity and religious freedom. It analyses the judicial weighting and balancing of relevant competing factors and considers the varied understanding of what secularity requires and whether the concerns of religious minorities_x000D_ are adequately safeguarded within secular polities where religion remains an important social force.

"In the light of growing awareness of the damaging effects of oil pollution on a national as well as a global scale, and in order to combat this, it is imperative that the courts regard offences of pollution with utmost gravity." per Yong Pung How CJ in Jupiter Shipping v PP.

In recent years the term “relational” to describe a class of contract has gained currency in English Courts. Whereas contract class is usually identifiable by type such as landlord and tenant or employment, “relational” contracts are variable agminates of indeterminate incidents, employing confusing, and inappropriate, epi-fiduciary language. I explore the incidents in an unsuccessful effort to find machinery which predicts whether a contract is relational. I review cases to determine how existing Contract law deals with each incident. I review the theoretical literature, seeking alignment between theory-based norms and case-embedded incidents. I question why Judges have not made the connection between incidents and norms. I propose an operable definition of relational contract, proposing four “incidents” using a domestic, new kitchen, contract as a thread. Central to my definition is a claim that implicit or express in such contracts is an obligation to maintain, develop or build a relationship.

In 2019, Professor Ginsburg delivered the Distinguished Visitor in Intellectual Property Lecture at the Faculty of Law, National University of Singapore. Titled “Fair Use in the US: Transformed, Reformed, Deformed?”, the lecture explored US caselaw applying the statutory fair use exception, highlighting its excesses and apparent rebalancing. Four and half years (and a pandemic) later, the Supreme Court has rendered decisions in two fair use cases (Google v Oracle; Andy Warhol Foundation v Goldsmith). Together, these controversies prompt inquiry whether the Supreme Court has redrawn the landscape of US fair use and copyright law, expanding fair use for commercial use of functional computer code, but narrowing it for at least some exploitations of “appropriation art.” That inquiry extends to the fair use doctrine’s potential to accommodate massive inputs of copyrighted works into databases to enable “machine learning” by artificial intelligence systems.

The rules on standing in Singapore have traditionally restricted the commencement of judicial review proceedings by anyone other than applicants directly and individually affected by either a legislative provision or executive action: there has been little scope for what is known as 'public interest litigation' (in all its various forms). This had been the landscape of public law adjudication in Singapore until recently. However, in the past five years, the courts have had to consider challenges by applicants in the absence of such a direct interest. Thus far, the discussion on these cases has focused on broader issues of constitutional interpretation and what the cases indicate about constitutionalism in Singapore. There has been little discussion on issues of standing and what this implies about the role of public law adjudication in Singapore. This article will show how, while explicitly rejecting the_x000D_ possibility of public interest litigation, the courts have provided some scope for developing a more circumscribed form of 'representative' standing in serious cases of illegality or unconstitutionality with built-in control features to prevent actions by 'busybodies' and ensure that the court does not become involved in free-standing political debate. It will propose how these developments may evolve over time, particularly, in a way that maintains the controls the courts have introduced thus far.

This article focuses on the lack of symbiosis between provisions within the Criminal Procedure Code and between that statute and the Evidence Act concerning the admissibility at trial of statements of witnesses to the police. The subject is of immense importance because the determination of guilt and innocence can often turn on the admissibility of a witness's previous statement. The article will examine the difficulties which arise from the legislation and consider the appropriateness of reform.