The proliferation of data-driven markets continues to raise questions about their implications for_x000D_ the right to data protection. A recent suggestion is that EU competition law can and should be used to address data protection concerns in the age of big data. However, the European Commission is reluctant to consider data protection issues in EU competition law, maintaining instead that competition law is not the right tool to promote the right to data protection. Yet, following the Treaty of Lisbon, data protection is a fundamental right under Article 16 of the TFEU as well as Article 8 of the Charter. Therefore, considering that the EU is under a duty to promote fundamental rights by virtue of Article 51 of the Charter, this paper argues that data protection should be among the objectives of EU competition law.

The requirement that claims in negligence for psychiatric injury must stem from shock-induced damage is both artificial and arbitrary. For this reason, the "shock" requirement has been rejected by the High Court of Australia. However, shock-induced injury continues to be a key criterion in both the U.K. and Singapore, at least in cases not involving medical negligence. This article examines the history of the shock requirement and its application in all three jurisdictions. It concludes that, while the Australian position is to be preferred, there is no immediate indication that the law in either the U.K. or Singapore is likely to be modified to remove the requirement.