Simester has defended the following conclusions: (1) an omission to ϕ can cause outcome x; but (2) an omission to θ (where θ-ing would have prevented x) cannot relieve another agent of causal responsibility for x. In relation to (1), I contend that a fuller explanation of why the law should recognise omissions as causes, rather than as an independent head of responsibility-attribution for results, is required, and that any such explanation will raise questions regarding Simester’s distinctions between causal elements. Conclusion (2) follows from Simester’s view that “direct” causation is sufficient for causation of x. It will be argued that Simester has not yet made the case for preferring this model over a more familiar one, whereby an initial finding of “factual” causation is always open to being defeated by doctrines of intervening causation to ensure that responsibility for outcomes is doled out appropriately by the criminal law.

The High Court almost always sits in its judicial capacity with a single Judge. The exceptions are limited. This article is concerned with the expanded constitution of the High Court in the exercise of its criminal and family court jurisdictions, and with the opinion expressed in some recent cases that the enlarged three-judge panel of the High Court might in these contexts be viewed as a de facto Court of Appeal. Upon a contemplation of the consequences said to result from such occasional expansions of the court, it is suggested in this article that the practice, while defensibly founded on practical necessity, should also lead to consideration of another method that could achieve the same_x000D_ outcome.

This article critically analyses the decision of the Indian Supreme Court in Yashpal and another v. State of Chhattisgarh and others holding the establishment of private universities as unconstitutional. Swayed by the overwhelmingly irresponsible character of the respondent universities, the Supreme Court innovated constitutional arguments to uphold the claims of the petitioners. While intuitively correct in the context of the immediate facts, the judgment, when analysed in the abstract, reveals the self-inflicted harm it has the potential to cause. The judgment is technologically regressive: it fails to account for the emerging trends in education, especially those related to the use of technology and in particular about the emergence of e-education. It is also unconstitutional: it purports to add grounds for judicial review of primary legislation that agreeably is a constituent rather than an adjudicative act. Finally, it is backward looking: it proposes to reintroduce a moralizing rhetoric in the conduct of education, thereby, paving way for poorer educational standards in India. Underlying these distinct inadequacies is a common inability of the Supreme Court to de-link the university as a "project of modernity" from its status as "the ideological apparatus of the nation-state." Universities, for the Indian Supreme Court, are still an embodiment of the "popular will" and, therefore, incapable of being appropriated.

Despite a steady trickle of enforcement actions taken against market misconduct by the Singapore regulators, no securities class actions have arisen out of these enforcement actions, which have ranged from misleading statements and market manipulation to the failure to comply with on-going disclosure obligations. This article examines whether the paucity of securities class actions might be attributable to the nature of the rights that securities investors possess. In doing so, the analysis reveals answers to an important theoretical question - the extent to which current rights protect the securitiesinvestor's interest in the fair and accurate pricing of securities.

The housing policies of the Housing Development Board (HDB) apply to more than 80% of Singapore's population who live in HDB flats. This article discusses selected aspects of family law practice which have been affected by some of these policies. It raises concerns involving the way the practice of family law has been shaped mainly by the eligibility conditions imposed for HDB flat dwellers

Five landmark cases, one from each decade between 1960 to 2010, are chosen to discuss the developments in the law on matrimonial property and the proper weight that should be given to contributions of the homemaker spouse. The journey towards giving homemakers, who are predominatelywomen, their proper share has not been an easy one and, as these cases show, has not ended yet. It remains to be seen how well the law is able to respond to the needs and aspirations of modern women who fulfil this role in Singapore.

Winding up proceedings have the potential to expose the company to ultimate dissolution. Thus, the issue of locus standi to petition the court for a winding up order assumes some importance. Under section 217()(a) of the Malaysian Companies Act 1965, the 'company' has standing to petition the court. However, under article 73 of Table A of the Act, the directors are delegated the management power. The question then arises as to whether the management power encompasses the power to petition the court for a winding up without a resolution of the members in general meeting. There appears to be a serious conflict of judicial opinion on the issue. This article traces the case law on the subject, focusing on the recent Malaysian case of Miharja Development Sdn Bhd & Ors v Tan Sri Datuk Loy Hean Heong & Ors and Another Application (1995) 4 MSCLC 91,285.